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1 INTRODUCTION  
”[Staten må ha full rett til å] gribe ordnende og kontrollerende ind..[]..Det ligger nemlig I selve 
Forsikringsbedriften hazardiøse Karakter og I dens over de forskjellige Samfundslag mere og mere 
udbredte Publikum, at dette Publikum vanskelig fuldt ud vil kunne overskue Sekskabernes Soliditet, 
sunde Forretningsførelse og deraf følgene Evne til at oppfylde de paadragne Forpligtelser…”(Norwegian 
government, January 1881, cited in Knutsen and Ecklund (2000: 28-29). 
 “Do what you will, the capital is at hazard….All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he 
shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, 
discretion and intelligence, manage their own funds, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the 
permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the 
capital to be invested” (US court decision from 1830, cited in Bernstein 1996: 248). 1 
1.1 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
As welfare states, advanced capitalist democracies today experience the challenges of a 
twin pressure. On the one hand, processes of economic globalisation imply that national 
borders dissolve and break down. Arguably, no sector is more global in its orientation and 
operations than finance. These developments, it is claimed, have induced a de-regulatory 
race to the bottom, which eventually would lead to the retreat or the end of the nation 
(welfare) state (e.g. Strange 1996; Ohmae 1995). On the other hand, welfare states face 
pressures from within. Due to the ongoing demographic shift, rising pension expenditure 
have put constraining effects on public budgets and challenges the traditional methods of 
financing pensions. The key challenge is how to make pensions sustainable.  
 
Accordingly, since the mid-1980s three empirical trends have been evident. Firstly, the 
growth in cross-border capital movement and financial assets has been substantial. 
Secondly, plans, drafts and implementation of national pension reforms represent a 
common trend away from a tax-financed pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system to increased 
reliance on funded plans. Hence, future pension systems would rather depend on returns 
on investments than a democratically agreed on redistribution of national income. 
Thirdly, at both the European and the national level public authorities advocate strategies 
that entail financial liberalisation and national pension reforms as an opportunity for 
                                              
1 The first quote stem form the debate prior to adoption of a comprehensive regulatory framework for life insurance in Norway, more than 100 
years ago. The second quote is a US Court decision from 1830, and reckoned to indicate the birth of the prudent-man principle. These contrasting 
regulatory philosophies and assign different importance to the role of state involvement in the economy. 
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making pension systems sustainable. The twin pressure appears then not only as a 
challenge, but also as a key solution to the problems caused by ageing populations. 
 
These empirical trends give however rise to some imperative implications. One is the 
changing character of pension policies and politics. What previously was considered as 
democracy’s administration of taxes and social rights (i.e. transfer systems within national 
jurisdiction) now increasingly appears as regulatory policy regimes for capital 
accumulation and safe asset management. This has encouraged the development of so-
called pension fund capitalism, where the regime of capital accumulation more or less 
equals the regime of retirement income provision (Clark 2000). As a result, financial 
institutions have experienced a substantial growth lately. According to OECD (2005), life 
insurance companies and pension funds held about USD 16 000 billion in custody in the 
OECD area, or roughly 90 percent of total GDP in that area. Since the 1990s these 
financial institutions have accounted for a majority of investments in the OECD area 
(OECD 2000). When examining globalisation of finance, the emerging pension fund 
capitalism should therefore not be neglected.  
 
Another implication is the fusion of supranational and national regulatory competencies. 
This has proceeded the furthest in Europe, where a Single European Market (SEM) sets 
up a regulatory framework, which is responsible for about 80 percent of all market 
regulations in that area (Goetz and Hix 2001: 4). The EU has lately also put more 
emphasis on reforming national pension policies and pension systems in order to achieve 
a fully integrated SEM and to cope with the adversities of globalisation and ageing 
populations. A pension fund directive has for instance been adopted and is due for 
member state implementation. The impact of Europeanisation on key domestic structures 
of governance such as pension systems and capital markets organisation could therefore 
be expected. 
 
Concerns on how to maintain safe and sustainable pensions have also been evident in 
Norway. During the last two decades substantial reforms have been implemented, several 
expert committees set down, reports and drafts have been submitted and frequent 
changes adopted. This has not only concerned the National Insurance Scheme, but also 
 2
Norwegian pensions and European markets 
the regulatory framework for occupational pensions and pension fund managers. Most 
national pension systems are categorised into three pillars; a public social security, 
occupational pension schemes, and individual savings (World Bank 1994). In Norway 
most occupational pensions are organised on a funded basis in contrast to public social 
security that is tax-financed. A regulatory framework for fund management of 
occupational pensions was established in the early 20th century, about 50 years prior to the 
establishment of the National Insurance Scheme. The framework for 2nd pillar pension 
provision has proved to be remarkable stable until the late 20th century. Lately, however, 
regulatory changes have occurred concerning e.g. how these assets are invested, by whom 
they are managed, and in which regulatory framework benefits are embedded.  
 
A growing pension market has become more visible as a sector due to the twin pressure. 
This has arguably enabled the financial sector to call into attention how fund management 
are regulated and practiced. Hence, pension policies have become industrial policies as 
pensions now are considered a key factor of future growth for financial industry. At the 
same time, Norway’s relations with the EU has been substantially extended and grown 
deeper. This has entailed considerable policy-delegation to European institutions of 
governance, formalised by the 1994 EEA Agreement. Hence, Norwegian financial 
institutions and capital markets have the last decade been subject to a multi-levelled 
regulatory framework characterised by both European and Norwegian rules and 
regulations.  
 
On this background, this thesis examines the role of European market integration on the 
Norwegian framework for occupational pensions, the so-called second pillar of the 
Norwegian pension system. Moreover, if pensions increasingly are becoming key 
elements of global capital markets, how has this influenced the welfare state’s ability to 
deal with the risks of the twin pressure? More precisely, the key research question is: 
to what extent have changes in the Norwegian risk management regime for occupational 
pensions implied a regime shift, and to what extent are these changes (if any) explained 
by constraints and incitements produced by European market integration?  
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The scope of this thesis is to detect European impact on a national policy area, which 
once was a key element in the establishment of the Norwegian welfare state (pensions). 
Moreover, the ambition is to provide new knowledge about the relation between 
Norwegian pensions and European capital markets, and to illuminate key questions 
related to the extent of regulatory capacity that remains on the financial area and which 
regulatory level that possesses these competencies. In doing so, primary focus is given to 
the nation state’s scope and role to ensure safe fund management and to deal with 
markets risks for occupational pensions. As the quotes in the introduction illustrates, two 
opposing risk management regimes can be indicated on these matters; one liberal regime 
based on prudence, another based on more paternalistic considerations, cf. chapter 2. 
1.2 THE CONTEXT 
The theme of this thesis is consequently positioned between social welfare policies 
(pensions) and Europeanisation of the nation state, but where emphasis is put on 
financial markets and how to regulate these. My research problem is embedded in the 
context of five discourses. Firstly, this thesis is positioned in the debate about state and 
markets and how services in this public-private mix are organised. States and markets are 
often characterised as conflicting institutions in the meaning that freer markets imply less 
governmental control and deregulation, and vice versa. On the other hand, states and 
markets could also be regarded as complementarities since markets are founded and 
institutionalised by public regulations. This concerns in particular fund-based 
occupational pensions, which in contrast to tax-financed public pensions, rest on 
regulatory policy regimes for capital accumulation and safe asset management. 
 
Secondly, the thesis concerns the relationship between European and national policy-making. 
Institution-building at the supranational level usually entail some form of delegation of 
policy competencies from the national level. The four freedoms imposed by the SEM 
might then very well induce four restrictions on the nation states’ capacity to implement 
domestic policy objectives. The principle of subsidiarity stresses however that the 
authority of social policies rests within the national domain, while market-making rests 
within the domain of the EU. The regulatory authority of occupational pensions is 
however a contested issue between these levels. For welfare states, market-based 
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occupational pensions are often regarded as complements to the modernisation of the 
National insurance scheme in order to make pension systems sustainable. 
 
Thirdly, this thesis calls into attention the complexity and difficulties with public regulation of 
financial markets. Processes of financial globalisation have according to some scholars 
produced a deterritorialisation of national economies. Financial markets are consequently 
no longer characterised as national but global. When pensions rests on the returns of the 
markets a key question is how to deal with market risks. Welfare states’ capacity of acting 
as “risk managers” rests on boundary control. Globalisation can then increase risk and 
uncertainty for sustaining national regulations. If this is correct, deregulation could on the 
one hand imply increased reliance on a corporative-based regulatory regime, where 
market regulations are decided by business actors alone. A pan-European regulatory 
framework on the financial area would on the other hand address this uncertainty by 
reducing it. European boundary control could then act as shield against the challenges of 
globalisation.  
 
Fourthly, this thesis concerns the “rules of the game” that are established to define the 
conditions under which the transactions occur. For some, the risk management principles 
embedded in a prudent-man approach are regarded as scientific methods to deal with 
uncertainty and to reduce market risks. For others, these regulatory techniques are related 
with gambling and form the basis of market failure. Divergent regulatory philosophies are 
related to the extent of a fundamental ideological confidence in the markets. However, 
markets are also constituted by public regulations, cf. above. The question is then how 
many and what kind of market norms that are institutionalised into rules and regulations.  
 
Finally, this thesis calls into attention key aspects of pension reforms and how welfare states 
deal with the challenges (and risks) related to the ongoing demographic shift. Growing 
public expenditure due to demographic developments has put the question of how to 
make pensions sustainable on the top of the political agenda, including how to make the 
regime for market-based occupational pensions complementary with the modernisation 
of first pillar public pensions. 
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There is a general mismatch between the large amount of statements that is put forward 
on the state-market issues and the actual political science studies that address these 
questions empirically. A general claim is that more markets imply less politics. With a few 
exceptions (e.g. Tranøy 2000, Helleiner 1994, Vogel 1996), there has however been a lack 
of studies that focus on regimes for markets and finance and how states and markets 
interacts in periods of regulatory reform. Such studies should be of growing importance 
when welfare states increasingly rely on the markets for future welfare provision. Some of 
this mismatch could perhaps be related to the intricacies and complexity of these policy 
issues, which involve substantial judicial and economic terms and concepts. The studies 
of pensions have until now primarily been cut down to the study of public pensions.  
 
My study is an empirical contribution to the discourses in this context and combines 
financial markets and welfare (pension) reforms with European integration. I 
consequently take a broadly defined approach in order to shed light over policy processes 
which should induce more future research on these themes among scholars of political 
science, cf. ch. 6. 
1.3 THE RESEARCH STRATEGY 
The theme of this thesis comes under topics about Europeanisation of the nation state. 
Within this tradition several studies have been submitted, of which many conclude that 
“domestic adaptation with national colours” is a most likely policy outcome (Cowles et al 2001). 
A general starting point of mapping adaptational pressures is to identify the “goodness of fit” 
between the European and the national level.2 If misfit is substantial, European 
institutions would seriously challenge the identity, constitutive principles, core structures 
and practices of Norwegian institutions. However, national institutions may also often 
appear robust, and their interactions with European integrative pressures have 
consequently produced traits of path dependence in policy output.  
 
One primary task of this thesis is to assess regime change. According to Esping-Andersen 
(1990: 2) speaking about regimes, is to “denote the fact that in the relation between state and 
                                              
2 A basic hypothesis is; the larger misfit (lower compatibility) between European integration and national political settings, rules 
and practices, the larger adaptational pressures. 
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economy, a complex of legal and organisational features are systematically interwoven”. Pensions are 
understood as insurance for those outliving their value as labour. Closely related to 
pensions is the notion of risk. When pensions are funded and rest on the returns of 
investments, they also become inherent to the risks of capital markets. Hence, regime 
changes are in this thesis linked to changes in how risk management is regulated and 
performed (see ch. 2). Regime change must accordingly be understood as somewhat more 
than changes in the mode of regulation (policy output). I therefore also take into account 
if changes in Norwegian fund management of occupational pensions have implied shifts 
in market behaviour and orientation (policy outcome) on specific areas.  
 
As I consider the public-private mix on a broad policy area, where change are bound to 
have implications for many societal concerns and actors, an International Political 
Economy (IPE) approach is applied. This subfield of political science and international 
relation is an eclectic approach that focuses on the connections and interactions between 
politics and economics. An IPE approach entails three fundamental premises:  
“i) that the political and economic domains cannot be separated in any real sense, and even doing so for analytical 
purposes has its perils;  
ii) political interaction is one of the principal means through which the economic structures of the markets are 
established and in turn transformed; and  
iii) that there is an intimate connection between the domestic and international levels of analysis, and that the two 
cannot meaningfully be separated form one another” (Underhill 2000: 806).  
Hence, I will examine European impact on national policies, regulations and practices, 
more broadly than any legal impact on national jurisdiction.  
 
Processes of Europeanisation are complex and multi-faceted. One way of making these 
more clear-cut is to distinguish between institutions, interests and ideas as driving forces 
of change (Hall 1997). Even though these casual variables to some extent are mutually 
inter-related I make a distinction between them and treat them as three separate variables 
for analytical purposes. Each has its own distinctive dynamics and its impact corresponds 
and rests on the rule-based, interest-based and ideational adaptations at the domestic level 
(Claes and Tranøy 1999).  
• Rule-based: Direct pressures on domestic politics stemming from the legalisation of 
international politics, represented by the Single European Market (SEM) regulations, 
which increasingly bind Norwegian authorities to a certain policy output.  
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• Interest-based: Indirect pressures due to strengthened competitive dynamics caused 
by shifts in the relative power of domestic market actors and sectoral demands; in this 
case the financial (pension) industry.  
• Idea-based: Increased opportunities for policy imitations and social learning due to the 
transnational exchange of beliefs and ideas taking place in expert communities at the 
European level. 
Expectations of European impact on my policy field in accordance to these processes are 
more thoroughly elaborated in next chapter.  
 
I apply case study as a research design for further examination. According to Yin (1994: 
13) a case study is an empirical inquiry “that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon are not clearly evident”. Moreover, it often 
has the purpose of being critical towards existing theories and estimations, as well as 
representing a new combination of more or less known conditions that previously have 
not been exposed to thorough examination. This fits well with the research objectives of 
this thesis. Since the late 1980s the national abdication on the financial area has to a large 
extent been taken for granted by many scholars due to processes of globalisation, 
Europeanisation and financial liberalisation. Few scholars have however taken the 
growing pension fund industry into account when making their conclusions. My study 
therefore tests if this general conviction fits on a policy area, which is considered as a 
growing part of global financial markets, but also constitutes the core of nation state 
sovereignty. Furthermore, the paper is not deductive, or generalising, but has an inductive 
and observing character, which aims at synthesising some processes of change.  
 
Nevertheless, in order to test the extent of European impact on the Norwegian regime, 
and to denote any pattern of change, some analytically distinctive categories are set 
forward. These should however not be regarded as mutual exclusive, but rather as ideal 
types, which contribute to clarification of principles and mechanisms in a complex 
research field. Empirically, the reality is generally of a more hybrid character. Moreover, 
the thesis has elements of comparative research design, as a key task is to position the 
Norwegian regime between some ideal types of regulatory styles, and to describe its 
development from time t0 to time t1.  
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Elaborating on the historical dimension of this research project has been both time and 
space consuming for this thesis. Reforms and changes on this policy area often comprise 
many different concerns and have evolved over at time-span of many years. Moreover, I 
have found myself repeatedly challenged by examining a policy field, which at the 
moment is exposed to substantial policy and regulatory activity, both at the European and 
the national level. Due to the complexity and absence of studies that could have acted as 
guiding stars, I have several times found myself challenged in providing a comprehensive 
portrait of this policy area. Business actors also stress this complexity. According to a 
financial industry informant, “there is only a handful that can fully pledge that they obtain a 
comprehensive knowledge of the Norwegian regulatory framework on this issue”.  
1.4 SOURCES AND DATA 
This thesis is based on several sources of sources of evidence. I have mostly relied on 
official documents issued by Norwegian authorities and the European Commission 
(Green papers, White papers, proposals, directives, reports by supervisory agencies etc). 
As Norwegian authorities in most cases assumingly would not find great interest in 
exaggerating the need for adaptation to European integration or make political 
compromises due to interest group pressure and bargains very explicit, the ability “to read 
between the lines” and to make own interpretation has been required. Reports and 
statistics issued by independent research centres and interest organisations, as well as the 
(Internet) publications of Investments and Pensions Europe (IPE) have also been helpful.  
 
Moreover, in spring 2002 I carried out a pension fund inquiry. A standardised post-
enquete (see Appendix 1) was sent to all pension funds that held more than NOK 10 
million in custody, both private and municipal.3 Out of 124 pension funds 58 responded. 
This is a response rate of 47 percent, which I consider fairly satisfactory, especially when 
the respondents accounted for about 60 percent of total assets managed by pension funds 
in 2001. Furthermore, I have carried out interviews with key actors or representatives in 
the Norwegian financial industry and relevant authorities. These interviews had a 
                                              
3 This information was provided by the annual yearbook 2001 for private pension funds (NPF 2001), and by local governments’ 
mutually owned life insurer, KLP, for municipal pension funds. 
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character of an informal conversation, but were helpful in sorting out the big picture of 
my thesis and confirming some of the arguments that I wanted to make.  
 
In dealing with data, ensuring sufficient reliability and validity is important. The method 
of data triangulation is widely employed in case studies and should make any significant 
findings more reliable. Moreover, much of the data stem from public institutions and 
experts, which I find no reason to doubt. Ensuring inter-subjectivity in interviews are 
more difficult, but in my case these ended up to be more of a confirming character on 
findings and trends already expressed in official documents and in my pension fund 
inquiry. The validity of data also rests on the appropriateness of operational content on 
concepts and processes and that this content provides relevant data for my research 
questions. This is discussed more thoroughly in chapter 2. I claim however that validity is 
sufficient to make significant conclusions on my data material. This is underscored by 
employing both quantitative and qualitative forms of evidence.  
1.5 COMPOSITION 
Next chapter presents a theoretical framework for how to understand and analyse 
modern welfare states. The notion of welfare states as broad risk management systems is 
a key topic in this context. An index for analysing regime change is developed. Moreover, 
the three processes of Europeanisation are more thoroughly presented, and some 
hypotheses are developed. Chapter 3 calls into attention the developments at the 
European level concerning relevant initiatives towards a pan-European regime for 
occupational pensions. Hence, it serves as a background chapter when I later account for 
and analyse changes in the Norwegian regime. In chapter 4, continuity and change in the 
Norwegian regime is presented. This is done along the scopes of assets, access and 
authority, which represent important dimensions for assessing regime change. Attention is 
given both to policy output (regulatory changes) and policy outcome (changes in market 
behaviour). Chapter 5 brings the theoretical considerations in chapter 2 and the empirical 
evidence of chapter 4 together and examines the impact of Europeanisation on the 
Norwegian regime. Finally, chapter 6 concludes my findings and provides an answer on 
the main question as set forward in chapter 1. 
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2 WELFARE CAPITALISM AND EUROPEANISATION 
“[One] conception of Europeanization focuses on change in core domestic institutions of governance and 
politics, understood as a consequence of the development of European-level institutions, identities and 
policies. European-level development then is treated as the explanatory factor and changes in the domestic 
systems of governance as the dependent variable” (Olsen 2002: 13). 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
As noted, most nation states today experience a twin pressure on welfare programmes 
and public budgets. This has led to a vast debate on the prospects of future survival of 
the welfare state (as we know it). Those emphasising the impacts of global market 
integration often conclude that welfare retrenchment is a most likely outcome, due to 
eroding regulatory capacity and principles of the welfare state. In Europe nation states 
have collaborated to maintain these competencies by setting up a regulatory regime above 
the nation state. This concerns in particular market issues, where the EU is responsible 
for almost 80 percent of all rules governing Single European Market issues (Goetz and 
Hix 2001: 4). This might itself have substantial constraining effects on nation states 
welfare provision. Hence, the four freedoms imposed by the SEM regime, might very well 
induce four restrictions on nation states’ capacity to implement domestic policy 
objectives.  
 
In this thesis, I approach the topic of Europeanisation by examining the role of the state 
on key asset management issues in the financial sector. This is an issue-area where the 
regulatory capacities of the state for decades have been thought of as ineffective and 
undermined. This is due to financial market integration both on a global and a regional 
level. Unlike many other studies of financial market integration, however, this has 
pensions as the empirical field. Pensions remains at the core of nation state sovereignty, 
as it involves “its competencies to tax its citizens, its obligations to protect them against risks, and 
through democratic decision making, produce the rights and duties which transforms a territorially given set 
of individuals into members of a solidarity community” (Hagen 2003).  
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The objective of this chapter is two-folded. Firstly, to present an approach and 
categorisation for how to understand and analyse welfare states in general, and regime 
change in particular. Secondly, as the thesis asks to what extent changes are explained by 
European market integration, I develop some expectations on how Europeanisation 
might influence Norwegian policy-making and industry behaviour on this policy area.  
2.2 PENSIONS AND STYLES OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 
Pensions are understood as insurance for those outliving their value as labour, and crucial 
for sustaining future level of consumption. Old-age security is then considered as an 
exchange of current production for a claim on future production (Barr 2000). This is 
either done by obtaining a promise (usually from the government) that benefits are 
provided in retirement, or by saving parts of wages for future consumption. In the 
former, pensions are paid by current contributions or taxes on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
basis. In the latter, schemes are funded, meaning that pensions are financed by savings 
and returns on investments of accrued funds. 
 
Old-age security was one of the first considerable tasks, in which welfare states engaged. 
Since that time, the extension of social rights and grants combined with ageing 
populations has made the task to design a framework for safe and sustainable pensions 
increasingly more challenging and urgent. Welfare states and pension policies can 
however not be understood in forms of public retirement services and transfers alone. 
Rather, when examining welfare states, an international political economy (IPE) approach 
that put emphasis on the state-society relationships of welfare state capitalism should be 
applied.4 Several studies have demonstrated that welfare states cluster into broadly 
defined welfare regimes, depending on how this private-public nexus is structured (e.g. 
Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001).  
2.2.1 Welfare regimes and cross-national variance in pension fund dependence 
The organisation of pension systems seems to be particularly important when categorising 
welfare regimes. According to Esping-Andersen (1990) three regimes of welfare 
                                              
4 An IPE approach entails three fundamental premises: “i) that the political and economic domains cannot be separated in any 
real sense, and even doing so for analytical purposes has its perils; ii) political interaction is one of the principal means through 
which the economic structures of the markets are established and in turn transformed; and iii) that there is an intimate connection 
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capitalism is evident, each relying on different private-public arrangements and traditions 
for the construction of retirement provision (see box 2.1). Moving further along this 
argument, Soskice (1997) assigns increased importance to the organisation of markets and 
market-related institutions, e.g. the financial system. This I find interesting and useful for 
my thesis as occupational pensions constitute a key link between financial system, 
industrial system and welfare organisation. Soskice finds that European welfare states also 
experience a divergent pattern in how market-related institutions are structured.5 Due to 
“interlocking complementarities” between the market related institutions he makes a distinction 
between liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs), 
cf. box 2.1. 
 
Box 2.1. Welfare regimes and capitalist models 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes: 
• A liberal welfare state is found in the Anglo-Saxon countries, e.g. the US, the UK, and Ireland (and 
corresponds with the Beveredgian model). This is characterised by means-tested assistance and modest, flat-
rate, universal (public) social security benefits. Its main objective is to prevent poverty, not to ensure social 
redistribution. As all people are more or less preoccupied with securing their own old age, this provides key 
incentives for private responsibility on old-age consumption, and encourages market-based provision of social 
insurance.  
• A conservative or corporatist welfare state (Bismarckian model) is found in large parts of Continental 
Europe, e.g. Germany, France and Italy. In this, social rights are attached to class, occupation or status, and its 
main objective is to conserve a retirement income for those previously employed. Benefits are tied to 
occupational schemes, which usually are indexed to previous income (wage) on a proportionate basis. Social 
redistribution mainly occurs between generations, not within. In this welfare regime, there have traditionally 
been few incentives to private responsibility for retirement income, and social insurance has become 
“decomodified” as a service.  
• A social-democratic welfare state is found in Scandinavia, characterised by a basic equal benefit to all and 
supplementary benefits tied to prior earnings. Hence, elements from both the Beveredgian and Bismarckian 
model have been incorporated. Its main objective is to promote equality and social redistribution (by taxation) 
both within and between generations. Substantial public involvement in the economy has crowded out large-
scale market-based social insurance, but not discarded the incentives for additional old-age security. 
Soskice’s capitalist models: 
• In LMEs, which corresponds with the Anglo-Saxon countries, the financial system is characterised by a 
                                                                                                                                             
between the domestic and international levels of analysis, and that the two cannot meaningfully be separated form one another” 
(Underhill 2000: 806).  
5 Soskice’s four institutional dimensions are the financial system, the industrial relations system, the education and training system 
and the inter-company system..  
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market-based style of financing, where large and liquid equities markets play a predominant role in supplying 
industry with risk capital. This is due to incentives for market based provision of social insurance and the rather 
uncoordinated form for corporate governance, which favours short-term horizons and competitive relations. 
This short-termism allow for a high-risk taking in capital markets where investors are competing for the highest 
returns on their investments.  
• In CMEs, the financial system is characterised by a credit-based style of financing. Unlike LMEs, corporate 
governance is structured around the long-term cooperative relationships between investors and companies. In 
the provision of long-term risk capital, universal banks have a crucial role and strong influence. This and the 
decommodification of social service have led to rather poorly developed capital markets. CMEs are mostly 
found in Continental Europe. 
The historical legacy of regime institutionalisation on welfare (pension) provision has led 
to substantial cross-national variance in dependence on and importance of market-based 
pensions. Hence, public pension policies have a decisive impact on the development of 
long-term savings, investments and hence the role of financial markets. Arguably, a 
polarisation between “funded” and “unfunded” Europe has been evident (Davis 1995).  
On the one hand, many typical CMEs on the Continent have relied on unfunded 
corporate pension schemes, such as book-reserves and PAYG-plans.6 On the other hand, 
LMEs have relied on financial markets as a financing method for occupational pension 
benefits. 
2.3 DIVERGENT RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
2.3.1 Risk and different risk management regimes 
Closely related to pensions is the notion of risk. When pensions are funded and rest on 
returns of investments, they also become inherent to the risks of the capital markets. Risk 
refers to the probability of a certain outcome that neither was planned nor anticipated.7 
Risk management then is “the ability to define what may happen in the future and to choose among 
alternatives” (Bernstein 1996: 2). While actuarial logics and statistical methods have 
contributed substantially to deal with different risks, neither pension schemes nor 
                                              
6 Germany has long traditions for reliance on book-reserves, where pension liabilities are mirrored and posted in employers’ 
balances. In France funded pension schemes have long been illegal (until 1994) and has rather relied on financing retirement 
provisions through PAYG-methods. Funded pensions in France and Germany mostly stem from individual pension schemes. 
Many CMEs, such as Germany, have recently introduced pension reforms, which makes it more advantageous with funded plans. 
7 The notion of risk is often related to the probability of loss, and consequently thought of negatively. Furthermore, taking 
opportunity of risk is usually associated with gambling. Previously, the rule of thumb and intuition lay the ground for risk 
management as art of crafts. According to Bernstein (1996), however, risk derives from the early Italian risicare, which means to 
dare. From this it follows that “prudence without daring to take the risk does not offer a challenge and leads to mediocrity and complacency; the 
opposite of progress” (European Commission/Pragma Consulting 1999: 25). 
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investments can give certainty, as the future is fundamentally uncertain. A key question is 
then what risks are politically acceptable and how these should be dealt with. 
 
Modern welfare states have taken great interest in how capital markets are regulated, and 
how pension systems are organised, cf. discussion on different welfare regimes above. 
This is related to their preoccupation with controlling the probability of damage, and 
ensuring adequate compensation when loss occurs. Consequently, welfare states should 
be considered as comprehensive risk management systems (Hagen: 2001; Giddens 1999). 
Based on the institutional variance presented above, divergent regulatory philosophies are 
evident in the different regimes. Different styles of capitalism produce differences and 
variations in rules, norms, practices and policies (Esping-Andersen 1990; Soskice 1997). 
The “rules of the game” which is established largely define the conditions under which 
transactions occur and shape the markets. Hence, different national regimes organise its 
risk management systems differently and have different conceptions of risk.8 This is 
reflected in the norms and regulations set up to prevent undesired risk, and to “shape” 
market behaviour and actors´ risk-taking capacity. When it comes to controlling market 
risk, two diverging styles of regulation are identified; one based on the prudent man 
principle, the other more paternalistic (e.g. Davies 2000), see box 2.2 on next page. 
 
Another key feature of funded plans is by whom risk and the potential for loss on accrued 
funds are borne. This depends on the construction of insurance elements in the pension 
scheme and whether these are defined by benefits (DB) or defined by contribution (DC).  
• Defined benefit plans refer to pension schemes whereby members (beneficiaries) are 
entitled to a certain benefit at retirement. Benefits are usually calculated on the basis 
of work participation (duration) and a pre-determined percentage of final salary. 
Moreover, benefits are paid until death occurs, and funds are pooled in insurance 
collectives. As DB plans are insurance-based market risks are borne by fund managers  
 
                                              
8 A regulatory regime is comprised of specific constellations of ideas and institutions. Vogel (1996: 20-22) distinguishes between 
ideas (regime orientation) and institutions (regime organisation), though these are often interrelated. The orientation of a 
regulatory regime constrains policy choices by defining what is acceptable or conceivable. The organisation of a regulatory regime 
constrains choices by structuring the incorporation of interest groups, defining state capabilities, and shaping state and societal 
interests.  
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Box 2.2. Risks and risk management systems 
Pay-as-you-go schemes and political risks: 
• In a system where state financed PAYG schemes are wide-spread, risk is shared between generations, as 
the claims on future rests on an implied (but usually unenforceable) contract between pensioners and 
labour. Reliance on political decisions makes however the system particularly inherent to political risks, 
i.e. risks that claims on retirement income is altered by political action. Political risks are particularly 
evident in cases of substantial changes in the societal structures (e.g. demographic shifts), when 
adjustments in social welfare provision and substantial political manoeuvrability often are required.  
 
Funded plans and market risks: 
• In a system of funded plans each generation must save for own retirement, and any future liabilities are 
to be covered by real or financial assets. As these funds usually are irrevocable, funding is considered as 
a strategy for overcoming pension problems deriving from ageing populations. It is generally expected 
that capital markets in the future will provide higher rates of expected returns compared to PAYG plans 
(Davis 1995). At the same time, increased reliance on funded schemes would set free substantial assets 
for investments, and hence have positive implications for capital markets efficiency and fostering growth 
in the economy.  However, when pensions are established on a funded basis, these are inherent to the 
risks of the capital markets.  
 
Prudent man risk management: 
• A qualitative prudential (homo prudence=zero-risk man) framework rests on public authorities’ 
confidence that fund-managers ensure that minimum requirements are met, and that any imprudent 
performance will trigger intervention from supervisory authorities. This liberal regime, which is usual in 
the LMEs, does however not mean that fund managers have a completely free hand. Tradition and 
history of institutional factors has established market practices and specific security norms with which 
must be acted in accordance, e.g. risk diversification and asset liability management techniques (ALM) 
are appointed great importance. Fund managers are accordingly to take account of the matching of 
assets to liabilities when making their asset allocation, where long-term balance between assets and 
liabilities is maintained by freedom to choose the most proper portfolio with reference to return, risk 
and duration characteristics of liabilities. The main regulatory concern is solvency control, where fund 
managers are required to hold an extra source of capital to help meet future liabilities in cases of 
unexpected events (e.g. market risk).  
 
Paternalistic risk management: 
• A paternalistic and extensive regulatory framework is often employed in CMEs, which is generally 
characterised by more poorly developed capital markets. These economies have often not established the 
same traditions and confidence in fund managers, and a framework is set up to hinder fund managers to 
engage in more risky operations than politically desired. Finance is considered volatile and dangerous, 
and should consequently be constrained and controlled. The regime is biased towards restrictions, 
prohibitions and obligations (e.g. product control, quantitative investment ceilings and more widely 
applied capital adequacy requirements). Moreover, paternalistic regimes are also to a larger extent 
compelled to apply discriminatory measures against foreigners and foreign markets; i.e. imposing 
constraints to invest abroad and incentives to invest in national markets, maintaining national licensing 
procedures, etc.  
and sponsors. In general fund managers are accountable for the insurance element 
that is promised in the insurance contract (some minimum guaranteed returns), while 
sponsors (employers) are accountable for any premiums that ensure that the promises 
to beneficiaries are met. 
• In defined contribution plans only contributions are defined in advance. Benefits 
will then vary, depending on level of contributions made by sponsors (employers) and 
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returns on accumulated funds. Accrued funds are often only paid for a certain period 
in retirement. Risk-sharing features are absent, and risk is fully borne by each 
individual. Hence, a shift towards increased reliance on saving-based DC plans would 
at the same time imply disclaiming any social responsibility for future promises on 
pensions. In many countries pension funds that meet certain requirements can also 
benefit from a special corporate income tax regime. The main reason is to encourage 
their citizens to save for their old age, cf. chapter 3. 
2.4 THREE DIMENSIONS FOR ASSESSING REGIME 
CHANGE (DEPENDENT VARIABLE) 
A variety of meanings and interpretations could easily be ascribed to prudential and 
paternalistic regimes. My approach is however not to assess these interpretations or to 
make reflections on advantages and drawbacks of different regulatory styles. Rather than 
normatively defined, this thesis is to empirically observe changes in the Norwegian regime 
and to assess if these are denoted in any pattern of change.  
 
Below I develop three dimensions, which would help me make this task more easily 
achieved. The dimensions are related to how assets are invested, by whom these are 
managed, and in which framework benefits are embedded. These are chosen with care, as 
they indicate core policy fields of fund management. They should therefore be of 
particular interest for national regulatory competencies both at the national and the 
European level. The dimensions also relate to how different risks are dealt with, as a 
fundamental precondition for welfare states to act as risk managers is boundary control 
(Hagen 2001). Lately, an almost unison conviction has been evident, stating that capital is 
by nature global, that financial institutions increasingly operate on a transnational basis, 
and that nation states experience reduced capacity to enforce social regulations on the 
financial area. Hence, these dimensions allow me to test if Norwegian financial market 
regulation (with pensions as empirical case) has changed in line with general convictions 
about globalisation and regulatory capacity on this area. Hence, I am primarily 
preoccupied with changes, which also are observed as changes in market behaviour and 
fund managers’ orientation.  
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The scope of assets 
Fund managers collect and invest accrued pension savings on a pooled basis. But how 
widely is the scope of investments (assets) defined? Based on the presentation about 
divergent risk regimes above, I expect that portfolio regulation and asset allocation is an 
area where I could find developments that could indicate regime change. Two questions 
are of particular importance when assessing changes in the Norwegian investment regime 
in a paternalistic-prudence continuum.  
• How much are allowed and actually invested in equities? Equities are generally 
regarded as risky assets, where volatility in equity prices is substantial. At the same 
time, they are expected to provide the highest returns in the long run (Davis 1995). 
• How much are allowed and actually invested abroad? According to prudent portfolio 
theory, international diversifications are expected to minimise investments risks (Davis 
1995). On the other hand this element is related to the control aspect of asset 
management and other political objectives of e.g. making pension savings available for 
national capital markets and to finance domestic industry projects and development.  
The scope of access 
Maintaining regulatory and supervisory control over fund managers should be considered 
important as they hold social responsibilities. Fund managers serve a strategic function in 
society, both as an integral part of national pension systems and by having remarkable 
effects on capital markets. The “national ownership” (on paternalistic grounds) is 
arguably reduced in regards to:  
• To what extent are foreign fund managers allowed to provide management services in 
Norwegian pensions markets, and to what extent do they actually do so?  
• How internationally oriented are Norwegian fund managers concerning provision of 
fund management services abroad? 
The scope of authority 
Financial regulation is legitimised in various objectives; economic, political and social 
(Herring and Litan 1996). In order to achieve these objectives, a key question is how 
regulatory authority is designed and exercised. The scope of authority then concerns the 
extent of confidence that is given markets to define the conditions under which the 
transactions occur. High degree of confidence should indicate a freer hand to markets in 
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fund management issues, while low degree of confidence should indicate that extensive 
regulatory policies are set forward to ensure a politically acceptable asset management, i.e.: 
• To what extent has a few market conform regulations become more important than 
providing a regulatory framework that put emphasis on social objectives and fund 
security? 
 
These three dimensions (the scopes of assets, access and authority) are neither exhaustive 
nor fully mutually exclusive for analysing regime change in the financial sector on this 
issue. Nonetheless, I argue that they provide a solid and valid categorisation that might 
illustrate how the Norwegian regime has developed relative to my research focus. In sum, 
a prudent man regime and paternalistic regime would then have following characteristics: 
• A prudent man regime is characterised by liberal portfolio regulations where 
custodians are allowed and actually allocate large parts of its assets into international 
equity markets; liberal licensing regulations and ownership legislation so that national 
borders are transparent for both foreign and domestic fund managers; and where the 
general confidence in markets is high so that custodians are only subject to a few 
market conform regulations.  
• A paternalistic regime is on the other hand characterised by more strict regulations 
on fund managers’ opportunities to invest abroad and in equities; nationally biased 
licensing practices and ownership legislation which makes cross-border activities 
difficult, and a general lack of confidence in markets so that custodians are subject to 
a regulatory framework where the provision of social objectives and extensive 
nationals standards for regulation that put fund security in the driving seat.   
2.5 PROCESSES OF EUROPEANIZATION (INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES) 
The concept of Europeanisation has many meanings (Olsen 2002), and an unequivocal 
definition does not exist. In this context I treat Europeanisation as an explanatory factor 
of change in domestic rules and regulations; in governmental policies and market 
behaviour; and in norms and identities. As noted in chapter 1, processes of 
Europeanisation are complex and multi-faceted. One way of making these processes 
more clear-cut is to distinguish between institutions, interests and ideas as driving forces 
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of change (Hall 1997). Even though these causal variables to some extent are mutually 
inter-related I make a distinction between them and treat them as three separate variables 
for analytical purposes. Its impact corresponds with and rests on rule-based, interest-
based (strategic) and ideational adaptations at the domestic level (Claes and Tranøy 1999). 
These are further elaborated on below. 
2.5.1 Legal-regulatory pressures and rule-based adaptation 
A rule based adaptational approach attempts to detect impacts of formal European 
legislation on domestic policies and practices. The internationalisation of ever-more policy 
areas and the process towards freer markets increasingly imply re-regulation (Majone 
1996; Vogel 1996), and a juridification or legalisation of politics (Goldstein et al 2000).9 
The Single European Market programme aims at setting up a comprehensive regulatory 
market regime above the nation state, where integrative efforts are categorised as negative 
integration or positive integration (Scharpf 1998).  
• Negative integration refers to deregulation and removal of restrictions and barriers at 
the national level. These policies entail market making (marketization) on the 
European level.  
• Positive integration refers to the establishment of an institutional and regulatory 
framework at the supranational level, which may be classified as both market-making 
and market-correcting policies. Regulatory and supervisory institutions are established 
to ensure that rules and regulations are enforced and complied with by member states.  
 
Norway became a participant in the Single European Market (SEM) when implementing 
the EEA Agreement in 1994.10 Due to this agreement, Norway is required to carry out 
the rules and regulations, which at any time prevail in the SEM. Unlike EU member 
states, the Norwegian politicians do not participate in the formal decision-making 
procedures. This is due to Norway´s status as non-EU member state. For Norway’s case 
                                              
9 Legalisation refers to three set of characteristics that institutions may possess: 1) Obligation means that rules and commitments 
increasingly bind states to act on account of attaining some agreed upon objectives. 2) Precision narrows the scope for reasonable 
interpretation and defines the conduct of behaviour. 3) Delegation means that third parties have been granted authority to 
implement, interpret and apply the rules (Abbott et al 2000). All these elements are central in the legal framework of European 
integration.  
10 The EEA-Agreement is a comprehensive free-trade agreement between EU and EFTA states. 
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the regulative flow then proceeds only in a downward direction. European regulatory 
policies mostly come in form of directives. 
 
On the financial area, Norway is committed to comply with EU’s basic principles, 
concerning freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital and services. The 
European regulative approach on financial markets consists of two distinctive methods. 
Firstly, the Commission produces initiatives that aim at developing uniform standards for 
the entire European market. This approach entails harmonisation of existing national 
standards. Secondly, the Commission might establish a set of rules and regulations that 
impose minimum requirements in national legislation. This approach of mutual 
recognition restricts state involvement in the market, but is less formal than 
harmonisation initiatives.  
 
In order to ensure compliance with EU rules and regulations, monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms are set up by the EEA Agreement. The EFTA Surveillance 
Authority (ESA) is the monitoring agency for EFTA countries participating in the EEA. 
Its primary tasks are to ensure that EFTA member states, which have agreed to 
participate in the EEA, implement and enforce relevant regulations, and that its 
corporations do not operate in conflict with the EEA Agreement’s rules and objectives 
(Graver and Sverdrup 2002)11. The EFTA Court of Justice advises and judges on 
conflictual issues.12   
Expectations: 
If European institution building involves a substantial and extensive replacement of 
national rules and regulations by European standards due to direct legal pressures from 
the European level, this would ascribe importance to rule-based adaptational processes. 
On cases were Norwegian authorities have not adapted in an adequate manner I should 
expect substantial involvement from EFTA regulatory institutions. In its most extreme, 
this could arguably cause convergence as a coerced choice of one set of rules and 
                                              
11 There are four basic types of breaches of the EEA Agreement 1) violation of treaty provisions, regulations and decisions, 2) 
non-transposition of directives, 3) incorrect legal implementation of directives, and 4) improper application of directives (ibid). 
12 Its responsibilities are firstly to deal with the infringement actions brought by the ESA. The Court also settles disputes between 
EFTA states concerning the EEA rules and regulations and considers to which extent ESA perform its tasks in a satisfactory 
manner. Finally, it gives advisory opinions in EFTA states on the interpretation of EEA rules. 
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institutions and put severe constraints on the ability to pursue national policy objectives 
(Berger and Dore 1996:3). On this background I address following hypothesis: 
Changes in the Norwegian risk management regime for occupational pensions 
have mainly occurred as a direct result of legal and institutional developments at 
the European level. 
2.5.2 Competitive dynamics and interest-based adaptation 
Traditionally, interest based approaches have been the most influential in the IPE 
discipline. These may be categorised into analyses that focus on producer-group coalitions 
and electoral approaches (Hall 1997). Policy output is usually conceived as a “function of 
political conflict shaped by the preferences of different actors, weighted by their market power and their 
propensity for collective action” (Garrett and Lange 1996: 49). Hence, these approaches call 
into attention how preferences in society are aggregated among individuals and groups, 
and how these aggregated preferences form interests.13 Arguably, “if one understands which 
economic interests that have gained economic strength, one knows which have gained political power and in 
turn how policy is likely to change” (ibid). The growth of fund managers should then make 
approaches of producer group coalitions relevant in order to examine and account for any 
policy change. Moreover, according to Frieden and Rogowski (1996) processes of 
internationalisation affect the opportunities and constraints, hence policy preferences, of 
actors in broadly predictable ways, based on the economic interests of actors. European 
market integration may consequently shift the balance of interests between domestic 
actors, and create new cleavages and coalitions among domestic interest groups. 
 
This thesis will however not examine the sharpening battles between labourers and 
capitalists, but assess if the SEM have produced increased competitive dynamics for the 
financial industry. To what extent are concerns about international competitiveness 
reflected in Norwegian policy making on this area. Competitiveness of Norwegian 
financial industry is arguably related to two primary abilities: 1) to sustain market shares in 
the domestic markets and 2) to compete on the international arena. If a shift in terms of 
trade, the position a sector will take on liberalisation contra protection depends on the 
competitiveness of the sector and the specificity of its assets. Hence, the degree to which 
                                              
13 Interests are understood as “the real, material interests of the principal actors, whether conceived as individuals or groups” (Hall 1997: 176). A 
key pre-condition is that actors are able to carry out rational cost-benefit analyses on own preferences, and act correspondingly. 
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their products are traded or non-traded, their markets domestic or international, and their 
assets specific or mobile would be decisive (Frieden and Rogowski 1996). Owners of 
sector-specific assets will have incentives to lobby for sectoral protection if faced by 
international competition or for liberalisation if faced with export opportunities. 
Therefore, one finds that “in many cases, the very industries that benefited from regulation in the past 
lobby for change because regulation no longer serves their interests” (Vogel 1996: 13).  
 
The aspects of the regulatory regime in which financial institutions carry out their 
activities are also important as variations in asset management prices and performance 
might stem from diverging regulatory practices and regulations imposed.  This would then 
cause cross-national variations in cost-efficiency due to diverging national institutions.14 
Davis (1995) argues that investors under a prudential regulatory regime provide better 
returns at lower costs (and risks) than those under a regime of quantitative regulations. 
This also relates to the type of products that are allowed to distribute, and under which 
circumstances these are offered. Regulation usually affects big business more directly than 
any other kinds of policy. Hence, “if interest groups are ever to dominate an issue, regulatory reform 
should be that issue” (Vogel 1996: 16). 
2.5.2.1 Expectations 
Any persistence of so-called Norwegian special regulations could arguably entail 
comparative disadvantages for Norwegian financial industry vis-à-vis foreign financial 
institutions. I therefore expect increased financial industry lobbyism due to competitive 
dynamics produced by European integration. This could arguably occur along three types 
of lobbyism, which would vary with the extent of industry’s European orientation.15  
• The first and most modest use of the European framework in lobbyism is by voice.  
European integration would then have empowered financial institution with new 
arguments for achieving own policy objectives. Increased capital mobility and 
transnationality would make threats and voice signals more credible and adequate to 
gain influence on national policy makers. The easier it is for custodians to move 
abroad, the greater are the costs of sustaining special regulations for this sector, and 
                                              
14 If state A imposes a set of unilateral regulations on its national firms, firms that are exposed to less or more liberal regulation in 
state B may gain a competitive advantage. 
15 My expectations of financial industry lobbysim largely coincide with Hirchmann’s (1970) framework of exit, voice and loyalty. 
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the stronger are the incentives for governments to pursue policies that meet financial 
industry demands.  
• Another type of lobbyism is financial industry’s application of exit mechanisms. 
Custodians then actually take benefit of the opportunities to escape from national 
regulators. Country-hopping and regime-shopping may then occur, where fund 
managers take advantage of variations in different levels of taxation and diverging 
regulatory styles.  
• The last and most advanced use of the European framework in lobbyism arguably is 
where industry replaces national loyalties with supranational. National authorities may 
sometimes be unwilling to leave regulation to market forces (market regulation), or 
fully converge to any international minimum standards (European regulation).16 As 
the EEA Agreement sets up a multi-levelled framework of governance, Norwegian 
financial industry may find new key allies at the European level in their fight for 
improved terms of trade. 
 
In its most extreme, industry lobbyism would induce and enable a competitive 
deregulatory dynamic to take place, where states move toward the lowest common 
denominator (e.g. Strange 1996). This race to the bottom would in the end induce policy 
convergence as a triumph of market forces (Berger and Dore 1996: 16). Following 
hypothesis is set forward to address these dynamics: 
Changes in the Norwegian risk management regime for occupational pensions 
have mainly occurred as a result of competitive dynamics introduced by the SEM. 
These dynamics have implied a more international oriented Norwegian financial 
industry lobbying for improved terms of trade, for which it has gained substantial 
support due to competition-sensitive Norwegian authorities.  
2.5.3 Technocratic learning and idea-based adaptation  
Ideational approaches have traditionally been employed to explain residual variance. Idea-
oriented approaches are however increasingly employed as independent competing 
variables. Scholars then often emphasise the effects of social learning. Checkel (2001: 53) 
                                              
16 Even though the European regulatory framework appears comprehensive and detailed, a judicial vacuum to some extent exists. 
In this, member states sometimes are left with significant flexibility regarding when and how to implement EU regulations (Selvig 
1999). Domestic institutions, such as socio-economic institutions that organise interests in the private sector and formal public 
institutions, may then step in and act as mediators between changes in the constellation of market driven preferences and other 
public policy objectives (Garrett and Lange 1996). This may in turn freeze the potential impact of economic power that certain 
producer group coalitions experience and lead to a persistence of Norwegian special regulations. 
 24
Norwegian pensions and European markets 
consider this as a process “whereby actors, through interaction with broader institutional contexts 
(norms or discursive structures), acquire new interests and preferences”. This form of ideational 
adaptation may occur due to two main dynamics (Claes and Tranøy 1999): 1) by actively 
employing European policies and arguments as to find solutions on perceived or 
experienced problems and crises at the domestic level (problem-driven learning); or 2) by 
imitating popular and prevalent ideas at the European level which are considered modern 
and in-fashion (solution-driven learning). Hence, when examining European integrative 
pressures on nation states, the prevailing ideas in Europe must therefore be considered as 
an independent variable for domestic change and adaptation. A key question is to what 
extent Norwegian risk management regime for occupational pensions has lost its national 
identity and embeddedness due to the integrative processes of European integration? 
 
Ideational adaptation as a mechanism for change is considered primarily influential in 
novel situations characterised by substantial complexity and uncertainty, and when limited 
knowledge makes it difficult to maintain fully fixed preferences (Checkel 2001; Tranøy 
1998). Ideas might then influence decision-makers by forming new preferences or 
changing conceptions of means-ends relationships (Claes and Tranøy 1999). Ideas often 
take the form of principled or causal beliefs (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). Principled 
beliefs are normative ideas and ideologies (doctrines), which specify, clarify and 
distinguish what is considered as legitimate from illegitimate. These might attain growing 
interest and popularity if underpinned by causal beliefs. These are ideas about cause-effect 
relationships, which guide individuals on how to achieve their objectives (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993: 9).17 In times characterised by substantial uncertainty principled and 
causal beliefs might serve as road maps, stipulating causal patterns and compelling 
principled of motivation for action (ibid: 16). Causal ideas respond directly to uncertainty 
by reducing it, whereas principled ideas enable people to behave decisively despite causal 
ncertainty.  




17 Changes in various cause-effect relationships take place more frequently than changes in principled beliefs as new scientific 
knowledge continuously reveals better and increased understanding on policy issues.  
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Moreover, ideational impact also relates to the role of experts and expert-networks. 
Knowledge about cause-effect relationships requires experts, and these are most 
influential if participating in networks where a common professional background is 
shared (Checkel 2001). So-called epistemic communities are transnational expert 
networks, which due to a shared professional consensus exchange beliefs and ideas that 
might have an impact on domestic policies and market behaviour. These networks consist 
of “professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative 
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992: 3). Epistemic 
communities have normally been used to explain coordination between countries on 
issues where agreements have been difficult to attain due to a fundamental lack of 
information and knowledge about proper actions. In this context I focus on how such 
networks might help the diffusion of norms and ideas that could subsequently change 
traditional forms for risk management principles and regulations. Ideational impact is 
most likely if there is a high density of interaction among participants (Checkel 2001). 
Moreover, any impact of experts is most likely when these are insulated from direct 
vel 
ensity in European meeting places, I expect policy imitation of popular and prevailing 
European ideas about fund management and market-based pensions to be significant. 
political pressure and exposure (ibid). 
2.5.3.1 Expectations 
One evident consequence of European integration is increased cooperation and contact 
across national borders. The Norwegian affiliation with the European Union, formalised 
by the EEA Agreement, excludes democratically elected politicians from taking part in 
the decision-making processes. Unlike politicians, experts are not formally excluded from 
EU committees and pan-European business networks. According to Trondal (2001: 1) “a 
de-parliamentarisation, a de-politisation as well as a bureaucratisation of EU related decision processes 
nationally” has been one key consequence of the EEA membership. Moreover, pensions 
and fund management are complex policy areas, which to a large extent are exposed to 
detailed technical standards and an extensive judicial framework. Fund managers and 
regulatory authorities (public officials) arguably have power over knowledge and expertise 
on this area due to its complexity. Their opportunity to act as experts and to make an 
impact on Norwegian policy-making and financial markets norms should therefore be 
emphasised in this context. If Norwegian experts participate and interact on a high-le
d
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Furthermore, the ongoing demographic shift and liberalisation of Norwegian capital 
markets might have substantially challenged the Norwegian regime on how to organise its 
risk management system. The Norwegian regime has accordingly been brought into a 
novel situation, which could have produced substantial uncertainty and doubt about how 
risk should be dealt with. Rapid technological changes and product innovations in the 
financial sector further increase the demand for industry-specific expertise and 
knowledge. This should induce Norwegian technocrats to make benefit of their European 
contacts and networks and apply policies and arguments embedded in the SEM to find 
lutions on this experienced uncertainty. 
vitable outcome. Given the expectations above I 
find the
 Norwegian risk management regime for occupational pensions 
have mainly occurred due to the impact of ideas embedded in the European 
arket regime 
d should be accounted for when I make my analysis and conclusions in chapter 
 and 6. 
so
 
If processes of social learning proceed unchallenged, convergence as a result of diffusion 
of the perceived best practice is an ine
 following hypothesis relevant: 
Changes in the
m
2.5.4 Some reflections on alternative explanations 
The objective of this thesis is to examine European impact on a national policy area. The 
three processes of Europeanisation which are introduced above are analytical distinctions 
that are not mutually exclusive. Hence, adaptation to European market integration could 
occur in all three mechanisms at the same time, or sequentially. The relative strength of 
each explanatory variable could then occur at the same time, but have different 
significance in different periods of time. Moreover, developments in the Norwegian 
regime could also be found in other explanations than those set forward above. 
Identifying changes that have little to do with Europeanisation and distinguish these from 
processes of Europeanisation might be a challenge, but nonetheless important when 
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Firstly, small states have according to Katzenstein (1985) relied more on world markets 
than large states. High dependence on international markets requires continuously 
adaptation to changes in international structures as a strategy of sooner the better. 
Changes in the Norwegian regime could then be perceived as an intentional adaptation to 
what is predicted the most probable outcomes internationally. Adaptation to 
internationalisation would then proceed independently of SEM implementation and 
adoption of the EEA Agreement. These effects could for example be a result of efforts 
ade by other international organisations, such as the OECD, World Bank and the IMF, 
ld cause parallel national shifts, where similar policy outcomes are 
rred by different welfare states, but which have nothing to do with any European 
ble 2.1 below these are summarised with some key expectation of 
regime change and European impact. I will return to this matrix in my conclusions in 
chapter 6.  
m
which also influence Norwegian policy making.  
 
Secondly, today most welfare states experience similar problems in the state-society 
relationship due to the constraining effects of globalisation and ageing populations. The 
expenditure on public budgets is rising and the prospects of increasing revenues (e.g. 
taxes, etc) are reduced. Since the 1980s new public management reforms have induced 
increased competition and liberalisation in many European welfare states, partly as a 
solution to these experienced problems. Hence, the challenges of what I have called a 
twin pressure cou
prefe
forces of change.  
2.6 SUMMARY - THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK  
To sum up, the analytic framework of this thesis consists of a dependent variable (regime 
change) that relies on three different dimensions. These dimensions are related to how 
assets are invested (scope of assets), by whom these are managed (scope of access), and in 
which framework benefits are embedded (scope of authority). Furthermore, three 
independent variables are set forward to analyse any European impact on regime change. 
These variables rest on the rule-based, interest-based and idea-based adaptations to 
Europeanisation. In ta
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Table 2.1. The analytical framework 
 
Rule-based 
Changes have mainly occurred as a 
direct result of legal and 






Changes have mainly occurred as a 
result of competitive dynamics introduced 
by the SEM, where a international 
oriented Norwegian financial industry 




Changes have mainly occurred due to 
the impact of ideas embedded in the 





Scope of assets 
Norwegian portfolio 
regulation and  asset 
allocation has become more 
oriented towards risk 
diversification into European 
equity markets rather than 
Norwegian markets 
 
    
Scope of access 
Liberalisation of Norwegian 
licensing regulations and 
ownership legislation has 
occurred so that national 
borders are transparent and 
characterised by substantial 
cross-border activities     
Scope of authority 
A few market-conform 
regulations have  become 
more important than an 
extensive  regulatory 
framework that put emphasis 
on social objectives and fund 
security 
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3 TOWARDS A PAN-EUROPEAN PENSION REGIME 
The [pension fund] directive will provide pension funds with a coherent framework to operate within the 
internal market. They will now be able to build on that platform to offer safer and affordable pensions. 
The directive will also give European companies and citizens the opportunity to benefit from more efficient 
pan-European pension funds, and so make an important contribution to tackling the pension time 
bomb.18 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter I developed some key expectations about national adaptation to 
European integration. This chapter addresses in short what has happened on the 
European arena on setting up a European framework for risk management on second 
pillar retirement provision.  
 
Occupational pensions are in most EU member states often provided and managed by 
separate pension institutions, such as pension funds. The European Commission has for 
long considered this provision as financial services. When implementing the SEM in 
1992, a Single Financial Space was established for banks, investment funds and life 
insurance companies. In spite of the similarities between pension funds and life insurance 
companies, political agreement on EU policy delegation has to be met on both.19 Finding 
an agreement on pension funds has proved difficult. The second pillar pension provision 
is characterised by substantial diversity across Europe when it comes to types of plans, 
financing methods, providers, regulation, taxation and supervision. Occupational 
pensions are also an integral part of member states pension systems. Unlike life insurance 
companies, pension funds were therefore not included in the SEM regime from the start. 
In spite of repeatedly endeavours from the European Commission to put these financial 
institutions under a European framework, common legislation on the activities of 
retirement provision was not adopted until 2003.  
 
                                              
18 Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein hailing the new directive on pan-European occupational pension funds and its 
approval by the European Council in mid-May 2003 (IPE Jul 2003). 
19 The European regulatory approach is institution-biased, where different types of financial institutions to some extent adhere to 
different European rules and regulations (directives). 
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As this chapter will reveal, occupational pensions have nonetheless been on the European 
agenda for about 15 years. But why has this taken so long, and why has the European 
Commission taken great interest in a pan-European pension regime? The objective of this 
chapter is to briefly present the policy processes and initiatives at the European level on 
this issue. Through this, some of the challenges linked to European policy delegation and 
pension reforms are revealed. This could shed light over reform processes in Norway, 
which are analysed later in this thesis. Moreover, it would allow me to make more valid 
reflections on the Norwegian regime’s uniqueness or commonness.   
3.2 THE EUROPEAN PENSION CHALLENGE – BETWEEN 
DEMOGRAPHY AND MARKETS 
3.2.1 The importance of pension assets 
Processes of globalisation and member states’ ageing populations have lately made the 
EU increasingly more concerned about the competitiveness of the European economy 
and future sustainability of member states’ welfare programmes (cf. the Lisbon process). 
In 1999 the Commission President Romano Prodi uttered: 
Where pensions are concerned we need a properly regulated pan-European pension fund market, which 
would give pensioners a far higher return on the capital they contribute and would also provide a stock of 
venturing capital for creating new business (Quoted in Holm Bakke 2000: 9).   
As the quote illustrates, the Commission has a two-folded objective: 1) to ensure the 
security and affordability of fund members’ pensions, 2) to achieve fully integrated 
financial markets, which would be highly beneficial for fostering economic growth in the 
region. According to the Commission, both these objectives are only attainable if a 
prudential framework for occupational pensions is established.  
3.2.2 Pensions and the Single European Market Regime 
The 1985 Single European Market initiative aimed at substantial liberalisation on member 
states’ financial sector. Consequently, a directive on freedom of capital movement was 
adopted in 1988, and directives on several financial services (bank, life insurance, 
investments, etc) were adopted subsequently. Rather than total harmonisation, the 
regulatory approach was based on mutual recognition, one single license and home 
country control (Litan and Herring 1995). This was believed to induce the four freedoms 
and produce new economic and political dynamics that would promote and enable the 
creation a Single European Financial Space.  
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• The principle of mutual recognition entails an explicit acceptance by each member state 
of the regulations, standards, and certification procedures of other member states.  
• The principle of home country control implies that member states have agreed that it is 
the member state in which the financial institution’s headquarter resides, that has 
sole responsibility for granting license and undertake financial supervision 
concerning e.g. solvency issues.  
• Having been granted licence in its respective home countries, the financial 
institutions are under the principle of one single licence/passport free to market and 
distribute its products and services in other member state. This framework enables 
financial institutions to more easily offer services across borders.20  
 
In the SEM regime, the principle of free movement of capital is particularly important, 
and is believed to benefit the European economy in several ways. Due to an enormous 
increase in European pension assets lately, the activities and operations (e.g. investment 
pattern) of pension institutions are considered ever more vital for achieving a fully 
integrated SEM. As the demographic shift proceeds, a pan-European regulatory regime 
for custodians of occupational pension benefits would become ever more important for 
European markets due to: 1) make free movement of labour easier and more flexible, 2) 
contribute to growth and improved utilization of savings, 3) increase competition in the 
financial sector which again might lead to product innovation and improved quality on 
financial services at lower costs, 4) produce better opportunities for risk diversification, 
and 5) have an disciplinary impact on economic policies (Bull 2002: 28).  
3.2.3 Demographic trends of ageing populations 
The demographic challenge of ageing populations is a key feature in all European 
member states. Growing life expectancy would lead to a substantial increase in pension 
expenses towards 2050 in all member states. Moreover, as declining birth rates are also 
                                              
20 EU law distinguishes three ways of which a financial institution can offer its services in other EU countries. Firstly, a subsidiary 
is regarded as a separate legal subject, which activities must coincide with national legislation of the host country, i.e. the country 
where the subsidiary is established. Subsidiaries do therefore not operate under considerations of home country control. Secondly, 
financial institutions may establish affiliates and branches in other member states. An affiliate/branch is not considered as an 
independent institution, and supervisory tasks do therefore adhere to the home country of its mother company. Finally, financial 
institutions may engage in cross-border activities where the provision of services occurs directly from the head-quarter or via a 
representative in host country. In these cases, licensing and supervisory control does also remain with the home country’s 
authorities. Financial institutions are however required to notify home country authorities about its intentions of cross-border 
engagement before this is actually carried out. 
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part of the demographic trends in Europe, the tax-financed transfer (PAYG) schemes’ 
sustainability is threatened, due to increasing dependency burden on the labour force that 
finances the pensions. (cf. table 3.1 below).  
 
Table 3.1. Estimated development in pension expenses, demographic factors, employment rate 
and dependency burden in Norway and 13 EU countries (Moum and Strømsheim Wold 2001). 
 Pension expenses 









 2000 2050 2000 2050 2000 2050 2000 2050 2000 2050 
Germany 10,3 14,6 26,0 53,3 1,4 1,5 77,8 82,5 65,3 67,2 
France 12,1 15,8 27,2 50,8 1,7 1,8 78,8 83,5 62,1 65,6 
Italy 14,2 13,9 28,8 66,8 1,2 1,5 78,8 83,5 53,8 65,0 
UK 5,1 3,9 26,4 46,1 1,7 1,8 77,6 82,5 71,5 72,3 
Austria 14,5 15,1 25,1 55,0 1,3 1,5 78,1 83,5 74,4 88,3 
Belgium 9,3 12,6 28,1 49,7 1,5 1,8 78,4 83,0 59,1 62,7 
Denmark 10,2 13,2 24,1 41,9 1,8 1,8 76,6 81,0 76,8 77,0 
Finland 11,3 16,0 24,5 48,1 1,7 1,8 77,5 82,5 68,3 68,4 
Ireland 4,6 9,0 19,4 44,2 1,9 1,8 76,7 81,5 67,4 75,9 
Netherlands 7,9 3,6 21,9 44,9 1,7 1,8 78,2 82,5 65,3 66,6 
Portugal 9,8 14,2 25,1 48,7 1,5 1,7 75,6 81,0 68,5 71,7 
Spain 9,4 17,7 27,1 65,7 1,2 1,5 78,5 82,0 55,9 68,0 
Sweden 9,0 10,0 29,6 46,1 1,5 1,8 79,7 84,0 73,1 77,3 
EU-13 10,3 13,0 26,7 53,4 1,5 1,6 78,2 82,8 61,4 66,3 
Norway 7,2 17,8 25,9 41,4 1,8 1,8 78,4 82,5 78,3 78,2 
 
However, irrespective of common demographic trends, cross-national variation is 
revealed. This variation is related to how the pension system is organised. As noted in 
chapter 2, pension systems in liberal market economies (LMEs) are less exposed to 
demographic risks as public compensation rates are less than in the coordinated market 
economies. On top of these differences, pension systems in LMEs (e.g. the UK), greatly 
rely on funded corporate pension schemes, which further adds to the reduction of 
demographic risks linked to the sustainability of public pensions. 
3.3 TOWARDS A PAN-EUROPEAN MARKET REGIME FOR 
SUPPLEMENTARY PENSIONS 
3.3.1 The European efforts of adopting a Pension Fund Directive 
3.3.1.1 Early attempts on a pension fund directive 
The need for a pan-European regime concerning retirement provision in order to get this 
in line with the treaty provisions on free movements of capital, services and labour was 
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first addressed by the Commission in 1989.21 In a speech the Commissioner of the 
Internal Market at that time, Sir Leon Brittan, called for the “three freedoms”; freedom of 
cross-border pension fund management, freedom of cross border investment, and 
freedom of cross border membership of pension funds. He claimed that a Single 
European Market was not to be completed unless it also included supplementary 
pensions. A directive was submitted in 1991 to remove obstacles on risk management of 
these benefits. The regulatory framework set forward focused on following principles 
(Brittan 1992: 17): 
• Provide much clearer guidance as to what restrictions may be justified on prudential grounds by abolishing 
localisation requirements, requirements to invest in particular categories of assets, currency-matching 
requirements beyond a certain level, and the systematic notification of investment decisions. 
• Take a new regulatory approach. This should be based on a small number of prudent investment 
principles for pension funds, covering such matters as diversification, liquidity, the quality and risk 
profiles of portfolios taken as a whole, and restrains on self-investment. 
• Establish the free provision of services to pension funds, in particular investment management and asset 
custody. 
• Establish the freedom of cross-border membership of pension funds by enabling companies to set up a 
European Pension Fund on a legal basis agreed upon at Community level. This could establish a 
consistent tax treatment for contributions to and benefits from pension funds  
With these principles, which also relates directly to the three scopes called into attention 
in this thesis, the pan-European debate on supplementary pensions was set. The draft 
directive entailed a clear bias towards financial integration and prudent man principle, 
while social aspects were more or less overshadowed. This became the nemesis of the 
directive, which was withdrawn “because of the amendments proposed by member states would have 
legitimised restrictions on pension funds rather than liberalised them” (European Commission 1997: 
14). Hence, member state resistance was considerable. New attempts were carried out in 
1994, but these also failed.22 
3.3.1.2 Growing concerns about segmented European markets and new policy initiatives 
In the late 1990s the Commission increasingly became aware of the lack of financial 
integration in European markets. The persistence of segmented financial markets gave 
                                              
21 In the start, a main concern was that member states “in the name of prudential control” were still able to apply localisation 
requirements and obligations to invest in specific financial instruments, such as governmental bonds, on pension funds’ 
investments (Brittan 1992: 17). The Commission argued however that “in many cases members’ investment rules go beyond what is objectively 
necessary to maintain adequate prudential supervision” (European Commission 1997: 14). 
22 In 1994 the Commission published a Communication on freedom of management and investment of funds held by institutions 
for retirement provisions, which content was similar to the proposals of the withdrawn draft directive (Holm Bakke 2000: 37). 
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birth to an action plan for financial services (FSAP) in 1999, which set out a blue-print 
that aimed at increasing the pace in European decision-making processes on the financial 
area (European Commission 1999a). Furthermore, it was acknowledged that any 
integrated financial markets are difficult to achieve without eliminating disparities in tax 
treatment of income from private savings. Hence, measures of tax harmonisation were 
also a prioritised issue in the action plan. Pension funds and supplementary pension 
provision were at the top of this EU financial services agenda.23 
 
In 1997, previous to the FSAP, the Commission submitted a green paper on 
supplementary pensions, which focused on quite similar targets and principles as those 
presented in the previous draft directive. The green paper is seen as seminal in a new 
wave of EU documents and policy initiatives concerning pension issues. Unlike previous 
EU documents, the green paper gave more attention to the role retirement provision 
played in social protection across Europe and became the first EU Green Paper that 
perceived the demographic shift as a threat for the provision of old-age pensions. The 
importance of prudential arrangements was stressed to ensure members’ security.24 The 
Green Paper was underpinned by the adoption of the Communication “Towards a Single 
Market for Supplementary Pensions” in 1999, and set out three principles for enabling a pan-
European regime on supplementary pensions (European Commission 1999b): 1) Better 
protection of scheme members coupled with more efficient investments by pension 
funds; 2) gradual removal of obstacles to labour mobility and 3) continued coordination 
of Member States tax systems. The EU also started publishing and funding research 
reports in order to stimulate public reflection and debate on supplementary pension 
provision, e.g. the 1999 Pragma report “Rebuilding Pensions” (European 
Commission/Pragma Consulting 1999).  
                                              
23 Commissioner Mario Monti (1998) has stated that “the creation of a single market for supplementary pensions would mark an important 
stage in the full integration of financial services in the Union, help to consolidate the European social model and be of major benefit of future pensioners”  
24 Moreover, the Green Paper had a different tone than previous documents as rather than giving clear obligations it asked 
member states, market actors and EU institutions about their view on the proposals. The Commission did however again raise 
concerns about some of the rules imposed by some member states, which it conceived to go beyond what was necessary and 
comprised a major obstacle to the freedom of capital movement in the Single Market. The proposals were nevertheless much 
more open than was the case of previous regulatory attempts (Holm Bakke 2000).  
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3.3.1.3 Lisbon strategy puts pensions at the top of the agenda 
Due to growing awareness of the effects of globalisation and ageing populations, EU 
policy makers were at the turn of the millennium concerned about competitiveness of the 
European economy and future sustainability of member states’ welfare programmes. The 
Commission was in particular concerned about the relative poor performance of 
continental European economies over the 1990s, compared to that of the US.25 In 2000, 
the so-called Lisbon strategy was launched as a comprehensive programme to make the 
European economy “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world within 
2010” The strategy stressed the need to complete the internal market, in particular the 
emergence of stable, efficient and integrated financial markets, which would benefit 
savers and at the same time help boost growth and employment. At the core of this 
strategy was adopting a pension fund directive. 
“In its contribution to the Lisbon European Council, the Commission itself has highlighted the need for 
an integrated EU framework in the field of pension funds which, by increasing more liquidity on capital 
markets, would ease future pressure on social security systems, reduce costs of capital and increase venture 
capital” (Bolkestein 2000) 
To foster growth and economic development across Europe the Commission therefore 
urged that; “as very long-term investors, pension funds should have the possibility to invest significantly 
in shares and risk-capital markets and manage schemes on a cross-border basis” (Bolkestein 2001).26 
The Lisbon European Council set an ambitious timetable for completing the FSAP by 
2005.  
3.3.2 The Pension Fund Directive – a compromise on a compromise 
A draft on a pension fund directive that aimed at setting up a prudential European 
framework on the activities of IORPs (institutions of occupational retirement provision) 
was submitted in October 2000 (European Commission 2000). The draft directive was 
somewhat more moderate than set forward by former papers. This time the Commission 
had to succeed. Rather than harmonising national supervisory arrangements and 
regulations in detail, it is to level a playing field of mutual recognition and confidence in 
the regulatory and supervisory framework of member states. The Commission recognised 
                                              
25 Many EU countries had for some time struggled with relatively low rates of growth and high rates of unemployment, compared 
to the US economy. 
26 While pension funds provide 60 percent of American industry’s risk capital, Europe is according to Commissioner Bolkestein 
characterised by shallow and relative inefficient capital markets, and lack of sufficient risk capital. 
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that “pension systems are just too different in each member state” to make a strict harmonisation 
feasible (Bolkestein 2000). Consequently, a twin pronged approach was taken: 
Firstly, to allow the member states such as Netherlands, Ireland and UK, who have a long and successful 
experience of pension funds to continue their system of prudential control based on the prudent man. 
Secondly, there are other member states who have less developed funds, less experience and who apply 
rather restrictive investment rules. These member states may not be ready to apply the full prudent-man 
yet until they have more experience” (Bolkestein 2000) 
 
Furthermore, the directive does not intend to interfere in the way member states organise 
their pension systems. These competencies remain under member states authority. Even 
though the draft directive could be considered a compromise compared to previous 
drafts, the directive gained substantial criticism and resistance from several holds in the 
process towards adoption.27 While the UK and the Netherlands lobbied for prudent man 
principle, Greece, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and Belgium were opponents of such a 
regulatory style (IPE Jul 2002). The old division lines between financial and social 
provision, and between countries embedded in divergent risk regimes, were still present. 
There have also been debates on how to understand, practice and find the right balance 
between prudent man ideas and required quantities approaches to ensure adequate 
security of funds. A political compromise was however reached at the ECOFIN summit28 
in June 2002. After more compromising, the directive was adopted by the European 
Council in April 2003, and became official legislation in September 2003 (European 
Commission 2003). Member states were required to comply with the directive within 
September 2005. 
 
As for other financial regulation, the directive follows the single passport principles. 
Regulatory authority is the home country of the pension fund, i.e. in the member state it 
is registered. This would in particular benefit multinational employers. Typically two pan-
European pension structures are expected (IPE Aug 2003). 1) A pan-European pension 
fund, where assets of several national pension funds are pooled into one fund in order to 
achieve economies of scale. 2) A pan-European pension plan, which place plan members 
                                              
27 The European financial industry has not been happy with what it regards as a mini-passport, and partly a continued reliance on 
host-country control, restrictively designed prudential rules and long transition periods, while many parliamentarians are afraid 
that the directive has not included adequate social provision and advocate some harmonisation of social policy elements as 
decisive.  
28 European Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN).  
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in a single plan centered in one member state. Host countries can however still insist that 
the pension plan should conform to the social and employment laws of that state. 
Moreover, collective bargaining agreements are also to be respected. Hence, 
multinationals would continue to face different national rules on these matters. 
Furthermore, the approach that all institutions that provide occupational retirement 
provision should fall under the directive has been considered too radical for the European 
Council (IPE Aug 2003). Hence, the directive does not apply to institutions managing 
social-security schemes, institutions that operate on a PAYG basis, companies using 
book-reserve schemes and investment funds. Member states are also free to make the 
directive inapplicable to institutions located in their territory, which operates pension 
schemes that together have less than 100 members in total.  
 
Moreover, even though the directive set forward some prudential investment rules with 
which must be acted in accordance (e.g. risk diversification), some quantitative 
requirements remains as parts of the political compromise. Member states may lay down 
more detailed quantitative rules for institutions located in their territory, but no member 
state can restrict fund managers to invest up to 70 percent of assets in equities and 30 
percent outside the euro-zone.29 Any application of quantitative requirements is however 
to be prudentially justified, and member states cannot require institutions to invest in 
particular categories of assets. Hence, the directive would anyhow liberate asset 
management in many member states, where the regulatory framework has rested on 
extensive investment restrictions. 
 
Unlike the proposals in the early 1990, the new directive also firmly establishes the link 
between assets and liabilities. Moreover, the Commission had this time been more 
preoccupied with solvency requirements that have to be met in member states legislation 
in order to protect fund members. Cooperation between supervisory authorities, 
introduction of notification procedures, obligatory disclosure of investment policy 
principles, annual accounts/reports and other relevant information to plan members are 
                                              
29  In events of cross-border activities, even more detailed investment rules are allowed to be set forward. Host country authorities 
(where sponsor and members are located) are for example allowed to ask home country authorities (where pension fund is 
located) to apply certain restrictions on assets corresponding to the pension scheme run on a cross-border basis, provided that the 
host country applies the same rules to its own domestic funds. 
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also stressed. More qualitative ALM (asset-liability-management) techniques for 
calculation of technical provisions, where fund managers are directly responsible for 
strategic asset allocation and risk management processes, are also introduced in the 
directive.  These techniques are related to the nature and duration of pension liabilities.  
 
The pension fund directive was to be implemented by all member states by September 
2005. In spring 2006 the Commission sent a so-called reasoned opinion, the second stage 
in an infringement procedure, to 11 member states that had not fully implementer the 
directive (IPE April 2006). In summer 2006 the Commission referred the UK and 
Slovenia were referred to the ECJ for failing to implement the directive (IPE June 2006). 
3.3.3 Eliminating tax obstacles to cross-border provision of occupational pensions 
As supplementary pensions are a vital part of the welfare programmes in many member 
states, fiscal incentives are usually employed to increase retirement saving and to 
overcome problems with citizens’ short-sightedness. Tax regulations are also employed to 
shape the occupational pension market in accordance with some larger social, political 
and economic objectives. There are three basic levels at which occupational pension 
provision might be subject to taxation (T) or exemption (E): 1) on the contributions made 
by employer/employee; 2) on the investment returns; and 3) on the payment of benefits 
in retirement. This implies nine possible combinations in the taxation-exemption matrix. 
Hence, member states’ second pillar has been characterised by large diversity on these 
matters. The large majority rests however on the EET system.30  
 
In order to preserve efficiency of tax controls, to ensure fiscal cohesion of national tax 
systems and avoid tax fraud, many member states have usually only made domestic fund 
managers eligible to held tax stimulated pensions in custody.31 Moreover, as entitlements 
to social rights are usually based on citizenship, these discriminatory practices on 
nationality are also socially legitimised. According to the Commission, these fiscal 
measures are severe obstacles to migrant workers and to the provision of financial 
services across member states borders. Furthermore, it prohibits any establishment of 
                                              
30 Exempted contributions, Exempted investment income and capital gains, and Taxed benefits. 
31 Due to the different tax systems in Europe, mobile employees could be subject to double taxation, or experience double non-
taxation (exemption). 
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pooled European pension funds for multinationals. The Pension Fund Directive does not 
deal with the obstacles to cross-border provision of occupational pensions found in 
member states’ tax regulations. The Commission has therefore concluded that “unless 
member states stop discriminating against foreign pension funds, we will not have a fully functioning 
internal market for occupational pensions even when the Pension Fund Directive is adopted” (IPE April 
2003).  
 
Many member states see the European involvement on these matters as a threat to their 
individual right to design their own tax and welfare system, which remains at the core of 
national autonomy. A 1992 ECJ court decision in the so-called Bachmann-case32 even 
gave support to member states concerns on many of these issues. To deal with this 
problem the European Commission issued a Communication on the elimination of tax 
obstacles to the cross-border provision of occupational pensions in 2001 (European 
Commission 2001). As the competence to tax remains within national jurisdiction, the 
Commission called for voluntary tax coordination in order to eliminate any double 
taxation or double tax exemption of migrant workers or persons retiring in another 
member state. As most national pension systems rely on the EET model, the 
Commission urged member states with another model to adapt to this regime.  
 
Even though national autonomy on tax-deductibility to occupational pension schemes has 
been legitimised by the ECJ decision in the Bachmann case, this has not stopped the 
Commission to intensify its efforts to end these discriminatory practices in order to retain 
a fully integrated SEM.33 In order to fasten the progress towards achieving a pan-
European pension market, the Commission has strengthened its judicial strategy to 
modify or even eliminate the effects of the Bachmann decision. Key activities has been 
publishing legal texts that will provide guiding lines for national legislations, monitoring 
                                              
32 Bachmann was a German citizen that demanded tax deductions for his contributions to a German insurance company while 
working and living in Belgium. Belgium refused to give such exemptions, as the life insurer was not established in Belgium, and 
gained support from the ECJ due to considerations of efficient tax control and the uncertainty of taxing pension payments due to 
different tax systems in Belgium and Germany (IPE Aug 2003b). The ECJ ruled that taxation on these matters were still to be 
subject to national jurisdiction (C-204/90 Bachmann). The ECJ decision was a setback for the EU and its aim in accomplishing a 
fully integrated SEM, as this meant that member states could retain discriminatory tax provisions against other member states.  
33 The Commission has regarded these practices as continued de facto protection of domestic pension industry, which constitute 
severe obstacles on the freedoms of the SEM and its aim to create a larger, more liquid and more efficient European capital 
market. A 1995 ECJ court decision in the Wielockx case made some modification in the Bachmann case, and ruled that fiscal 
 40
Norwegian pensions and European markets 
national rules, and bringing matters of infringements before the ECJ. Moreover, it has 
also encouraged companies and individuals to bring test cases to the ECJ and to take legal 
action against member states’ eagerness to apply discriminatory tax regulations against 
pension fund managers localised in another member state. Several ECJ judgements have 
already been carried out or are awaiting ECJ decision in these respects.34 
 
In 2003 the Commission launched infringement proceedings against several member 
states that refused cross-border deduction for pension contributions.35 Since 2003 the 
Commission has extended the list of member states that are involved in such proceedings, 
as well as taken more severe steps towards some member states in order get these to 
amend its legislation in accordance with the Commission’s principles. As political 
harmonisation on tax reliefs are difficult, the Commission’s strategy is to struck down 
national restrictions on this area bit by bit, in order to complete a pan-European pension 
regime. The efforts on these matters are still in process. Most European countries now 
rests on the EET system regarding pension taxation, and have ended its discrimination on 
pension contribution paid to foreign funds (IPE March 2007). 
3.4 SUMMARY - THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVES 
To conclude, the efforts of establishing a pan-European pension regime has been a long 
and difficult process. The first efforts were made in the late 1980s, but the process first 
                                                                                                                                             
coherence could not be invoked as a justification in situations where members states have voluntary given up that coherence 
(European Commission 1997). 
34 In 2002 the ECJ judgement in the Danner case (C-136/00), which has many similarities with the Bachmann case, held that it 
was contrary to the EC Treaty for Finland to disallow deductibility of contributions when contributions are made to foreign 
pension plans, while allowing deductibility for contributions made to national plans. Danner emigrated from Germany to Finland, 
but even though being a tax resident in Finland, he continued to pay social security contributions into the German compulsory 
occupational pension scheme that he adhered to. Finland refused the deduction on the basis of maintaining coherence of the 
Finnish tax system and efficiency of tax controls, avoiding tax fraud and keeping the integrity of the tax base (IPE: May 2002), 
and claimed that a link should exist between a tax deduction up front and a taxation of the benefit later. The ECJ rejected these 
concerns as benefits for Danner would anyway be taxable in Finland, and because the Court believes that it is possible to reach 
the aim of efficient tax control by other means than imposing non-deductibility. 
In 2003 the ECJ court decision in the Skandia/Ramstedt case (C-422/01) followed a similar stance to end discrimination 
against static employees who have purchased pension products abroad (IPE Aug 2003b). The Skandia case has been launched by 
the Swedish insurer Skandia and challenges Swedish legislation for not allowing deductions on contributions to occupational 
pension products offered to its director Ramstedt, but purchased in another country (provided by Skandia Germany, Skandia 
Denmark and Skandia UK). The Swedish authorities, which tax current returns on investments, claimed that this would be 
impossible on foreign providers (Grønvik 2002: 74). The Court’s dismissal of arguments brought by Swedish authorities was 
similar to the Danner case (IPE Aug 2003). 
35 A formal request (Reasoned Opinion) was sent to Denmark in, while at the same time official requests (letters of formal notice) 
were sent to Belgium, Spain, France, Italy and Portugal (European Commission (2003b). Later that same year, the Commission 
decided to take Denmark to the ECJ over this pension tax discrimination, as well as starting infringement procedures against the 
UK and Ireland (IPE Jul 2003b). In January 2007 the ECJ ruled that Danish tax rules are against the EC Treaty. In reaction to the 
ruling by the ECJ ruling on Denmark, Sweden has announced that it will also comply with the ruling and amend its legislation. 
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gained pace in the late 1990s. The EU then put this issue on top of the agenda. The 
initiative has revolved around three essential objectives: 
• To complete the internal market, and improve the free movement of capital, services 
and labour 
• To boost the objectives of higher economic growth, employment creation and 
increased competition  
• To avert the old-age crisis (“defuse the pension time-bomb”) and make pensions 
sustainable 
A pension fund directive was eventually adopted in 2003. Even though the Commission 
increasingly has taken more interest in how to make pension systems sustainable due to 
demographic challenges, the Commission has primarily been occupied with pension funds 
as financial services and their role in the SEM. The European Commission regarded this 
as an important step towards a fully integrated SEM. The directive should be considered 
as a compromise between prudential regulation styles (preferred by the Commission) and 
more restrictive regulatory styles and social policy input, even though it is biased towards 
a prudent man regulatory philosophy on fund management. Moreover, the European 
Commission has lately strengthened its judicial efforts in order to remove what it 
considers as discriminatory tax regulation on cross-border provision of supplementary 
pensions. 
 
The difficulties with achieving a political agreement on the European level might be 
explained with the substantial diversity that exists across Europe when it comes to 
regulation, taxation and supervision, etc, of second pillar pensions. Delegation of policy 
competencies to the European level on these matters has been difficult, because this 
tangle core issues in the public-private mix that also influence the model of capitalism. As 
the demographic trends proceed, the challenges faced by many European countries is that 
“fealty to the inherited models of intergenerational social solidarity may be impossible expensive, while the 
Anglo-American model of economy and society would seem to imply acceptance of individual levels of risk 
and inequality at odds with continental traditions” (Clark 2003: 26-27). Moreover, EU 
involvement on these issues hits welfare states at the core of their origin, namely to design 
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their own tax policies in order to shape welfare provision in accordance with their social 
model. 
 
The Commission has nevertheless made important achievements on this area lately. 
Attention is now directed towards ensuring that member states implement the spirit of 
the directive in national legislation and pursuing any inappropriate implementation of 
member states. The European Commission is determined to apply judicial efforts in order 
to eliminate obstacles to cross-border provision of pension services and to attain a fully 
integrated SEM. Many fears however that without political cooperation on this area, the 
European regime would end up in a complex legal quagmire, which again might be an 
obstacle to cross border freedom of pension funds. 
 
The European Commission has with its initiatives put emphasis on a pan-European 
regime for occupational pensions which objective is to extend the scopes of assets (to 
European equities), access (freedom of services across borders) and authority (increased 
confidence in market actors) in a prudential direction. The next chapters deal with the 
Norwegian risk management regime for occupational pensions in this context. In chapter 
4 I assess to what extent any changes in the Norwegian regime have implied a regime shift 
in a prudential direction, while in chapter 5 I analyse to what extent these changes are 
explained by constraints and incitements produced by European market integration.     
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4 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE 
NORWEGIAN REGIME FOR OCCUPATIONAL 
PENSIONS 
“Debate about the future of European pension systems often revolves around the tensions between 
continuity with the past (ideal conceptions of social solidarity and social security) and convergence to some 
form of the Anglo-American model (with all that it implies about the role and status of the markets)” 
(Clark 2003: 35). 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses the development of occupational pensions in Norway. Until 
recently, about 2/3 of all employees have been covered by an occupational pension 
scheme. According to the pension commission, payments from occupational pensions 
accounted for more about 25 percent of total old-age pensions in 2001 (Pension 
Commission 2003: 3). Among pensioners that had earned membership in an occupational 
pension scheme, the equivalent share was 40 percent of their old-age pensions. From 
2006, occupational pensions were made mandatory in Norway. With the exception of the 
Norwegian Public Service Pension Fund36, Norwegian occupational pension schemes are 
established on a funded basis.  
 
Most occupational pension assets are held in custody by life insurance companies and 
pension funds. Over the last decades there has been a considerable growth of assets held 
in custody by these financial institutions. By the end of 2006 their assets accounted for 
about NOK 790 billion (SSB). These assets are mostly based on contributions to 
occupational pension schemes. In comparison, equivalent numbers for 1980 was NOK 
43 billion (ibid). Hence, during a generation, the growth of pension assets held by these 
financial institions has been about 18 times in nominal value. Compared to the growth in 
the economy, these assets have increased fourfold.37 How assets are invested, by whom 
these are managed, and in which framework benefits are embedded, should therefore be 
of increasing importance.  
 
                                              
36  Statens pensjonskasse is a pension plan for certain categories of public sector employees. This is financed on a PAYG basis. 
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It is often claimed that Norway has developed a special form for welfare capitalism, a so-
called democratic capitalism, where principles of equality and fairness have been central 
(Sejersted 1993; Esping-Andersen 1990). This has historically been reflected in an 
ambitious and redistributive welfare state with extensive involvement in the economy. As 
noted in chapter 2 of this thesis, a common regime distinction on the risk management 
for occupational pensions is between paternalistic and prudent regimes. The main focus 
of this chapter is to denote in what extent the Norwegian regime has been transposed in a 
certain direction. I have therefore taken the scopes of assets; access; and authority into 
account in order to observe any continuity or change. Attention is called both to 
regulative policy output and market behaviour outcome. More specific I will focus on to 
what extent:   
• Norwegian portfolio regulation and asset allocation has become more oriented towards risk diversification 
into European equity markets rather than Norwegian markets? 
• Liberalisation of Norwegian licensing regulations and ownership legislation has occurred so that 
Norwegian national borders are transparent and characterised by substantial cross-border activities? (i.e. 
Norwegian markets have become dominated by many European fund managers rather than a few 
national fund managers and European pension markets have become more important for Norwegian 
custodians than domestic markets) 
• A few market conform regulations have become more important than an extensive regulatory framework 
that put emphasis on social objectives and fund security? 
On the one hand, a prudent man regime is characterised by liberal portfolio regulations 
where custodians are allowed and actually allocate large parts of its assets in international 
equity markets; liberal licensing regulations and ownership legislation so that national 
borders are transparent both for foreign and domestic fund managers; and where the 
general confidence in markets is high so that custodians are only subject to a few market 
conform regulations. On the other hand, a paternalistic regime is characterised by more strict 
regulations on fund managers’ opportunities to invest abroad and in equities; nationally 
biased licensing practices and ownership legislation which makes cross-border activities 
difficult; and a general lack of confidence in markets so that custodians are subject to a 
regulatory framework where the provision of social objectives and extensive national 
standards for regulation that put fund members’ security is in the driving seat, cf. ch. 2. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
37 My estimate based on the growth of mainland GNP, where petroleum related revenues are excluded. 
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This chapter starts with a brief historical presentation of the Norwegian regime. This is 
important for assessing any direction of recent changes. Even though Norwegian 
occupational pensions have grown considerably during the last decades, this form for 
welfare provision rests on long traditions. A Norwegian regime on occupational pensions 
came into force about 50 years prior to the establishment of the National Insurance 
Scheme. The Norwegian regime has proved to be very stable until the late 1980s. In order 
to assess regime change this therefore necessitates a retrospective on principles 
determined a century ago. In this I also find why life insurers obtain a dominant position 
in the Norwegian pension market. Unlike many other European countries, which have 
kept occupational pension schemes under separate institutional arrangements, large part 
of the Norwegian occupational pension assets are at life insurers’ custody. Life insurance 
companies are accountable for more than ¾ of all funded occupational pension schemes 
(Aamo 2002: 2). Moreover, these occupational pension assets account for about ¾ of 
Norwegian life insurers’ total assets.38 Hence, the regulatory framework on life insurance 
is vital when assessing continuity and change in the Norwegian risk regime.  
4.2 A NORWEGIAN REGIME IN THE MELTING POT  
This section presents key initial reforms and developments, of which many had a decisive 
impact on how the Norwegian regime considered “appropriate” risk management until 
the 1980s and 1990s. I argue that the Norwegian regime at an early point of time took a 
national, paternalistic orientation, which was reinforced during the post-war period. 
4.2.1 Emergence of collective pension insurance  
The first life and pension insurance schemes were established in 1847. Then Christiania 
Gjensidige Forsørgeranstalt (Gjensidige Life) emerged as the first Scandinavian life 
insurance company (Gallefoss 1999: 23). Norwegian State Railways established the first 
pension fund in 1884 (Nordby 1999: 3). The emergence and demand for pension plans 
occurred at a time when the Norwegian financial system shifted into a market based 
orientation (Knutsen 1994), and when liberal trends in Norwegian and international 
economy were prevalent. Hence, funded plans became wide-spread. From the 1890s to 
                                              
38 In general I make no distinction between private sector and municipal fund managers, as these operate more or less under the 
same provisions. On many issues in this paper, this also concerns life insurance companies and pension funds, even though 
pension funds sometimes act as principals and life insurers as agents for pension funds. But since both primarily carry out many 
of the same services, I will only distinguish between them when substantial differences are evident. 
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WW I a modern capital market emerged in Norway, and at the same time the number of 
life insurers and pension funds grew rapidly (Knutsen 1994; Myhre 1996). Pooled pension 
funds were established, inspired by Bismarck’s German social insurance reforms in the 
1880s, which were the most advanced welfare programmes at that time. The design of 
pension funds is regarded as a consequence of emerging industrialisation at the end of the 
19th century. Firstly, insurance-based defined benefit pension schemes tied to work 
experience in the corporation grew popular among employers as a mechanism to prevent 
labour unrest and to bind labour to the company (i.e. prevent labour mobility). Secondly, 
in this period the industrial expansion grew more capital intensive, and it became 
important to ensure that accumulated funds benefited sponsors by investing funded 
capital back into the corporation. 
 
The first collective pension insurance distributed by a life insurance company occurred in 
1917 when Norske Folk was established (Øverbye 1991; Myhre 1996).39 This joint-stock 
company was established by the seven largest insurance companies in order to forestall 
the Norwegian employer organisation to organise industry-wide collective pension funds, 
which had occurred in Sweden (Myhre 1996). Industry-wide pension schemes did not 
occur, but unlike many other European countries, life insurers got a solid foothold in the 
Norwegian occupational pension market already from the start.  
4.2.2 A paternalistic call for regulation 
Parallel with these developments, and as a response to the rapid industrialisation and 
growth of the Norwegian economy at turn of the century, Norwegian authorities 
developed various regulations to control the markets. These regulations were principal for 
almost a century. Firstly, a comprehensive Norwegian insurance legislation was 
implemented in 1911, and established a supervisory authority (Forsikringsrådet) to assist the 
government. This was primarily legitimised with social policy motives and was to protect 
the interest of the general good (Knutsen & Ecklund 2000). On other regulatory 
activities, the regulatory framework “reflected the uncertain and not always harmonic relationship 
between public authorities and industry” (Sejersted 1993: 175). The prime minister’s quote in 
                                              
39 Norske Folk is a predecessor for Storebrand Life and was the sole provider of these products until the end of the inter-war 
period, except for pension funds set up by employers (Myhre 1996). 
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the introduction of this thesis represents such a view. The insurance industry did however 
also call for improved public regulation and protection in domestic markets.40 Licensing 
regulations were designed to prevent unsafe competition, which was considered to 
weaken life insurers´ solidity. Indirectly, this implied prevention of any strong foreign 
ownership in Norway and limited access to Norwegian markets.  
 
Secondly, the 1911 Tax Bills granted under specific terms tax deductibility for employers, 
which contributed to funded pension schemes. These fiscal stimuli were established to 
overcome problems with short-sightedness and to shape the market-based pension 
regime in accordance with some larger social, economic and political objectives. Only 
contributions to funded plans, organised in a separate judicial entity based on irrevocable 
funds, were tax exempted. This removed any incentive for employers to establish 
accumulated funds on the company´s own balances. Hence, tax regulations had an 
immense impact on the Norwegian regime’s orientation towards funding as a financing 
method for occupational pensions.  
 
In 1917, tax provisions became even more important as these incentives were coupled 
with a third early initiative, the establishment of the Norwegian Public Servants Pension 
Fund (Statens Pensjonskasse). This public PAYG-plan acted as a norm for funded tax-
stimulated pension schemes, concerning level of benefits and how these were calculated. 
No tax stimulated occupational pension schemes were allowed to provide higher benefits 
than the Norwegian Public Servants Pension Fund. This also prevented any emergence of 
a market for defined contribution pension plans to take place (Øverbye 1991). From the 
early 20th century and until the 1960s an institutionalisation of occupational pension 
schemes developed, where earning-related, insurance-based, defined benefit pension 
schemes became standardised.  
4.2.3 Risk management in a paternalistic regime 
As a starting point of analysing changes on the scopes of assets, access and authority, I 
shortly assess how these were organised before regulatory reforms started in the late 
                                              
40 In a letter to the government dated 1906, leaders from eight Norwegian life insurance companies claimed that the international 
character on fire insurance ”hører slet ikke hjemme paa livsforsikringens felt”, and that policies stressing that ”forsikring udelukkende bør 
tegnes i indenlandske selskaper” should be encouraged (quotes cited in Knutsen and Ecklund 2000: 53). 
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1980s. Attention is given to life insurers, as pension funds in this period were primarily 
subject to the provisions laid down in the Tax Bills.  
4.2.3.1 Scope of assets 
The 1911 insurance act’s most important objective was to attain maximum security for 
fund members’ benefits. The insurance act therefore set forward detailed portfolio 
regulations for ensuring that assets were allocated in respect with this objective and to 
prevent undue investment risk. In 1961 some amendments were carried out, which 
opened for allocations in equities. Total investments in Norwegian equities and property 
was however not to exceed 15 percent of life insurers’ balance (NOU 1983: 52, p 45). 
Custodians of occupational pensions were however not only subject to the social 
regulations laid down in the 1911 insurance act. During the post-war period a form for 
“strategic capitalism” developed, where ambitions concerning industrialisation- and industry 
development gained foothold in the regulatory framework (Knutsen & Ecklund 2000: 
236). Consequently, several constraints were imposed on financial institutions’ investment 
opportunities in order to channel credit into political prioritised sectors and companies. A 
monetary and credit act implemented in 1965 empowered Norwegian authorities to 
require that at least 60 percent of financial industry’s assets held at custody were allocated 
in Norwegian bonds. Moreover, custodians’ investment universe was provided by a 
governmental list of “high quality” securities.41 Foreign exchange regulations made 
foreign investments unfeasible.42  
4.2.3.2 Scope of access 
The product standardisation of occupational pensions due to the tax regulations led to a 
de facto monopoly situation for life insurance companies and pension funds, which 
distributed insurance-based, defined benefit pension products. In order to ensure plan 
members economic security, Norwegian authorities set forward detailed licensing 
regulations in 1911, which were to be met in order to carry out these services. For life 
insurance companies a two-folded objective was laid down: to trammel owners and 
industry’s self interest in employing assets held at custody as means for achieving 
individual objectives and to prevent against any strong foreign ownership (Sejersted 
                                              
41 Equities did only count for a few percent of total investments until the late 1980s (Kvinge et al 1992). 
42  The insurance industry was not enthusiastic about the investment requirements imposed on insurance companies, as they 
conceived themselves as socially, not financially motivated actors (Knutsen & Ecklund 2000: 201-202). 
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1993). Licensing regulation restricted in this way competition. Competition was however 
also constrained by industry’s own market regulatory initiatives. These put emphasis on 
cooperation and cartel activities rather than competition. Both authorities and insurance 
industry considered that too much competition in the market would weaken solidity and 
consumer confidence and consequently harm public interest (Knutsen and Ecklund 2000; 
Myhre 1996). In the post-war period societal demand for insurance was employed as a key 
direction for granting license.43 Moreover, a strong flavour of local and regional policy 
considerations led to ambitions of a “decentralised centralisation” of Norwegian financial 
sector, rather than building strong national financial institutions (Knudsen and Ecklund 
2000). Foreign ownership in Norwegian financial institutions was restricted.44 Foreign life 
insurers were however allowed to establish affiliates in Norway, but these were not 
eligible to provide and manage tax-stimulated occupational pensions, due to national and 
paternalistic arguments.45 This also concerned cross-border provision of life and pension 
insurance, which was not allowed.   
4.2.3.3 Scope of authority 
The design of Norwegian occupational pensions has emerged as a bi-product of public 
regulations, in particular tax regulation, rather than a negotiated outcome between 
domestic labour groups and the government, which occurred in Sweden (Øverbye 1991). 
These plans are an integral part of Norwegian welfare policies. Social elements were 
therefore from the start embedded in the insurance act. The Ministry of Social Affairs 
exercised the regulatory authority. Social measures were also clearly set out in the Tax 
Bills. Norwegian authorities have consequently carried out product control both in the 
insurance legislation and in tax regulation. The Norwegian regime has from the start relied 
on the EET model, where sponsors’ contributions and returns on investments of 
accumulated funds are exempted taxation, while pension benefits are taxed in retirement. 
In the post-war period, when the Beveridgean model gained popularity, the social 
objectives embedded in the tax regime were extended to also concern the principles of 
                                              
43 As a result, only three Norwegian life insurance companies gained access from the late 1930s to the mid-1980s (NOU 1983; 52: 
p 157). The only alternative was to set up own pension funds. 
44 In the 1980s foreign ownership was not to exceed a 15 percent share in a Norwegian life insurance company (St. meld 31 
(1989-1990)). 
45 A common view was that foreign actors in Norwegian markets would diminish control and supervision carried out by 
Norwegian regulatory bodies. Moreover, due to security, control, language, judicial issues, etc., consumer protection was also 
regarded better if Norwegian financial institutions managed pension benefits (NOU 1986; 5: 168). 
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egalitarianism and proportionality. Amendments in tax bills in 1968 laid down a 
comprehensive regulatory framework for occupational pensions on these matters.46 
Moreover, strict product regulation and control of custodians investments, made any 
regulations on capital requirements redundant in this regime. Emphasis was put on 
attaining the general good and social policy motives, rather than financial stability and 
solvency controls. 
4.3 TOWARDS A PRUDENTIAL RISK REGIME? 
The initial position of the Norwegian risk management regime was arguably paternalistic 
oriented on all scopes assessed in this context. This regime has proved very stable until 
the 1980s. The rest of this chapter focuses on developments over the last two decades. In 
this period there have been frequent and substantial changes on these matters. A key 
question is to what extent these changes have led to a regime shift in a prudential 
direction? This is also been a period where European integration has extended to ever-
new policy areas and moved towards deeper integration. The scope of next chapter is 
therefore to elaborate on any impact of European market integration on changes in the 
Norwegian regime as presented in this chapter.  
4.3.1 Scope of assets 
The  section assesses to what extent strategies toward international equity markets are 
reflected in Norwegian portfolio regulation and custodians’ asset allocation. More 
importantly, has a detailed portfolio regulation characterised by substantial restrictions on 
investments abroad and in equities been replaced by a liberal prudential framework, where 
asset allocation are mostly biased towards international diversification?  
4.3.1.1 Changes in portfolio regulation 
Some of the detailed portfolio regulation for fund managers was removed in the 1980s,47 
while other regulations were liberalised. In 1988 a new insurance act was adopted, which 
modernised and revised the insurance act of 1911. At the same time, a comprehensive act 
for financial institutions was adopted.48 The so-called 1988 reforms reflected the market 
                                              
46 See Regulation no 3 June 28 1968 and Regulation no 9451 October 27 1969. Until then, a practice where different groups in the labour 
market were treated unequally in private pension schemes, and where benefits were measured out for each individual on an 
approximate basis, was carried out. 
47 The obligations to invest in bonds were removed in 1985; Karlsen and Nilsen 1997:392). 
48 Insurance Activities Act of June 10 1988 no 39 and Act no 40 June 10 1988 concerning financial activities and financial institutions 
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ideology of the 1980s and liberalised the regulatory framework on several issues. A 
separate portfolio regulation for insurance companies was implemented, which stressed 
that “assets were to be managed due to considerations about security, risk diversification, returns and 
liquidity”.49  Hence, the prudent man principle of risk diversification was implemented into 
Norwegian legislation. 
 
Even though the 1988 reforms led to some liberalisation on portfolio regulation, 
substantial quantitative restrictions on investments remained. Maximum equity exposure 
was first set to 12 percent (Knutsen 2000: 275; Nordby 1996: 20) and then lifted to 20 
percent in 1990. Moreover, holding shares issued in one company were first not to exceed 
10 percent of the respective company total stocks, and later raised to 15 percent in 1990. 
Furthermore, restrictions were also set on other assets regarded as risky or illiquid.50  
 
During the 1980s, Norwegian foreign exchange regulations were gradually removed (St. 
meld. no 2 (1989-90): 75). Life insurance companies were consequently allowed to invest 
abroad and diversify risk into international equity markets. Due to concerns about 
exchange rate risk, provisions of currency matching were however set forward. These 
stressed that custodians of pension insurance were at any time required to hold at least 80 
percent of its financial assets in the currency of which its insurance liabilities are located. 
If all liabilities remain in Norway, these functionally legitimised provisions meant a de 
facto restriction on foreign investments to 20 percent of insurance-based assets. 
 
In 1993 the insurance act and many of its adjoining regulations were also applied on 
pension funds.51 From this point, all pension fund managers were more or less subject to 
the same regulatory provisions on asset management. The new framework liberalised 
investment restrictions laid down for pension funds, but did also implement new 
restrictions and requirements. Pension funds were for example not to possess stocks, 
                                              
49 Regulations on asset management, September 8 1989 no 930. 
50 Maximum 30 percent was allowed invested in loans not guaranteed by the Norwegian government, local governments and 
Norwegian financial institutions; loans guaranteed by certificates issued by others institutions than mentioned above; and 
investments in illiquid property. 
51 Regulations on Incurance Activities Act’s applications on pension funds, February 19 1993 no 117, the so called pension fund regulations. Pension 
funds had for a long time not been regarded as insurance activities, as they did not distribute services beyond the company for 
which they were established. 
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shares or any forms for own capital in the enterprise, for which it was established.52 In 
1997 the portfolio regulation for life insurers and pension funds was revised and replaced 
by a new asset management regulation,53 which led to a more detailed regulation of 
investment opportunities. In 1998 the investment ceiling in equities was further lifted to 
35 percent for custodians’ technical provisions of insurance-based liabilities 
(Kredittilsynet: 1998).  
 
At the turn of the century Norwegian authorities advocated that this limit was not to be 
interpreted absolutely, but applied to the extent of custodians’ risk bearing capacity (e.g. 
regarded in relation to the size of buffer capital, se chapter 4.3.3). In 2001, custodians 
were required to assess so-called stress-test analyses on a current basis to examine 
whether buffer capital is adequate in relation to actual market risk exposure on assets.54 
The objective is to assess how any negative developments in markets affect fund 
managers´ balances and capacity to meet its liabilities. According to Kredittilsynet (2007), 
such tests have now become a central tool in custodians’ asset management. Stress tests 
are arguably a step towards more prudential risk-based supervision, where quantitative 
restrictions on assets are not interpreted as absolute measures anymore.55 According to 
the MoF, these tests are primarily to be employed as a supervisory tool in asset 
management, and should not be regarded as something which should lead to formalised 
requirements on asset allocations (ibid: 45). Hence, investment ceilings prevail. 
 
From the 1980s and onwards product developments in financial industry have blurred the 
line between life insurance products and general saving products.56 Capitalised saving 
products on a defined contribution basis (DC) were however not incorporated into the 
Norwegian tax regime for occupational pensions until 2001.57 Unlike DB pension 
                                              
52 Other forms for securities issued by the sponsor as, well as loans to the company, were not to exceed 20 percent of the fund’s 
assets. 
53 Regulations in asset management, April 23 377 no 377. 
54 Stress test analyses allow custodians to consider their capacity to bear losses on investments in securities. As a minimum these 
analyses should entail the capacity to meet following stress-scenarios: a 30 percent downturn on the Oslo Stock Exchange, a 20 
percent downturn in international equitiy markets, and a parallel shift in interest rates of 2 percent in international and Norwegian 
markets (Kredittilsynet 2001). If necessary, stress tests should also entail assessments on exchange-rate risk. 
55 The solidity norms reflected in stress tests are rather based on a qualitative approach, where risk-models apply more directly to 
each financial institution’s positions than any pre-determined quantitative investment ceilings. 
56 An important distinction between insurance products and saving products is, however, that while the first promises certain 
benefits or guaranteed returns on investments, the latter do not entail such forms for insurance.    
57 Defined contribution plans (DC) were allowed for individual pension schemes (IPA) in 1997. 
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schemes, which mostly have been managed on a pooled basis, portfolios of DC plans 
were required organised separately, due to the absence of risk sharing elements. In a DC 
pension plan each fund member is allowed to make his or her own asset allocation and 
freely design its portfolio.58 Consequently, investment risks are individualised, borne by 
those that determine the asset allocations. The emergence of DC plans in the Norwegian 
occupational pension regime represents a major liberalisation regarding portfolio 
regulation and risk management policies. 
 
In 2006 a new insurance act was implemented, which provided a new structure for how to 
categorise life insurers´ portfolios into three classes (cf. NOU 2001: 24)):  
• A jointly pooled portfolio covering all technical provisions due to its insurance-based liabilities, which is subject 
to quantitative portfolio regulations set forward as risk is borne by custodians.  
• Individual investment portfolios of unit-linked/DC products, where allocations are carried out based on 
individual preferences. Market risk is then borne by each employee.  
• Custodians’ own funds (free assets), which are to be employed in cases of insolvency, but invested freely by 
custodians. 
A revised asset management regulation for life insurers and pension funds is in 
preparation and is expected to come into force in 2008. It is expected that this would 
liberalise investment ceilings, but it is yet not clear how much, cf. chapter 5.2. 
4.3.1.2 Changes in custodians’ asset allocation 
The changes in Norwegian portfolio regulation for life insurance companies and pension 
funds indicate a gradual move in prudential direction. How is this reflected in custodians’ 
investment pattern? Figure 4.1 demonstrates that one of the most profound changes 
during the 1990s has been the growing importance of equities. This concerns both life 
insurers and pension funds.  For life insurers equities accounted for about 10 percent of 
total assets in the early 1990s. At the turn of the century, equities accounted for about 1/3 
of total assets. For pension funds the relative share in equities has risen even faster, from 
about 6 percent of total assets in 1990 to 27 percent in 2000. The turmoil in international 
securities markets from 2000 led to a substantial fall in pension funds and life insurers 
exposure in equities. As figure 4.1 illustrates, this concerned life insurers in particular, 
                                              
58 The portfolio might be composed of shares in securities funds, shares in specific investment portfolios and/or cash 
denominated in bank deposits. 
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where the exposure in equities in 2002 was reduced to the level of the early 1990s. Life 
insurers have thereafter been more reluctant to invest in equities than pension funds.59 
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In spite of increased investments in the equity markets, and deregulation of bond-related 
investment requirements, bonds have sustained its position as the most important 
investment category. A long-term trend in the asset allocation has also been the declining 
importance of loans as an asset category.61  
 
Investments in foreign securities markets did also increase substantially during the 1990s 
and represented a universal trend in asset allocation. Figure 4.2 reveals that life insurers 
and pension funds’ foreign investments have proved a growing importance in this period. 
In the early 1990s life insurers’ allocations in foreign equities and bonds were less than 20 
percent of total investments in these securities. In 2000 more than 60 percent of the 
allocation in equities were invested abroad. Pension funds, which were not allowed to 
                                              
59 Private pension funds have been more exposed in equities than municipal pension funds. 
60 The figure derives from numbers provided by SSB´s bank of statistics (http://statbank.ssb.no/statistikkbanken). Prior to 1997 
these numbers rest on booked values, while from 1997 an onwards market values are employed in SSB statistics. For pension 
funds both private and municipal pension funds are included.  
61 Loans have historically been an important asset category, due to the credit regulations that financial institutions were subject to 
in the post-war period.  
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invest abroad until 1993 when the asset management regulation for life insurance 
companies was employed on pension funds, have also increased its investments abroad. 
This concerns equities in particular. Pension funds have traditionally been more biased 
towards domestic markets than life insurers.  
 
Figure 4.2. Pension funds and life insurers’ investments in equities and bonds abroad as percent 
























































Foreign equities - pension funds
Foreign bonds - pension funds
Foreign equities - life insurers
Foreign bonds and certificates - life insurers  
Even though investments abroad have grown substantially, the figure also reveals that 
large parts of these custodians’ assets are still denominated in domestic markets. When 
accounting for the size and importance of the Norwegian equity markets compared to 
European markets, the home-bias of fund managers´ investments are arguably still 
evident. Moreover, the figure reveals that in times of substantial economic turmoil and 
uncertainty, the domestic orientation of fund managers’ investment pattern is reinforced. 
From 2000 and onwards the investments in international equities have been reduced, in 
particular for life insurers. According to statistics from SSB, more than 70 percent of the 
investments abroad are allocated into European markets (EU-15). About 30 percent of 
                                              
62 The figure derives from numbers provided by SSB´s bank of statistics (http://statbank.ssb.no/statistikkbanken). Prior to 1997 
these numbers rest on booked values, while from 1997 an onwards market values are employed in SSB statistics. 
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the investments in European markets were allocated in the Nordic countries, which might 
add to the home-bias account.63 
4.3.2 Scope of access 
Based on last section, it seems that the trend towards prudence has been more distinct in 
portfolio regulation, than in custodians’ asset allocation. This section observes to what 
extent strategies of cross-border activities are reflected in Norwegian legislation and in 
custodians’ conduct of providing pension related services across Norwegian borders. 
Liberal licensing regulations and ownership legislation so that national borders are 
transparent both for foreign and domestic fund managers would in this case indicate a 
prudential orientation of the risk management regime. 
4.3.2.1 Changes in licensing regulation and ownership legislation  
Until the 1980s the Norwegian insurance sector was strongly biased towards national 
protection and limited competition.  Liberalisation processes and market ideology of the 
1980s led to a deregulation of industry’s own market regulatory initiatives (cartels) and a 
modernisation of the financial regulatory framework (Knutsen and Ecklund 2000). The 
reforms in the late 1980s put emphasis on sustaining fair competition in Norwegian 
markets, rather than considerations about societal demand, which previously had been 
common. Hence, the Norwegian market for occupational pensions have since the 1980s 
increasingly been exposed to competitive dynamics.64 
 
Norwegian authorities put however still substantial emphasis on measures to counteract 
the emergence of too powerful financial institutions.65 The formal scope of access for 
foreign financial institutions, including foreign affiliates, was nevertheless increased under 
the 1988 reforms. These were then more or less granted licence on equal terms as 
Norwegian insurers concerning provision of life insurance services (Kjær 1992: 60). In 
                                              
63 These numbers also include non-life insurance investments. Even though, Nordic countries are important, life insurers had 
large shares allocated in the UK, Germany and the US. Life insurance companies and pension funds, accounted in the late 1990s 
for about 30 percent of all Norwegian investments in foreign denominated securities (Sundell 2000: 35).  
64 This was amplified when the pension fund regulation became implemented in 1993. Due to the growing importance of pension 
insurance services for life insurers in particular and in society in general, pension funds were also increasingly regarded as 
competitors to life insurers in this period. Large parts of the life insurance legislation were therefore deployed on pension funds. 
Nonetheless, pension funds are only allowed to manage pension benefits for employees of the company, for which it is 
established. Hence, competition is only established as long as sponsors consider establishment of own pension funds’ as an 
alternative to purchasing services from a life insurer. 
65 Domestic regional policy considerations were however considered more important than building international competitive 
institutions (Ecklund and Knutsen 2000; NOU 1986: 5). 
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1994 the principles of one single license under home country control were implemented 
in Norwegian life insurance legislation, which also concerned the freedom of cross-border 
provision of life insurance services.  
 
While the scope of access on life insurance services was deregulated at an early point of 
time, the eligibility of tax deductible occupational pensions required that contributions 
were made to Norwegian licensed life insurance companies or pension funds. These entry 
restrictions implied that only subsidiaries of foreign life insurance companies were allowed 
to provide such services. In 2001 a comprehensive revision of the framework for 
occupational pensions was done. At the same time, EEA licensed foreign affiliates localised 
in Norway were also permitted to provide tax stimulated pension products. The 
requirement of being established in Norway was considered important, as this would 
reduce risk of tax fraud by employers or financial institutions, compared to cross-border 
provision where non-existent or not adequate sanction mechanisms were apparent (NOU 
1998: 1; Bull 2002). Norwegian localisation would also make it easier to ensure that all 
custodians fulfil the social obligations embedded in tax stimulated occupational pension 
products. 
 
As noted above, the 2001 pension reforms also allowed for tax deductibility on DC 
pension schemes. This extended the formal scope of access to include several types of 
financial institutions, e.g. banks and securities funds, in the provision of DC pension 
plans. Life insurance companies were until recently required to manage funds of these 
plans in separate unit linked companies.66 The new insurance activity act, which was 
implemented in 2006, lifted the requirements that restricted management of unit-linked-
insurance and DC pension plans to separate companies for life insurers.  
 
In 2006 amendments in the occupational pension regulation were implemented, which 
abolished the requirements of establishment in Norway for foreign financial institutions 
in order to provide tax-deductible pension services (St. meld. nr 23 (2006-2007)). 
                                              
66 This relates to the strict licensing regulations on life insurance, which stress that only products containing some form of 
insurance element are allowed distributed by life insurers. Banks, unit-linked companies and securities funds are on the other hand 
not allowed to manage insurance-based DB pension products. 
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Consequently, foreign life insurance companies and pension funds may now fully engage 
in cross-border provision of fund management services for Norwegian occupational 
pension schemes. 
 
Another powerful instrument to gain access and a solid foothold in Norwegian pension 
markets is by acquisitions and take-overs. Restrictions on foreign ownership in 
Norwegian financial institutions were liberalised in 1990, when foreigners were allowed to 
own maximum 33 1/3 of a financial institution (Husevåg 1994). This restriction was 
removed in 1995. The only ownership restriction which remained was the so-called ten 
percent rule, which concerned both Norwegian and foreign shareholders of financial 
institutions. This rule set maximum ownership in a Norwegian financial institution to a 10 
percent share (NOU 1998: 14).67 Its objective was to ensure independent financial 
institutions and an independent financial sector, and to counter any undesirable 
concentration of economic power in the society (NOU 2002:3).68 In 2003 new ownership 
legislation was adopted, which put an end to the absolute 10 percent rule. Ownership 
legislation is now based on a system of more approximate judgements, where any 
shareholders that desire to aquire more than a 10 percent stake are required to apply to 
the authorities when trespassing intervals of 10, 20, 25, 33 and 50 percent ownership (Ot. 
prp. nr 50 (2002-2003)). 
4.3.2.2 Changes in Norwegian market structure and fund managers orientation 
The regulatory scope of access has consequently been liberalised in a step-by-step manner 
during the last two decades and increased the potential of actors that might engage in the 
provision of occupational pension services substantially. This concerns both financial 
institutions domestically, and from abroad. To what extent are these reflected in the 
structure of Norwegian fund management market and Norwegian custodians’ proneness 
to go abroad? 
  
                                              
67 Some exceptions were however found. Financial institutions may hold a larger stake if legitimidsed in strategic copperation, or 
fully own another financial institution. 
68 Consequently, the 10-percent rule could in this case be considered as a remnant of the old regime’s objectives to trammel 
industrial ownership of financial institutions. Today, it is also considered an important instrument to attain over-all structural 
objectives in the financial sector; e.g. to ensure that ownership structure do not conflict with competition considerations and 
solidity concerns. 
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In 1990 11 life insurance companies were licensed, of which the four largest (UNI, KLP, 
Storebrand, Vital) accounted for about 80 percent of total life insurance assets (St. meld. 9 
(1991-1992).69 At the same time there was 143 private pension funds and 40 municipal 
pension funds. In 2006, 9 life insurance companies, 91 private pension funds and 28 
municipality pension funds were in activity (Kredittilsynet 2007). There has consequently 
been a decline in the number of Norwegian licensed life insurers and pension funds. 
Moreover, a further concentration of life insurance assets seems to have occurred. At the 
end of 2005 three life insurance companies (Vital, KLP and Storebrand) comprised for 
about 90 percent of total life insurance assets.70 Life insurance companies represent a 
market share of more than ¾ of the defined benefit occupational pension market (Aamo 
2002). Pension funds account for the remaining share. From 2001 securities funds and 
banks were also allowed to set up tax-deductible DC occupational pension schemes. It 
seems however that more than 90 percent of these schemes have been established in a life 
insurance companies (FNH 2007). Banks have in particular played an insignificant role.  
 
Foreign entrance into Norwegian life and pension insurance markets has been rare until 
the late 1990s.71 The only foreign-owned subsidiary of some significance in Norwegian life 
and pension market is Nordea life.72 The importance of foreign affiliates and financial 
institutions engaging in cross-border provision in Norwegian life and pension markets is 
insignificant. Even though, an increasing number of foreign financial institutions have 
notified Kredittilsynet in accordance with EEA regulations about their desire to take part 
in the Norwegian market,73 the actual significance of foreign life insurers has been much 
more modest. According to SSB (data provided on my request), only 8 foreign affiliates 
are actually present in the Norwegian markets. Total assets held in custody by foreign 
affiliates accounted in 2005 for about NOK 6 billion. Their minor importance must 
primarily be regarded in relation to Norwegian tax regulation and the practice of tax-
                                              
69 This share has traditionally been even more concentrated when considering these institutions’ respective share in the 
occupational pension market (excl. pension funds). KLP, did for a long time retain monopoly in the municipal pension market, 
while Storebrand maintained a dominant position in the private sector. 
70 Estimates based on FNH (2006b) 
71 In 1990, only two Swedish life insurance companies were present in Norwegian life insurance markets (St. meld. no 9 (1991-
1992). Due to the practices carried out in Norwegian tax regulation, these were however not allowed to manage tax deductible 
p nsion schemes. e
72 This occurred when Kreditkassen was acquired by Merita Nordbanken in 1999. Nordea life has a market share of about 5 
percent in the Norwegian market for life and pension insurance (Kredittilsynet 2007b). 
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deduction. Table 4.1 illustrates the insignificance of import of such services compared 
with total domestic production and consumption. This might however change in the 
future, as access to tax stimulated pension schemes has been liberalised lately. 
 
Table 4.1. Life insurance and pension fund services. Annual production and consumption, 
exports and imports. NOK mill.74 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Life insurance services              
Norwegian production 3414 2397 2481 2820 2900 2186 2384 2278 2225 947 3334 4778 4876 
Imported services 3 2  1 5 7 16 79 29 3 9 17  
Exported services 9 25 17 12 25 52 27 18 41 16 162 61  
Norwegian consumption 3408 2374 2464 2809 2880 2141 2373 2339 2213 934 3181 4734 4876 
              
Pension fund services              
Norwegian production -138 219 634 473 439 430 507 437 46 50 243 361 496 
Norwegian consumption -138 219 634 473 439 430 507 437 46  50 243 361 496 
 
Table 4.1 also reveals that Norwegian life insurance companies’ engagement abroad 
(export) has been insignificant. Any cross-border transactions for pension funds have not 
taken place. Again, this must primarily be regarded in relation to tax regulation and 
practices on tax-deductibility across Europe, cf. chapter 3. In 1999 Storebrand established 
the subsidiary Euroben in Ireland in partnership with two Swedish life insurers. The 
objective was to provide pan-Scandinavian pension schemes for Scandinavian 
multinationals, which was not tax-deductible in Norway. A few years later this project was 
closed down due to failing interest among Scandinavian multinationals. In 2005 
Storebrand established an affiliate in Sweden to market occupational pension services in 
the Swedish market. In sum, the Norwegian initiatives in life and pension markets abroad 
have been trivial. 
 
There has been a tendency for pension funds to outsource its asset management to more 
specialised management companies. The domestic orientation is however also evident on 
these matters. According to the pension fund inquiry, which I have carried out (cf. annex 
1), none of the responding pension funds have discussed moving parts of asset 
management abroad, even though this meant more advantageous regulatory terms. This 
inquiry also reveals that about 70 percent of pension funds purchased all or some asset 
                                                                                                                                             
73 The notification procedures are important elements for achieving the EEA principles of one single licence subject to home 
country control and mutual recognition of regulatory and supervisory bodies. 
74 Numbers are provided by SSB on my request, cf. also Hansen and Olsen (1998: 32-33).    
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management services from other custodians. Less than two percent, however, have to 
some extent purchased financial and judicial services from foreign institutions. Hence, 
pension funds prove a strong reliance on Norwegian actors on these matters.75 
 
To conclude, even though the regulatory scope of access has been liberalised in a step-by-
step manner during the last two decades, these markets are not characterised by 
transnational activities and any competition in this market mainly remains within 
Norwegian borders. 
4.3.3 Scope of authority 
The last section of this chapter assesses how regulatory authority is designed and carried 
out. This concerns to what extent a few prudent market-conform regulations have 
become more important than providing a regulatory framework that put emphasis on 
social objectives and fund security. I will particularly address issues that have relevance for 
asset management.  
4.3.3.1 Fiscal regulations and social policy objectives in occupational pensions 
Issues of social distribution are vital in the Norwegian pension system. Due to tax 
deductibility, occupational pensions have been a key element in Norwegian welfare 
provision since 1911. Premiums and contributions made by employers or employees and 
the investment returns on accrued funds are exempted from taxation, while payments in 
retirement are taxed. According to the National budget for 2007 the loss of tax income 
(so-called tax expenditure) was calculated to NOK 14 billion in 2006 (St. meld. nr. 1 
(2006-2007)).76  This is a considerable amount compared to equivalent tax expenditure in 
2000, which was calculated to NOK 2 billion (St. meld. nr. 1 (2000-2001)). The growth is 
primarily related to the increase in accrued funds and contributions to these pension 
schemes. 
 
 As noted, fiscal regulations have also been employed to shape the market for 
occupational pensions in accordance with some larger social objectives. Fiscal stimuli 
                                              
75 Norway is by no means a special case on these matters. A report from CEIOPS demonstrated that the cross-border 
development of institutions for occupational retirement provision has been modest. By the end of January 2007 competent 
authorities reported less than 50 cases that operated on a cross-border basis. (CEIOPS 2007). 
76 Cf. chapter 4.5. in St. meld. nr 1 (2006-2007) for more information in these estimates. 
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have been established (and legitimised with) in order to overcome the problems of short-
sightedness regarding retirement savings. For Norwegian authorities, it has been 
important to maintain this regime and the social objectives comprised in tax regulations 
(St. meld 35 (1994-95)). Paternalistic arguments of inciting more long term saving for own 
retirement and continuance of a stable framework on these matters, as well as sustaining 
the social content and profile of supplementary pensions, have been stressed in debates 
on the relevance of tax stimulation in this context (NOU 1994: 6; St. meld. no 35 (1994-
95)). Consequently, fiscal regulations have acted as a key catalyst for how the regime for 
occupational pension has been oriented and organised. Only funded plans that included 
earning-related, insurance-based, defined benefit pension schemes provided by life 
insurers or pension funds were tax-deductible. Embedded in these plans were then social 
elements and objectives concerning which risks that were considered politically acceptable 
and how to prevent undesired risks. Such social elements were embedded in both 
insurance legislation and tax regulations.  
 
While product control in the life insurance act became deregulated during the 1990s, the 
product control remained in the tax provisions until 2001. Then defined contribution 
pension plans (DC) were made tax-deductible and incorporated into the Norwegian 
regime. These pension reforms represented unprecedented changes for the traditional 
Norwegian regime, where principles of tax exemption had been rather stable for almost a 
century. As noted, risk is borne by each fund member in these plans.77 For custodians, 
however, these schemes imply a less comprehensive regulatory framework to take into 
consideration compared to the framework for defined benefit pension schemes (DB). 
Asset management are arguably more easily performed in these saving based plans than 
for the insurance based plans.78 Consequently, these products are apparently regarded 
more market-conform than traditional insurance-based DB plans.  
 
The impact of DC pension schemes in the Norwegian regime was however modest until 
occupational pensions became mandatory in 2006 (FNH 2007). Then, all employers were 
                                              
77 In cases of substantial market volatility no compensation is offered for losses on members accrued benefits, which is the case in 
traditional DB pension schemes. Only contributions are fixed in DC plans, while life-long benefits are not guaranteed. 
 63
From a paternalistic risk management regime to European prudence? 
compelled to establish a pension scheme for all employees and to include those with a 20 
percent position or more (NOU 2005:15; Ot. prp nr 10 (2005-2006)). According to a Fafo 
study about 600 000 employees in private sector were not covered by any occupational 
pension scheme (Veland 2004). It seems that most of these new contracts were signed in 
DC pension schemes. In 2005 less than 5 000 DC contracts had been signed, while this 
numbers exceeded 60 000 contracts in 2006 (FN 2007). At the same time, the number of 
DB pension schemes that were transposed into DC pension schemes doubled. Hence, 
even though DB pensions still represent a majority of Norwegian 2nd pillar pension plans, 
DC pensions have gotten a solid foothold and represented a market share of 18 percent 
in the life insurance companies in 2006 (ibid).  
 
Moreover, as noted above fiscal requirements of presence in Norway in order to provide 
tax-deductible occupational pension services in Norway were abolished in 2006. This 
would arguably pose challenges to the Norwegian tax authorities´ ability to maintain tax 
control and to prevent tax fraud on issues of tax exemptions to schemes registered 
abroad. Furthermore, it would challenge Norwegian supervisory authorities´ ability to 
control that custodians provide pension services in accordance with Norwegian tax 
regulations. An overview of foreign pension funds that offer pension schemes can best be 
obtained by the introduction of a reporting obligation (Ot. prp. nr 1 (2004-2005).  
 
On the other hand, the social principles of egalitarianism and proportionality have been 
carried on in the new pension regime for both DB and DC pension schemes and even 
extended on some key issues.79 A key element in Norwegian welfare state policies is the 
norm about equal treatment between men and women. This norm has however been 
difficult to attain in occupational pension provision, due to different demographic 
patterns between genders. A typical DB product would compel sponsors to make higher 
contributions for women than men in order to safeguard equal pension benefits for men 
and women in retirement. This might however have distorting effects on women in the 
                                                                                                                                             
78 While administration costs in a DB plan are about 25 to 30 percent of total pension costs, this percentage is only 5 to 10 
percent in DC plans, according to an insurance broker (Økonomisk Rapport 19/2002). 
79 In DC plans the principle of egalitarianism refers to requirements that all employees in a company are to be included in the 
pension scheme in order to gain tax deductions, and that contributions are measured on an equal basis for all fund members. 
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labour market as it might produce disincentives to employ women. The debate on gender-
neutral contributions has been accentuated due to two separate developments.  
• When DC pensions became implemented in the Norwegian regime the issues of 
equality, proportionality and neutrality in relation to gender got a new dimension. In 
order to achieve these principles, i.e. to prevent that annual pension payments are 
determined by different longevity between genders, employers that set up DC 
pensions schemes were obliged to set higher for women than men (cf. NOU 2001: 
27). This was adopted in 2002, cf. chapter 5.3.1. 
• Moreover, the aspects of gender and age neutrality in DB pensions were also raised to 
the political agenda. The demographic differences between men and women have 
traditionally been regulated differently in private and municipal life insurance 
companies. While gender and age neutral pension products have been allowed in 
municipal sector, this has not been allowed in private sector. In 2006 it became 
allowed to distribute gender-neutral pension schemes on a voluntary basis also in 
private sector (St. meld. nr. 23 (2006-2007)), cf. chapter 5 for more information on 
these issues.  
4.3.3.2 From product control to consumer protection and increased emphasis on solidity 
measures 
Strict product control and detailed control of custodians´ investments had made any 
regulations on capital requirements redundant. These provisions were implemented to 
reduce risks for economic failure, among other things. Emphasis was put on attaining 
social policy motives, rather than financial stability and solvency controls. The 1988-
reforms changed some of this. The 1988 reforms were more biased towards enforcing 
increased competition in Norwegian financial markets.80 Moreover, a general trend 
towards liberalisation of several regulatory requirements in the old regime started. This 
was supposed to benefit customers greatly, but also called for improved consumer 
protection and fund security. Several measures were carried out to achieve these 
objectives, e.g.: 
• Transcripts disclosing accrued benefits and returns on accumulated funds that exceeded the 
promised interest rate were to be issued annually by custodians 
                                              
80 Custodians of occupational pensions resorted to the Ministry of Social Affairs until 1986. Then these came under the regulatory 
responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance. During the last decades much regulatory competencies have been delegated to 
Kredittilsynet. 
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• At least 65 percent of returns exceeding the promised interest rates were to be distributed to 
customers’ accounts on an annual basis. Funds transferred were irrevocable. 
• Portability rights were adopted to increase competition and to ensure that customers didn’t 
lose accrued rights when changing custodian  
 
Improved solidity measures also became increasingly urgent for Norwegian authorities in 
order to sustain financial stability and fair competition among financial institutions and to 
protect consumers (St. meld 2 1991-92). Capital adequacy regulations were implemented 
for insurance companies in 1991 and pension funds in 1993. Custodians were then 
required to hold a capital base (reserves) of 8 percent in order to be operational. This 
capital is considered as an important buffer against substantial under-capitalisation in 
situations of considerable market instability. Assets are to be rated by risk based on the 
different items on custodian’s balance sheet. Hence, the capital adequacy requirements 
reflect the risk profile of custodians’ balances, and might therefore also have an impact on 
how assets are allocated.81 These requirements first and foremost address credit-biased 
risks, which is the benefit for creditors. Their objective is to secure creditors’ assets and to 
hinder panic if a financial institution should fail, which eventually could cause instability in 
the financial system. The liability side is not accounted for in these requirements.  
Arguably, these requirements are not in particular biased towards the kind of market risk 
that custodians are mostly exposed to.  
 
In the mid 1990s several new solidity measures were implemented (St. meld. no 13 (1994-
95)).  
• In order to prevent pension providers in outbidding each other, a fixed ceiling on 
maximum guaranteed interest rate to fund members in defined benefit pension 
schemes was implemented in 1993.82  
• Another key solidity measure was to improve fund managers opportunities to 
establish buffer capital exceeding capital requirements, which could be deployed in 
                                              
81 The calculation base consists of assets held by the financial institution multiplied with the risk weight for the different asset 
categories. Equities are rated with a 100 percent weight, while bonds are given a 20 to 50 percent weight. These are considered as 
expressions for the risk of loss, which the particular asset entails (NOU 2000: 9, p 121).  
82 Due to the long-term relationship of pensions and uncertainty of short-term market returns, it was considered important to 
keep interest rates at a reasonable level. A promise of high interest rates would reinforce market risk for custodians, while low 
interest rates would put more market risk on sponsors, as employees are entitled to a future defined benefit. The interest rate was 
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periods when market returns was lower than guaranteed interests. Both carrot (tax 
stimuli) and stick (instructions) were employed. These buffers would benefit long-
term management by making it more advantageous to hold larger stakes in equities 
characterised by short-term volatility but that are likely to provide higher returns in 
the long run.83 
• In 1995, solvency requirements were implemented (but only for life insurers). Unlike 
capital adequacy requirements, these are calculated on conditions concerning the 
insurance activities themselves, and stem from considerations about insurance risk and 
scope of liabilities that an insurance company holds. The objective of solvency 
requirements therefore is to ensure that life insurance companies are able to meet its 
liabilities at any time. This means that Norwegian life insurers are required to achieve 
two sets of minimum capital requirements.  
 
Different forms of buffer capital have gained increased importance in the risk 
management framework and custodians’ capacity to deal with market risks. Figure 4.3 
demonstrates how size of this capital might fluctuate in time due to market volatility. 
Substantial cross-institutional variance might also exist. Pension funds have also 
demonstrated growing buffers, and these did in 2006 account for about 17 percent of 
total assets, i.e. twice of life insurers´ buffers (Kredittilsynet 2007b: 30).  
 
Figure 4.3. The development of buffer capital in life insurance companies. Percent of total assets. 






















                                                                                                                                             
not to exceed 3 percent per annum for new contracts. In light of low level of interest rates, this was set to concern all pension 
schemes in 2004, regardless of the date on which the contract was entered into (St. meld. nr 37 (2003-2004). 
83 Detailed provisions of how returns on these buffers were to be shared between customers and custodians were also set 
forward.  
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Not all of these policies which have been set forward to ensure fair competition in a 
framework that also put emphasis on consumer protection and fund security can be 
regarded as market-conform regulations. Parts of the measures set forward arguably 
favours short-term asset management on long-term liabilities by reducing custodians´ 
capacity to hold equities (in particular in cases of low buffers) and at the same time fulfil 
the short-term requirements that are set forward in regulations (Kredittilsynet 2003).84 
This concerns for example that the returns exceeding the guaranteed interest rate are to 
be allocated on an annual basis. These requirements must be considered as a general 
distrust to markets when it comes to ensuring affordable benefits for fund members in 
the long run.  
 
A new insurance act (the act on insurance companies, pension funds and pension 
companies and their activities) was implemented in 2006 (St. meld. nr 23 (2006-2007)). 
This provides a clearer distinction between the assets of the insured and those of the 
company, a clearer distribution of risk between customer and company and a clearer 
pricing of life insurance products. One objective is to avoid unintended effects on asset 
management.85 In general the new legal framework stresses that: 
“innslaget av handlenormer i den offentlige reguleringen kunne reduseres og erstattes” av et regelverk 
utformet som et ”rammeverk” for markedsaktørenes handlefrihet supplert med bestemmelser som 
fastlegger ”de ytre grenser” for handlefriheten (NOU 2001: 24, p 18; NOU 2004: 24). 
How to enable long-term asset management and at the same time ensure desired 
consumer protection, solidity and fund member security are complicated issues, which are 
still debated and in process.   
 
To conclude, the scope of authority has not been changed in a clear-cut direction. 
Changes have entailed liberalisation, introduction of more market-conform pension 
products and more emphasis on competition on the one hand, and substantial re-
regulation and continuity (and even extension) of key social principles on the other hand. 
It seems that the re-regulatory efforts have been more widely employed than characterised 
                                              
84 In particular this concerned the combination of portability rights and annual distribution of returns to customers’ accounts, 
which has entailed increased complexity for custodians (e.g. concerning ownership of assets) and might also have harmful 
consequences for asset management.  
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by any prudential framework. More emphasis has however been put on financial 
regulations which primary objective is to ensure financial institutions´ solidity. 
4.4 SUMMARY – BETWEEN CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 
Occupational pensions are of growing importance in Norway. At the same time, there are 
long traditions for relying on funded pension schemes, which dominates Norwegian 
second pillar pension provision. A Norwegian regime for occupational pensions came 
into force about 50 years prior to the establishment of the National Insurance Scheme. In 
chapter this chapter I have assed to what extent the Norwegian regime has been 
transposed in a certain direction concerning how to deal with risks in fund management 
of occupational pensions. A common regime distinction on these matters is between 
paternalistic and prudent man regimes. I have therefore analysed the development along 
three dimensions (the scopes of assets, access and authority) in order to examine if there 
has been a regime shift. Attention has been given to both regulative policy output and 
market behaviour outcome.  
 
My argument is that this regime at an early point of time took a national, paternalistic 
orientation. Moreover, the Norwegian regime for occupational pensions was rather stable 
for almost a century. From the late 1980s, considerable regulatory activities have taken 
place. During this period, changes in Norwegian portfolio regulation for life insurance 
companies and pension funds have indicated a gradual move in prudential direction. A 
fully prudential framework is however yet to be implemented. A more liberal investment 
regime has led to increased importance of international equity markets. Nonetheless, large 
parts of custodians´ assets are however still allocated in Norwegian markets. Moreover, 
even though the importance of equities in asset allocation has increased, their role has 
been rather modest compared to equities ceilings set forward. 
 
The regulatory scope of access has also been liberalised in a step-by-step manner during 
the last two decades and has substantially increased the potential of actors that might 
provide occupational pension services. These steps have occurred in life insurance 
                                                                                                                                             
85 Ownership of funds is now suggested categorised into three portfolios; one jointly pooled portfolio covering insurance 
liabilities; one consisting of individual investment portfolios; and finally custodians’ own capital (cf. 4.3.3). Custodians’ ownership 
of surpluses is suggested limited to any returns on own funds, while customers are entitle to returns on other funds. 
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legislation, tax regulations and ownership legislation. The formal scope has been extended 
for both domestic financial institutions (banks and securities funds), and for foreign 
financial institutions. Nonetheless, the impact of these changes on market behaviour has 
been very modest. These markets are not characterised by transnational activities and a 
domestic concentration within Norwegian borders are maintained. 
 
The scope of authority has not been changed in a clear-cut direction. Changes have 
entailed liberalisation, introduction of more market-conform pension products and more 
emphasis on competition on the one hand, and substantial re-regulation and continuity 
(and even extension) of key social principles on the other hand. It seems that these re-
regulatory efforts have been more widely employed than any prudential framework would 
have acknowledged. Re-regulatory emphasis has in particular been put on financial 
regulations which objective is to ensure financial institutions’ solidity. Some of these have 
constraining effects on how asset management are exercised by custodians. 
 
Given the changes on scopes of assets, access and authority as observed in this chapter, 
data do not provide a clear-cut conclusion on the question of regime change. The 
Norwegian risk regime has increasingly emerged as a hybrid model, it seems, between 
paternalism and prudence, between continuity and change. Furthermore, a general 
liberalisation of asset management regulations and deregulation of cross-border activities 
have led to re-regulation on other aspects in order to ensure security aspects related to 
fund management. A new framework is now in process to be implemented on life and 
pension activities. The new framework is likely to push the Norwegian regime further in a 
prudential direction. The impact on regime output and outcome remains yet uncertain.  
 
One evident lesson is the complexity of life and pension insurance and the 
comprehensive and multi-faceted regulatory framework for risk management, under 
which these custodians are subject. Furthermore, processes of liberalisation have 
proceeded along with re-regulatory activities and initiatives. Next chapter assesses these 
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5 NORWEGIAN ADAPTATION TO EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION 
”Samtidig utgjør regelverket og reguleringsregimet for norsk finanssektor samlet sett rammevilkår som er 
av stor betydning for sektorens internasjonale konkurranseevne…Det er viktig at regelverket og 
reguleringsregimet til enhver tid utformes og praktiseres slik at det legges til rette for velfungerende 
finansmarkeder og en effektiv finansnæring. Det ikke minst nødvendig for å sikre norsk finansnæring 
mest mulig likeverdige konkurransevilkår. Sett i forhold til det omfattende internasjonale regelarbeid som 
pågår, som legger føringer for norsk regelutforming, representerer dette en betydelig utfordring. Dette gjelder 
særlig i forhold til de forpliktelser som følger av EØS-avtalen.86  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Norway has been exposed to the Single European Market (SEM) regime since 1994 when 
the EEA Agreement was implemented. The implementation of the SEM more or less put 
Norwegian financial institutions and capital markets under a multi-levelled framework 
characterised by both European and Norwegian rules and regulations. Since that time, 
Norway’s relations with the EU has been substantially extended and grown deeper. In 
chapter 3 I revealed that fund management of occupational pensions have been on the 
European agenda for almost two decades. The European Commission has taken great 
interest in how this issue should be regulated and has advocated a prudential framework. 
Hence, it seems that the integrative pressures on this area have increased. At the same 
time, the Norwegian regime for fund management on occupational pensions has been 
exposed to substantial regulatory activities the last decades, cf. chapter 4.  
 
This chapter seeks to examine continuity and change in the Norwegian regime of fund 
management for occupational pensions in the context to the incitements and constraints 
that European integration poses. As noted in chapter 2, processes of Europeanisation are 
complex and multifaceted. One way of making these processes more clear-cut is to 
distinguish between institutions, interests and ideas as driving forces of change (Hall 
1997). The impact of these integrative pressures corresponds with and rests on rule-
based, interest-based and ideational adaptations at the domestic level (Claes and Tranøy 
1999). Hence, the analysis is divided into three parts. A starting point is the expectations 
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and hypotheses I presented in chapter 2. The key question is to what extent do any of 
these adaptational processes provide explanatory significance for developments in the 
Norwegian regime? Moreover, have some adaptational processes been more important 
and common than others?  
5.2 RULE-BASED ADAPTATION 
Due to the EEA Agreement Norway is compelled to continuously implement European 
regulations and standards on several policy issues. On the financial area, the principles of 
free movement of capital and freedom to provide financial services across borders are 
essential. The European framework on the financial area is institution-biased, where 
different types of financial institutions to some extent adhere to different directives. 
Unlike many other EEA member states, which have kept occupational pension 
management under a separate legal regime, life insurance companies are major custodians 
of Norwegian pension benefits. Norwegian life insurance activities became subject to EU 
regulations when the EEA Agreement was implemented. This special characteristic could 
then have made Norwegian occupational pensions exposed to rule-based adaptation at an 
early point compared to many other European countries. A political compromise on the 
so-called pension fund directive was however reached in 2003 and has arguably extended 
legal integrative pressure. Moreover, the European Commission has set forward several 
initiatives to eliminate tax-related obstacles to cross-border provision of occupational 
pensions. Other directives and regulations might also have significance. 
 
As stressed in chapter 2, it is therefore reasonable to expect that rule-based adaptation has 
been substantial on this area. I presented following hypothesis: 
Changes in the Norwegian risk management regime for occupational pensions 
have mainly occurred as a direct result of legal and institutional developments at 
the European level 
 
Hence, the first section of this analysis examines to what extent changes in the Norwegian 
regime has been a result of processes where Norwegian authorities are obliged to replace 
national regulation with European rules and regulations. Has European institution-
                                                                                                                                             
86 Minister of Finance Karl Eirik Schjøtt-Pedersen at the 100th anniversary for Norwegian financial supervision, September 7 
2000. 
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building posed substantial restrictions on regulatory measures designed to sustain national 
scopes of assets, access and authority? 87 
5.2.1 Scope of assets 
The processes of financial liberalisation and deregulation of Norwegian capital markets 
started in the 1980s prior to EEA-implementation. The EU directive on free movement 
of capital was incorporated into Norwegian legislation in 1990. Nevertheless, restrictions 
on institutional investors’ opportunities to make allocations in equities and abroad have 
remained. Arguably, the legal-institutional pressures of the EEA Agreement have not 
changed this much so far. The life directives mostly entail some minimum requirements 
that are to be met by national legislation. This concerns for example adherence to the 
principle of risk diversification. The principle of risk diversification is emphasised in order 
to ensure security, liquidity and sufficient returns on investments. These prudential 
principles of safe and sound asset management were however laid down in Norwegian 
regulatory framework already under the 1988 insurance reforms, cf. ch. 4.3.   
 
In spite of these prudential principles, Norway has still been allowed to set its own 
regulatory measures on asset allocation for fund managers subject to Norwegian 
jurisdiction. Quantitative investment restrictions have remained, and have not been lifted 
as a direct result of EEA participation, cf. chapter 5.3. The EEA Agreement compelled 
however Norwegian authorities to remove all requirements in portfolio regulation, which 
obtained a national orientation. An important exception is currency-matching regulations. 
Even though, these regulations are functionally legitimised, they sustain a de-facto 
domestic orientation on asset allocation, particularly when insurance risks (liabilities) are 
embedded in home markets. As learned in chapter 4 this is the case for Norwegian fund 
managers. The objective of currency-matching regulation is to reduce foreign exchange 
risk. Moreover, currency-matching regulations are however not only allowed, but also 
                                              
87 It should be noted that more than 90 percent of Norwegian rule-based adaptation has only required amendments in regulations, 
where the Ministry concerned immediately prepares implementation (Trondal 1999).87 This represents a challenge when analysing 
rule-based adaptation on this issue, where many issues are rather technical. Implementation of EU-regulation into Norwegian 
legislation may proceed in three different ways (Claes 2001: 8-9). Firstly, agreements on issues of particular importance that 
require legislative reforms must obtain the Parliament’s approval. Secondly, issues that require regulations or amendments of 
existing rules and regulations need to be handled in cabinet meeting and granted by governmental resolutions. Most EU-
regulations concerning the internal market do however comprise administrative and technical standards, and belong in the third 
category, where the Ministry concerned immediately prepares implementation.  
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required by EU authorities. Such regulations were however also incorporated into 
Norwegian portfolio regulation prior to EEA implementation. 
 
Most changes in portfolio regulation due to EEA implementation have been of a rather 
technical character. Perhaps the most important of these “technical” changes in portfolio 
regulation, are the requirements, which stress that investment restrictions (in the name of 
prudential control) are only to prevail on assets covering insurance-technical provisions. 
Other assets, so-called free assets (i.e. companies’ own funds and buffer capital), are 
accordingly allowed invested freely by custodians.88 A large part of Norwegian 
occupational pensions have however been subject to insurance liabilities due to the 
dominance of DB pension plans. Hence, its real impact on asset allocation has been 
rather modest.  
 
Also, more frequent re-regulatory processes and activities due to implementation of 
minimum requirements concerning e.g. asset categories, investment restrictions, currency 
matching, localisation of assets, can also be ascribed to rule-based adaptation. A main 
result of these activities has been more detailed regulations, which led to the 
implementation of a new asset management regulation in 1997. While an important 
motive for regulatory reform in 1988 concerning asset management was to make these 
regulations more clear-cut and undemanding, it seems that due to rule-based adaptation a 
more judicial detailed, complex and comprehensive framework for asset management has 
appeared. According to Aamo (2006) a general trend is that European lawmaking, often 
leads to a more complex and detailed regulatory framework than desired.  
 
The directive does also itself set forward some quantitative restrictions, which objective is 
to reduce market risks in accordance with the principle of risk diversification.89 These are 
however minimum requirements where stricter regulations were allowed if legitimised in 
risk diversification or general good considerations. Norwegian authorities did for example 
                                              
88 For Norwegian life insurers this did in fact imply a return to the regulatory framework prior to the 1988 reforms on this issue 
(Ot. prp. 77 (1993-94). Quantitative measures in portfolio regulation concerning all assets under management, did then only last 
from 1988 to 1994. 
89 E.g. investment ceilings concerning allocations in equities, bonds or loans provided by one issuer, and investments ceilings in 
unregulated markets, are set forward. 
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implement stricter provisions on custodians’ maximum holdings of equities issued by one 
single company (which in 1990 was set to a 15 percent share). When the EEA Agreement 
was implemented, the Norwegian government regarded this restriction as a guarantee for 
risk diversification (Ot. prp. 77 (1993-94). In 2001 however the government received a 
reasoned opinion from ESA, concerning its application of this restriction also on life 
insurers free assets, i.e. assets that were not to cover insurance-technical provisions (Ot. 
prp. no 78 (2000-01).90 Amendments in legislation were carried out to ensure 
compatibility with European regulations. 
 
In sum, I argue that legal developments at the European level have so far not constituted 
a breach or substantial change on matters discussed under the scope of assets. This is 
however bound to change when the new pension fund directive is fully implemented. A 
draft on a new asset management regulation that is expected to come into force in 2008 
has recently been submitted. This is now in legal preparation at the MoF. According to 
Kredittilsynet (2007) it is likely that investment ceilings will be lifted to the level of the 
minimum requirements of the directive. At the same time, new requirements on risk 
management performance will be proposed so that asset management is adjusted to each 
fund managers’ competence and risk capacities. A new asset management regulation is 
however not a consequence of rule-based adaptation alone, as the quote below indicates: 
”Sentrale deler av dagens kapitalforvaltning ble fastsatt for over ti år siden. Etter dette har det skjedd betydelige 
endringer både i kapitalforvaltningsfaget, i finansmarkedene og på tilsynssiden. Da reglene ble utformet var det lite 
innslag av grensekryssende virksomhet i det norske forsikringsmarkedet. Norske aktører opplever i dag stor 
konkurranse fra utenlandske aktører. I tillegg er et nytt pensjonskassedirektiv vedtatt.” (ibid: 45). 
5.2.2 Scope of access 
Liberalisation of the regulatory framework and practices concerning licensing regulations 
and ownership legislation also started prior to EEA implementation, cf. chapter 4.3. The 
principles of one single licence, home country control and mutual recognition were 
however implemented into Norwegian legislation in 1994. These set up and ensured more 
favourable conditions for establishing foreign affiliates abroad and to engage in cross 
border provision of services. In principle, no member state can reject foreign providers of 
life insurance products as long they are licensed in their respective EEA member state. As 
                                              
90 ESA gave reference to the ECJ decision in the Skandia-case (C-241/97), where the ECJ ruled the Swedish restriction on 
owning more than 5 percent in one company illegal (Dyrhaug 2000: 262). An argument for this restriction was also to ensure an 
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demonstrated in chapter 4, the effects of increased formal scope of access have been 
modest. This has partly to do with the regulations and practices regarding who are eligible 
to providing tax-deductible pension schemes. Due to the dominance of tax stimulated 
pension products in the Norwegian market, the effects of the life directives on 
transnational activities have been modest. As tax-deductible occupational pensions are an 
integral part of the Norwegian pension system, these have for long been considered as 
matters of national jurisdiction, even though life insurance companies in general are 
subject to EU regulations. This did for a long time legitimise a persistence of 
discriminatory provisions based on nationality also in Norway.  
 
The European Commission has lately taken great interest in removing obstacles to the 
free movement of services, which are embedded in member states tax provisions, cf. 
chapter 3. Due to legal processes at the European level, where several ECJ-rulings step-
by-step have attempted to nullify former ECJ-rulings on these issues, Norwegian 
authorities have been compelled to amend legislation. In the legal preparations to the 
2001 pension reforms when foreign affiliates were made eligible to tax-deductible pension 
schemes, Norwegian authorities referred to the ECJ decision in the Wielockx case. This 
stressed that even though direct taxation is a matter for member states´ competencies, 
member states “should comply with Community law and desist from every form for open and concealed 
discriminatory treatment legitimised in nationality” (NOU 1998: 1; NOU 1999: 32; Ot. prp. nr 47 
(1998-1999). Eligibility to life insurance companies engaging in cross-border provision 
was not given, due to the objective of maintaining coherence in the tax system and 
efficiency of tax controls (ibid).91 However, a few years later, in 2004, the ESA sent a 
latter of formal notice to the MoF on these matters (Ot. prp. nr 1 (2004-2005)). This 
occurred as the European institution building had proceeded further due to important 
ECJ rulings on the matters of tax-deductible pensions, cf. chapter 3. Norway amended its 
legislation accordingly and opened for eligibility to fund managers that operate on a cross-
border basis. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
independent role of Norwegian financial institutions and to prevent too much concentration of economic power in society.  
91 It was referred to another ECJ ruling, the Bachmann case (cf. chapter 3), on these matters. 
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Furthermore, EEA implementation has also required that all discriminatory provisions on 
nationality in ownership legislation of financial institutions have to be removed. Such 
restrictions were abolished in 1995. From the mid-1990s, the only remaining restriction in 
ownership legislation was the so-called ten-percent rule, which was applicable to all 
owners regardless of their nationality. The rule limits maximum ownership in a 
Norwegian financial institution to a ten-percent share. The rule was set forward as a legal 
anchor to achieve several objectives; 1) to ensure independent financial institutions and an 
independent financial sector; 2) to counter any undesirable concentration of economic 
power in the society; and 3) to maintain an ownership structure, which ensures that 
competition and solidity of financial institutions is sustained (NOU 1998: 14; NOU 
2002:3). In real terms the ten percent rule also maintained that if a ten-percent share was 
obtained, this was sufficient to carry out strategic control in the financial institution.92 The 
rule therefore became a famous so-called Norwegian special regulation, both domestically 
and internationally. The financial industry has stressed disapproval with the regulation 
(ibid; NOU 2000: 9).93 However, the Norwegian Parliament has repeatedly stressed the 
importance of strict application of these provisions. Furthermore, under the EEA 
negotiations the Norwegian government considered it important to sustain the ten-
percent rule, and concession to do so was given by the Commission.94  
 
Nevertheless, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) started making inquiries about 
Norwegian ownership legislation on own initiative in 1999. A letter of formal notice was 
sent in 2000 and a reasoned opinion was made in 2001. In contrast to the European 
Commission’s opinion almost a decade ago, the ESA claimed that Norwegian ownership 
legislation entails restrictions on the freedom of capital movements and concluded that 
the ten percent rule was incompatible with EEA regulations. According to ESA the 
Norwegian regulations were unjustified restrictions and not compatible with the principle 
                                              
92 Ownership legislation stressed that any bidding part in both friendly and hostile take-overs must gain acceptance from at least 
90 percent of shareholders in the financial institution at stake for attaining governmental approval. By acquiring a 10 percent share 
veto power has consequently been achieved. This occurred when Storebrand’s Norwegian competitor, Den norske Bank (DnB), 
managed to block a bid from the Finnish life insurer Sampo, even though this was welcomed by Storebrand, and eventually 
overturned the proposed cross-border acquisition. As the blocking part was a Norwegian financial institution where the 
Norwegian government at that time held a 47 percent share, accusations of patriotism and that “finance flies the flag” were also 
raised (Financial Times 21.10.2001). 
93 Norway is according to the financial industry’s (FNH) the only remaining EEA country, which has not implemented ownership 
legislation based on EU notification procedures. 
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of necessity (Dyrhaug 2000: 259). Norwegian authorities argued on the other hand that 
these regulations did not constrain the freedom of capital movements, and considered 
them non-discriminatory, just and necessary. An expert committee was set down in order 
to assess the compatibility between the Norwegian ownership framework and European 
principles (NOU 2002: 3). According to an independent expert on EU Law, it was an 
open question whether Norway would win or lose a potential case in the EFTA Court of 
Justice (ibid). 
 
The Committee recommended a system based on the principles in the EU directives.95 
Hence, due to processes of rule-based adaptation, over which a cross-country merger 
attempt in life insurance shed light (cf. footnote above on the Storebrand-Sampo case), 
the framework for ownership legislation was amended in 2003. Legislation is now based 
on a system of more approximate judgements, where shareholders that desire to acquire 
more than a 10 percent stake are required to apply to the authorities when trespassing 
intervals of 10, 20, 25, 33 and 50 percent ownership (Ot. prp. nr 50 (2002-2003). This 
framework is likely to make mergers and acquisitions substantially easier. The guiding 
lines concerning assessing suitability of the bidder remain however with Norwegian 
interests and tradition (NOU 2002: 3). 
 
In sum, legal-institutional pressures have been rather considerable on the scope of access 
lately. This has resulted in several examples of rule-based adaptation in Norwegian 
legislation. It seems evident that what was regarded as compatible with EU regulations in 
the 1990s has increasingly been regarded as incompatible in the last five-year period. Rule-
based adaptation has in particular increased the formal scope of access during this period. 
This is much owed to increased efforts and initiatives on the European level, where 
integration processes have gained speed, cf. chapter 3. The effects on market outcome are 
yet very modest, cf. chapter 4. Norwegian markets are still characterised by concentration 
of a few domestic fund manager.  
                                                                                                                                             
94 The Commission did not view the rule as any restriction on the provisions of free movement of capital, as it concerned all EEA 
market actors (St. meld. 27 (2001-02): 39). 
95 EU regulations do not entail quantitative provisions concerning maximum ownership in a financial institution. Anybody 
intending to acquire a qualified holding in a financial institution is nevertheless required to notify about this to competent 
supervisory authorities and get authorisation in advance. The notification procedures start when certain limits are trespassed.  
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5.2.3 Scope of authority 
The EU sets up a regulatory framework above the nation state, which often challenges 
national jurisdiction and domestic political objectives. The four freedoms of the SEM can 
accordingly be characterised as the four restrictions on the nation state.96 Taxation and 
social provision have however been matters subject to national jurisdiction. As noted 
above, however, the ability to design national tax provisions on its own terms has recently 
been challenged due to new ECJ rulings. This has led to amendments in the legal 
framework concerning the eligibility to tax-deductible occupational pension for foreign 
providers of these services. Rule-based adaptation can however not explain other changes 
and reforms that concerns taxation and social provision. 
 
In the EEA framework the regulatory authority of financial institutions rests on the 
principle home country control. This implies that it is the country in which the financial 
institution’s headquarter resides, that has the responsibility for granting license and 
undertake financial supervision, cf. chapter 3.2. Due to the domestic orientation fund 
managers’ liabilities (cf. chapter 4), Norwegian authorities arguably still play a vital role on 
life insurance and pension related issues. As noted, Norway is however compelled to 
implement the minimum standards laid down in relevant directives. Moreover, according 
to the directives national authorities might on several issues implement stricter 
requirements on domestic fund managers than laid down in the directives.97 Generally, 
the Norwegian lawmakers have interpreted the EU directives as minimum requirements, 
and stressed that 
“the EEA regulatory framework is not exhaustive, and that Norwegian authorities should consequently 
not desist from implementing complementary rules and regulations” (NOU 1998: 14, p 50). 
 
                                              
96 European rules and regulations might entail various types of obligations: 1) Provisions requiring that the national law shall 
contain rules of a particular content, 2) provisions requiring that the national regulatory measures shall at least meet a particular 
minimum standard, 3) provisions requiring the adoption of national regulatory measures designed to achieve a particular objective 
or to be consistent with particular guidelines, 4) provisions merely asking for the adoption of national rules on a particular subject 
without indicating anything as to the content of the rules, and 5) provisions prohibiting national rules of a particular content 
(Selvig 1999: 230-231).  
97 National rules and regulations might be invoked if legitimised with reference to the general good. These exceptions are however 
not to discriminate against foreign competitors, show reasonableness in relation to its target and demonstrate that they are 
objectively essential to meet this target. Nonetheless, general good principles are often disputed, as they call for national special 
regulations and may impede the four freedoms. 
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Minimum standards are for example laid down concerning appropriate solidity measures 
in order to ensure soundness of the financial institution. EU regulatory policies are 
however institution-biased, which means that different directives are adopted for different 
financial institutions. Different solidity measure are then set forward to deal with the 
different types of risks that financial institutions are exposed to. For banks and credit 
institutions this concerns requirements on capital adequacy, which objective is to reduce 
credit-based risks. For life insurance companies certain solvency requirements have to be 
met, which objective is to reduce insurance-based risks on the liability side. Norwegian 
legislators have however also carried out the credit-biased capital adequacy requirements 
for banks on Norwegian life insurance companies and pension funds. These requirements 
came into force prior to the EEA-regulations, as this framework rests on the legal 
processes of the Basle Committee.98 Solvency requirements have been implemented for 
insurance companies, but have yet not been exercised for pension funds. The 
implementation of the pension fund directive in will however also require solvency 
measures on pension funds. 
 
Norwegian legislators have consequently applied EU regulations on a broader basis than 
required due to the EEA minimum standards. Even though, financial industry has 
disapproved with these special Norwegian regulations (e.g. NOU 1998: 14; FNH 2000; 
FNH 2006), Norwegian authorities have stressed the importance of a comprehensive 
regulatory framework, which put emphasis on security and fair competition between 
different types of domestic financial institutions.99 The application of EU regulations on a 
broader basis than necessary is also valid concerning how Norwegian authorities have 
employed EEA-relevant regulations for life insurance companies on pension funds. 
Pension fund have been exposed to EU-regulations on these matters since 1993, even 
though a pension fund directive was first adopted in 2003. An objective for Norwegian 
authorities has been to establish equal terms of trade for these custodians. 
 
                                              
98 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides an international forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory 
matters. Its objective is to enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision 
worldwide. 
99 The origin of credit-biased regulations for Norwegian life insurers must be regarded in relation to the historically unique role of 
credits and loans on life insurance companies and pension funds´ balances. 
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Even though EEA implementation has required deregulation of product control within 
life insurance, product control has also proved continuity due to some important issues.  
• Firstly, fiscal provisions remain under Norwegian jurisdiction. In order to achieve tax 
deductibility, several social measures have to be attained, e.g. principles of 
egalitarianism and proportionality and that national social law and collective 
bargaining agreements are respected. According to the pension funds directive states 
can still insist that pension plans should conform to the social and employment laws 
of that state, cf. chapter 3.  
• Secondly, Norwegian life and pension insurance legislation contains extensive 
considerations about e.g. consumer protection. These considerations may often 
invoke the principle of the general good, which again allow for national departure 
from EEA provisions. Life and pension insurance is generally based on a very 
complex regulatory framework that might prove substantial cross-national variance. 
On these grounds, directives are careful to stress harmonisation beyond minimum 
requirements. According to EEA provisions following issues are subject to host 
country insurance law (Bull 2002: 398-413).  
1. Distribution of costs, losses and income between insurance branches, contracts and among insured within the 
same insurance collective 
2. The ability to intervene in unreasonable contributions and terms of insurance set forward by fund managers  
3. Application of portfolio rights  
4. Practices of individual accounts and transcripts of accounts 
5. Distribution of surpluses to customers  
Consequently, many of the regulatory initiatives implemented in the 1988 reforms have 
outlived EEA membership. The national variation and complexity of these regulations, 
also contribute to reduce the scope of cross-border activities within life and pension 
insurance, cf. chapter 4. Any changes in these regulations must be explained elsewhere. 
 
In sum, I argue that European institution building has not implied a large-scale 
replacement of national social policy objectives with more market-conform regulations. I 
rather find examples that Norwegian legislators on several issues have implemented more 
strict regulations than laid down in EU regulations. Moreover, EEA provisions 
concerning some types of financial institutions or activities have sometimes also been 
added to other areas in order to maintain broader national social and financial objectives. 
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Much of these developments must therefore be regarded as something more than rule-
based adaptation, cf. chapter 5.3. 
5.2.4 Concluding remarks on rule-based adaptation 
It is often argued that the European regulatory regime imposes substantial legal 
constraints on Norwegian legislation. Based on the analysis above, rule-based adaptation 
has been a more modest explanatory factor than I expected in chapter 2. Any large-scale 
convergence towards a coerced choice of one set of rules and institutions has not 
occurred. European institution building has however produced frequent re-regulatory 
activities and amendments in existing Norwegian regulations. Many of the European 
regulations that Norwegian authorities have been compelled to implement can be 
characterised as minimum requirements. Moreover, many amendments and revisions due 
to rule-based adaptation have been of a rather technical character (e.g. changes in 
portfolio regulation). It seems therefore that legal processes at the European level has led 
to a more comprehensive and complex framework for custodians asset management.  
 
Furthermore, the legal-institutional pressures on the activities of financial institutions that 
hold occupational pensions in custody have grown in strength lately. This has in particular 
concerned the deregulation of the scope of access. The ESA has recently been engaged in 
infringement proceedings on both ownership legislation and the lack of tax-deductibility 
to custodians that provide occupational pension schemes on a cross-border basis. 
Nevertheless, changes in actual market orientation and policy outcome have been very 
modest so far on these aspects. Moreover, the implementation of the new pension fund 
directive would imply a liberalisation of portfolio regulation and new requirements on risk 
management performance due to fund managers’ competence and risk capacities. This is 
expected to take place when a new asset management regulation is implemented in 2008. 
 
In sum, I argue that Norwegian authorities’ role as vital risk managers are yet to be 
substantially constrained by EEA legal commitments. Fiscal provisions and several 
regulatory issues in national insurance legislation are still subject to national autonomy. 
Recent changes at the European level concerning national discrimination on the provision 
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of tax-deductible pensions, which has led to amendments in Norwegian legislation, might 
however challenge this authority in the years to come.  
5.3 INTEREST-BASED ADAPTATION 
The ongoing internationalisation of finance, in particular represented by SEM integration, 
has arguably exposed financial institutions and national authorities to new and increased 
competitive dynamics. The aspects of the regulatory regime in which financial institutions 
carry out their activities should then become increasingly important for fund managers as 
variations in costs and performance might stem from diverging regulatory practices and 
regulations imposed. It is for example often argued that investors under a prudential 
regulatory regime, which the European Commission has advocated, provides better 
returns at lower costs (and risks) than those under a regime of a paternalistic orientation. 
The relative importance of constraints and incentives posed by European integration vis-
à-vis those constraints and incentives inherent in the Norwegian regime, might then 
induce forms of interest-based adaptation. These dynamics might however induce 
different strategies along the public-private nexus to confront these challenges. In chapter 
2 I expected for example financial industry to employ mechanisms of voice, exit and 
loyalty to achieve more market-conform regulations. Following hypothesis were set 
forward:  
Changes in the Norwegian risk management regime for occupational pensions 
have mainly occurred as a result of competitive dynamics introduced by the SEM. 
These dynamics have implied a more international oriented Norwegian financial 
industry lobbying for improved terms of trade, for which it has gained substantial 
support due to competition-sensitive Norwegian authorities. 
 
Financial industry’s competitiveness is arguably related to two primary capacities: 1) to 
sustain market shares in domestic markets and 2) to compete on the international arena. 
Hence, this section calls into attention to what extent financial industry holds the capacity 
to influence and shape the Norwegian risk regime. Can any interest-based adaptation on 
the scope of assets, access and authority be regarded as the triumph of market forces? 
5.3.1 Revision of the framework for fund managers – between competitive dynamics 
and pension reforms 
In the late 1980s Norwegian lawmakers established a comprehensive financial framework 
that regulated key aspects on solidity, competition, ownership and consumer protection in 
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a uniform manner independent of type of domestic financial institution. The objective 
was to put emphasis on equal terms of trade between financial institutions in order to 
ensure and promote fair competition and sound and independent financial sector. In 1990 
the Banking Law Commission was appointed in order to modernise, harmonise and revise 
Norwegian financial legislation in order to attain these objectives. Even though the 
Commission was originally set to finalising the financial reforms in the late 1980s, the 
mandate of the Commission has since been extended several times.100 This has also 
concerned assessments of how to incorporate relevant SEM regulations into Norwegian 
legislation and to assess how the changes in the regime of occupational pensions might be 
carried out. By spring 2007, the Commission has prepared 16 reports according to these 
missions. In addition there have also been other commissions, which also have elaborated 
on aspects of the Norwegian risk management regime of occupational pensions.  
 
The role of the Banking Law Commission in the legal development on this area is 
indisputable. The Commission is a cooperative organ which consists of representatives of 
Norwegian authorities, financial industry and other relevant special interest groups and 
public instances. The financial industry interest groups are the Norwegian financial 
services association (FNH) which represents the insurance companies, banks, etc, and the 
Norwegian pension fund association (NPF), which represents most private pension 
funds.101 The reliance on consensus-biased corporatist structures in the public-private 
nexus, which is typical for Norway (e.g. Katzenstein 1985), is consequently also evident 
on this area. However, even though financial industry has been included in these and 
other commissions, whose mission are to prepare legal revisions and reforms that stake 
out the direction of the Norwegian regime for occupational pensions, other 
considerations than financial industry’s concerns have also often been emphasised. 
 
                                              
100 Insurance was initially excluded from the Commission’s work, but incorporated in 1991, in spite of insurance industry’s 
discontent, to achieve the political objective of equal terms of trade for all financial institutions. 
101 FNHs role is to safeguard the interests of their members’ vis-à-vis the authorities, as well as to represent its members in 
international forums. FNH works to ensure that the financial services industry in Norway have good operating conditions and 
development opportunities and to ensure that Norwegian-based operations of the financial services industry are subject to 
conditions which put them on a level playing field with their foreign competitors and are well adjusted to developments within the 
EEA (www.fnh.no). NPF role is to safeguard the common interests of their member and works to ensure that pension funds 
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For the financial industry it became increasingly evident that the uniform way of 
regulating financial institutions in Norway produced so-called special regulations, which 
were regarded as competitive disadvantages when markets now appeared international. 
Some of these special regulations occurred as Norwegian authorities implemented the EU 
regulations more strictly than the minimum EEA requirements set forward, cf. chapter 
5.2. For Norwegian authorities these were however often legitimised in objectives about 
consumer protection, equal terms of trade between different types of (domestic) financial 
institutions, ensuring an independent financial sector and aspects about solidity, security 
and financial stability. Hence, Norwegian authorities have been reluctant to change this 
framework into more market-conform regulations (NOU 1998: 14). It was rather argued 
that the many complex requirements legitimised in consumer protection, competition and 
solidity constituted competitive advantages for Norwegian fund managers when cross 
border competition in insurance became more efficient (St. meld no 2 (1991-92): 31). 
 
While Norwegian authorities maintained the objective of equal terms of trade between 
different types of domestic financial institutions, life insurers lobbied for a level playing 
field which was compatible with the framework of international competitors. During the 
1990s several amendments in Norwegian regulations were carried out to encompass EU 
requirements.102 The financial industry maintained however that 
 “policy initiatives and reforms on the financial area have been characterised by a substantial 
preoccupation of single aspects, rather than to adapt Norwegian financial industry to the international 
economy, of which it is a participant”(Skauge 2000). 
 
At end of the 1990s, the continuance of several so-called Norwegian special regulations 
particularly in life insurance and the general regulatory philosophy of Norwegian 
authorities became increasingly intolerable for financial industry. When the Banking Law 
Commission was appointed to prepare a modernisation of the Norwegian financial 
legislation, the financial industry vetoed the Norwegian authorities’ perspective in the 
Commission (NOU 1998: 14).  
”Banklovkommisjonen var i arbeidet med den 4. delutredningen om finansforetak fra 1998 delt på viktige punkter 
mellom representantene fra myndighetene og finansnæringen. Finansnæringens representanter måtte ta dissens bade 
                                              
102 Most amendments have occurred in form of regulations, while the basic legal structure has outlived these amendments until 
recently. 
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med hensyn til overordnet reguleringsfilosofi og når det gjelder behov for EU-harmonisering i viktige enkeltsaker der 
flertallet gikk inn for fortsatt særnorske regler” (Skauge 2000) 
An urgent need for EU harmonisation was stressed, due to the industry’s alertness of new 
integrative dynamics at the European level. New efforts to establish a comprehensive 
elaboration on financial industry’s international competitiveness were carried out. The 
arguments and concerns gained validity, and a commission was set down. Its report on 
competition in the financial sector (NOU 2000: 9) concluded that the regulatory 
framework on insurance was in particular complex, comprehensive and on some issues 
not clear-cut. On this background the Banking Law Commission was again appointed to 
follow up the report’s recommendations on life insurance. Its mission was to: 
”..etablere et tidsmessig, helhetlig regelverk for å sikre norske selskapers rammevilkår for å møte et store 
innslag av internasjonal konkurranse og for å gi grunnlag for effektiv drift og et best mulig tilbud til 
kundene….(NOU 2001: 24) 
 
Parallel to these developments changes in the framework for occupational pensions were 
also stressed. The introduction of DC pension schemes into the Norwegian regime was 
first raised on the public agenda in the 1994 Green Paper on supplementary pensions 
(NOU 1994: 6), but rejected in a governmental White Paper on welfare in 1995 (St. meld. 
nr. 35 (1994-95)). Due to social objectives on risk management, the government put the 
drafted pension reforms on hold, while the importance of clear-cut insurance elements, 
life-long benefits and certain objectives of social redistribution, was maintained. These 
market-conform products were however reconsidered when the white paper on welfare 
was debated in Parliament. A majority in Parliament had in particular taken notice “that 
many small and medium sized Norwegian employers had not yet established supplementary pension 
schemes for its employees” (St. meld 1 (1996-97): 97). On this basis a Commission was set 
down to modernise the occupational pension framework. The Commission submitted 
two reports, which objective was to prepare an act on occupational defined benefit 
pension plans (NOU 1998: 1) and an act on occupational defined contribution plans 
(NOU 1999: 32). These acts were implemented in 2001. 
 
The insurance industry advocated a more broadly defined market for individual and 
occupational saving, which was regarded as vital for Norwegian financial industry 
competitiveness and growth. This demand became urgent when the EEA Agreement 
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opened for provision of so-called unit-linked products by foreign financial institutions, 
while Norwegian actors were largely barred from taking part in this market 103 I argue 
however that the primary factor for introducing tax-deductible DC pension products into 
the Norwegian regime has been paternalistically reasoned. The main objective has been to 
extend the application of fiscal stimuli as an incentive to increase saving for retirement 
age and to include a larger share of the labour force into the occupational pension regime.  
 
Over the next years several key documents were submitted and legal changes were 
implemented on life insurance and occupational pensions due to the work with reforming 
the pension system and the incitements produced by the Commission that assessed 
Norwegian financial sector’s competitiveness (NOU 2000: 9). Below are some of the 
most important initiatives in these respects: 
• In 2001 a green paper on life insurance was submitted (NOU 2001: 24), which was a 
follow-up on the 2000 green paper on competition in the financial sector. The 
objective was to develop a new modern legal framework for collective life insurance, 
which also was adjusted to the 2001 occupational pension reforms. A proposal was 
adopted in 2004. This marked a first step towards a new comprehensive act on life 
insurance and pension funds and their activities, see below.   
• Also in 2001 a green paper on gender neutrality on pension schemes in private sector 
was submitted (NOU 2001: 27). Due to implementation of DC pension schemes into 
the Norwegian regime, the issues of equality, proportionality and neutrality in relation 
to gender got a new dimension. In order to achieve these principles, i.e. prevent that 
annual pension payments are determined by different longevity between genders, 
employers that set up DC pension schemes were obliged to set higher contribution 
for women than men (NOU 2001: 27; Ot. prp. nr 100 (2001-2002). The Parliament 
                                              
103 The Norwegian government has long viewed unit-linked products positively as a financial innovation (St. meld 31 (1989-90)). 
Norwegian authorities maintained however the importance to prevent negative returns on fund members’ assets. Hence, financial 
risk was still to be borne by custodians. This implied however conditions of asymmetric risk allocation, as risk of loss were to be 
borne by custodians, while at the same time not entitled to any returns on investments (NOU 1995: 16, p 48; NOU 1998: 10). 
Life insurers did therefore not distribute unit-linked products until financial risk was allocated symmetrically. The Norwegian 
restrictions on unit-linked products were in particular devastating according to the Norwegian Insurance Association: “The 
Norwegian Insurance Association oppfatter Regjeringens holdning som en så alvorlig diskriminering mot norsk forsikring at Forsikringsforbundet ikke 
kan forsvare å stille seg positiv til at Norge inngår en EØS-avtale (press release from 1992 cited in Kjær 1992: 64). Even though these 
restrictions were removed in late 1996 due to substantial pressure from the Norwegian financial industry, this did not concern tax 
stimulated supplementary pension schemes.  
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adopted the changes in 2002, but requested at the same time changes that enabled 
gender and age neutral pensions in defined benefit pension schemes. 
• A green paper on competition in the municipal segment for life insurance and 
occupational pensions was submitted in 2003 (NOU 2003:11). A key issue was to 
establish a framework where all pension providers (life insurance companies) could 
offer gender and age neutral defined benefit municipal pensions that satisfied the 
requirements of the General Collective Agreement for the municipal sector. Until 
then, only KLP had been allowed to offer pension schemes based on a gender and age 
neutral financing system. The starting point of these amendments was a Labour Court 
decision in 2002, cf. chapter 5.3.4. Furthermore, the green paper includes a proposal 
on modernisation and simplification of regulations for transferring life insurance and 
pension contracts. The proposed amendments were adopted in 2003. 
• In 2003 it was also submitted a green paper on gender and age neutrality in group 
pension insurance schemes (NOU 2003: 28). This was a follow-up on Parliament’s 
request to draft a legislation which allowed life insurance companies to establish 
gender and age neutral pensions also in private sector if demanded. The proposed 
amendments were adopted in 2006. Hence, pension products which objective is to 
counteract the fact that pension costs will vary according to the members’ gender or 
age are now allowed distributed on a voluntary basis both in private and public sector.  
• In 2004 a green paper on pension funds was submitted (NOU 2004: 24). The report 
put emphasis on the regulation of pension funds as institutions and their activities as 
providers of occupational pension services. This was partly follow-up work on the life 
insurance legislation proposals as listed above in order to ensure that life insurance 
companies and pension funds have equal terms of trade (e.g. concerning asset 
management of pension benefits) since they largely operate in the same market. An 
objective was also to make an editorial revision of the insurance activity act to develop 
a more transparent and tidier Act. The green paper also elaborated on changes in the 
Norwegian regulatory framework in order to adapt to the requirements set forward in 
the pension fund directive. Furthermore, it drafted changes where several 
municipalities are permitted to join together and establish an inter-municipal pension 
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fund. The legal provisions for pension funds were included in the insurance activity 
act when the proposal was adopted in 2005.  
• Also in 2004 the so-called pension commission issued a green paper on modernised 
national insurance scheme (NOU 2004: 1). Its mission was to clarify main objectives 
and principles of a comprehensive pension system, in particular assess strategies for 
making public pensions sustainable and maintain social security at retirement. Both in 
the green paper and in the follow-up white paper on pension reform (St. meld. nr 12 
(2004-2005)) the role of occupational pensions as an important supplement to the 
National Insurance Scheme was stressed. In the discussions on the white paper in the 
Parliament it was concluded that mandatory occupational pensions were to be 
implemented.  
• A green paper on mandatory occupational pensions was submitted in 2005 (NOU 
2005: 15). Second pillar pensions became mandatory in 2006. It was decided that the 
mandatory occupational pensions are to be designed within the framework of defined 
benefit and defined contribution pension schemes and certain minimum requirements 
are set forward. 
• Finally (so far) a green paper on joint pension funds (NOU 2006: 12) was submitted 
in 2006 due to a resolution in the Parliament when discussing the proposal to new 
pension fund act in 2005. On this basis it is now proposed changes that enable a 
group of independent enterprises to establish a joint pension fund for these 
enterprises´ occupational pension schemes. The main objective is to reduce 
management costs for small and medium pension funds and to reinforce competition 
between pension funds and life insurance companies in the Norwegian market for 
occupational pensions. 
 
A new framework on life insurance and occupational pensions was implemented in 2006. 
In addition to these amendments and changes in the legal framework several changes in 
regulations have also been implemented and there are still several regulatory changes in 
process due to the new act (e.g. a new asset management regulation). Developing a new 
framework for life insurance and occupational pensions has been a long process, which 
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has demanded both innovative time-consuming efforts. As director Arne Skauge of FNH 
puts it:  
“..regelverksutviklingen de siste tjue årene har vært særdeles krevende både for tilsynet og for 
finansbedriftene, med en nærmest total omskrivning av all lovgivning og regelverk på finansområdet. 
Dette har vært nødvendig først og fremst som følge av de stadige strømmen av de nye EU-direktiver, men 
også som følge av enkelte lovinitiativ ut fra rene nasjonale ønsker og behov, hovedsaklig innenfor området 
livsforsikring og pensjon” (Skauge 2006: 170-171). 
In sum, European market integration has arguably led to increased competitive dynamics 
in the Norwegian regime for fund management on occupational pensions. Changes have 
however not occurred due to considerations about financial industry’s competitiveness 
alone. Pension reforms and other social, economic and political objectives have also been 
important. Below I elaborate more specifically on the three scopes in my thesis.  
5.3.2 Scope of assets 
Investments in international equity markets are according to financial theory expected to 
diminish market risks and give the highest returns in the long run (Davis 1995). This has 
also been some of the rationale for Norwegian authorities’ decision to invest all of the 
Government Pension Fund – global (Petroleum Fund) assets into international securities 
markets (of which 40 percent so far has been allocated in equities). As demonstrated in 
chapter 4, these terms have not been present for life insurance companies and pension 
funds that hold occupational pension assets at custody. Arguably, I should expect 
substantial financial industry lobbying to liberate these investment ceilings. Asset 
management has increasingly become a key activity for these custodians and returns on 
capital would then represent a key competitive element. 
 
The demand for liberalising equity ceilings has been frequently stressed by the insurance 
industry (e.g. FNH 2000; Pensjon & Finans 2002; FNH 2005, FNH 2006d). It seems 
however that the liberalisation of custodians´ portfolio regulation so far has to be put in a 
more broadly defined economy based adaptation to competitive dynamics. At the end of 
the 1980s, industry-demand for equity capital to finance investments grew fiercer. The 
Norwegian banking crisis and a general downturn in Norwegian economy had then dried 
up the supply of credits for Norwegian industry. At the same time, Norwegian economy 
became increasingly integrated into the international economy. Norway became a net-
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exporter of capital in 1990 at the time when the EU directive on free movement of capital 
was incorporated into Norwegian legislation (NOU 1996: 23).  
 
To confront these challenges for Norwegian industry, the role of pension benefits was 
frequently emphasised in the 1990s. When the government assessed internationalisation 
of Norwegian financial markets in a 1990 White Paper, it stressed that improving life 
insurers capacity to act as institutional investors, would strengthen the role of Norwegian 
equity markets (St. Meld 31 (1989-90): 4). On these grounds, the equity ceiling was risen 
from 12 to 20 percent. The positive implications this gave for withstanding foreign 
dominance in the Norwegian economy were also emphasised (ibid). 
 
The 1994 Green Paper on occupational pensions (NOU 1994: 6) and the 1995 White 
Paper on Welfare (St. meld 35 (1994-95) stressed that tax stimulus to private saving for 
retirement was not be legitimised in considerations about total level of savings in the 
society, long-term investments and/or ownership in Norwegian economy.104 A green 
paper on savings and equity capital (NOU 1995: 16) issued in 1995 called into attention 
the low share of financial liabilities held by private sector, in particular institutional 
investors, compared to other countries.105 Sustaining competitiveness of Norwegian 
industry became frequently debated in the second half of the 1990s. The key role of 
occupational pensions and capital supply for the general competitiveness of Norwegian 
economy and sustaining Norwegian ownership in industry was further stressed in a serial 
of governmental documents (NOU 1996: 23; St. meld 61 (1996-97); St. meld. 19 (1997-
98); St. meld 40 (1997-98); St. meld 41 (1997-98). The Ministry of Finance (MoF) put 
however also emphasis on ensuring security of pension benefits. The equity ceiling was 
therefore not lifted until 1998, when MoF considered that adequate buffer capital was 
established to confront increased market risk. Even though many hearing instances 
advocated a total abolishment of equity ceilings, Kredittilsynet and MoF did not support 
this (St. meld. nr. 19 (1997-98). Lately, the pressure for any increase in capital supply and 
                                              
104 Rather, the importance of inducing people to save for retirement age, ensuring stability of the Norwegian regime and achieving 
social policy objectives embedded in the Norwegian welfare state, were considered vital for granting tax exemption (ibid).  
105 The total Norwegian saving rate did not differ much from the OECD level, but unlike most other countries, a substantial 
higher share of Norwegian savings took place in public sector. Moreover, most private savings had been a result of investments in 
own real estate (NOU 1995: 16, 8-9). 
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investments in the Norwegian economy has primarily been related to the investment 
strategies of the Government Pension Fund – global.  
 
I consequently argue that liberalisation on the equity exposure in life insurers portfolio 
regulation did not come as a result of interest-based adaptation due to concerns about the 
financial industry’s competitiveness, but primarily due to strategic considerations about 
the competitiveness of the Norwegian economy. Moreover, the EEA adapted portfolio 
regulation for life insurers, cf. chapter 5.2, became applicable to pension funds in 1993. 
The pension fund association (NPF) disapproved with this harmonisation and argued that 
the new framework entailed competitive disadvantages for pension funds vis-à-vis life 
insurers, as it did not sufficiently take into consideration the distinctiveness of pension 
funds (St. meld no 1 (1994-95): 126). Some of the frustration was due to a greater 
regulatory complexity in pension funds’ asset management. Hence, the general 
liberalisation on pension funds’ assets has to be regarded as a government driven interest-
based adaptation. Any significant lobbying for increased asset allocation into international 
markets to diversify investment risks has not taken place.   
5.3.3 Scope of access 
One result of the EEA Agreement is that the formal scope of entry to and exit from 
Norwegian financial markets has been extended. Accordingly, competitive advantages and 
disadvantages related to the capacity to maintain market shares in domestic markets and 
to compete on the international arena would arguably trigger strategies of exit and evasion 
if industry’s concerns are not met. One key objective for financial industry has been to 
promote equal terms of trade for Norwegian-based financial activities and institutions as 
their foreign competitors. Moreover, Norwegian authorities stated at an early point that a 
primary task was: 
“to give the financial industry increased opportunities to take benefit of any comparative 
advantage in order to increase the export of financial services, and to maintain its market 
shares in domestic markets” (St.meld no 2 (1989-90): 73). 
 
Norwegian authorities did however regard the potential for international competition in 
life insurance as rather modest (St. meld 1 (1995-96): 180). Chapter 4 in this thesis 
demonstrates that the domestic orientation of both life insurance companies and pension 
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funds are considerable. Moreover, foreign entrance and provision to Norwegian markets 
have been modest. As stressed in chapter 3, most EU member states have not provided 
tax-deductibility on benefits held in custody by foreign fund managers. These fiscal 
provisions and practices, as well as the cross-national variance of complexity in life 
insurance legislation in general, have arguably led to a continuance of domestic product 
control, cf. chapter 5.2. Hence, occupational pensions have to a large extent in real terms 
been non-tradable services. Fiscal provisions have led to a sustained protection of 
national pension markets, both in Norway and elsewhere. This has consequently put 
severe constraints on financial industry’s capacity to carry out strategies of exit and 
evasion in order to influence and shape the Norwegian risk management regime. The 
asset specificity triggered by fiscal provisions has therefore not disconnected capital from 
national territory.106  
 
During the 1990s the competitive dynamics also grew more prevalent in the debate about 
the importance of sustaining a Norwegian financial industry. Processes of globalisation 
and European market integration raised concerns from many holds that Norwegian 
financial institutions being sold to foreigners and hence lead to an impairment of the 
Norwegian financial sector (e.g. St. meld. no 55 (1997-98); NOU 2000: 9). It became 
more evident for both financial industry and the authorities that Norwegian financial 
institutions were small compared to its European competitors, and vulnerable for foreign 
take-overs. Demands for building internationally competitive financial institutions, so-
called national champions, became more evident.107 Arguments about the necessity of 
having a Norwegian financial centre due to its importance of contributing with equity 
capital to Norwegian industry have been stressed. During the last decades mergers and 
acquisitions within life and pension insurance have primarily led to increased 
concentration in these markets, cf. chapter 4. Even though the financial industry has 
called for more lax ownership legislation (NOU 1998: 14; NOU 2000: 9; NOU 2002: 3) 
changes are primarily explained elsewhere, cf. ch. 5.2. 
                                              
106 The life insurer Storebrand attempted to challenge this regime in the late 1990s as it co-established (with Swedish Skandia and 
SPP) the subsidiary Euroben in Ireland. According to Storebrand, Euroben was a response to customer demands about cross-
border co-ordination of their occupational pension schemes (Aftenposten 11.04.1999). The business was however not a success 
and ended a few years later. 
107 Until the late 1980s local and regional considerations were emphasised and any mergers or acquisition entailing the four largest 
life insurers should be desisted (NOU 1986: 5; St. meld 31 (1989-90). 
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In sum, European market integration has provided the Norwegian insurance and pension 
industry with amplified arguments and rhetoric for regulatory change. Strategies of exit 
and evasion have however been rarely employed. Arguably, industry lobbying for more 
market-conform regulations has on these grounds been more biased toward sustaining 
market shares domestically than on improved market opportunities internationally. The 
implementation of a new pension fund and increased tax harmonisations on the issues of 
tax-deductibility across Europe may however lead to new competitive dynamics in the 
SEM regime. National variation in insurance and pension legislation, cultural and 
traditional relations, as well as well as an organised distribution system and knowledge 
about national clients, may however still put severe constraints on international 
competition in these markets.  
5.3.4 Scope of authority 
When the EEA Agreement was implemented, it became apparent that some of the 
regulations that prevailed were typical for Norway in order to deal with various types of 
risk and undesired market behaviour. Some of these special regulations have even come 
about as a result of adaptational processes to European integration. In chapter 5.2 I 
argued that many of the capital requirements that was required implemented for banks 
and credit institutions due to EU directives, were also implemented for life insurance 
companies and pension funds. Hence, Norwegian authorities implemented a double set 
of capital requirements, as solvency requirements are also to be fulfilled for life insurers 
due to the life directives.108 In spite of considerable financial industry discontent, this 
Norwegian special regulation has persisted. In the start these regulations also became a 
risk management tool for the authorities to forestall investors´ capacity to take on 
investment risks (St. meld. 31 (1989-1990): 20). This should therefore be regarded as 
government driven interest-based adaptation. Norwegian authorities have frequently 
considered first-class solidity as one of the most important competition parameters in life 
insurance (e.g. St. meld. nr. 1 (1995-1996: 176)).  
                                              
108 The application of the capital adequacy requirements, which first and foremost are credit risk biased, was arguably due to the 
role of loans in fund managers’ allocation, which at the turn of the 1980s were substantial. This asset category accounted in the 
early 1990s for about 40 and 30 percent of life insurers and pension funds’ investments. The importance of this asset category has 
been substantially diminished during the 1990s.  
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Moreover, many of the measures implemented due to the 1988-reforms to enhance 
consumer protection and security of accrued funds, had unintended implications for the 
asset management performance. This concerned for example portability rights and annual 
distribution on returns to customers, etc. Arguably, the effect is that they favour short-
term asset management on long-term liabilities by reducing custodians´ capacity to hold 
equities in cases of low buffers. Hence, financial industry’s discontent has in particular 
been raised on these matters (Kvinge og Langeland 1996; NOU 1998: 14); FNH 2000). 
These issues became increasingly urgent to address when a situation of volatile stock 
markets, low levels of buffer capital and low interest rates due to low inflation occurred at 
the turn of the millennium. This put severe pressure on the custodians’ ability to meet its 
obligations and to make the long-term investments that were required. In the preparation 
of the new life and pension insurance legislation a key objective has been to avoid these 
unintended effects on asset management. Some measures are set forward in the new 
insurance act, while others are still debated.  
 
Persistence of many traditional regulatory instruments and practices may seem 
paradoxically, when EU provisions are adopted on a market activity. This is however 
related to directives as regulatory policies. These stress the objectives that are to be 
attained and not the strategy. Consequently, EU provisions are on many issues rather 
vaguely expressed and drafted with varying degrees of precision. Some may even indicate 
conflicting objectives. This makes accurate assessments concerning the obligations 
imposed on member states difficult and open for national interpretation. Moreover, 
member states are allowed to invoke host country expectance if legitimised in general 
good considerations. These are often set forward for consumer protection. Even though 
the European regulatory framework appears comprehensive and detailed, a judicial 
vacuum therefore to some extent exists. In this, member states sometimes are left with 
significant flexibility regarding when and how to implement EU regulations (Selvig 1999).  
 
If a substantial mismatch exists between the Norwegian and the European risk regime, 
Norwegian authorities might take advantage of the judicial vacuum in the EEA legislation 
and choose to sustain national regulatory practices. However, this might induce 
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Norwegian financial industry to submit complaints to the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
(ESA) and the EFTA Court of Justice. This should in particular be evident if the 
persistence of national rules and regulations resulted in competitive disadvantages for 
fund managers. These supranational institutions obtain to some extent an interpretative 
authority on how the EEA Agreement should be understood. Therefore, EEA and EU 
regulatory bodies might narrow the judicial vacuum by publishing definitions, precisions 
and interpretations through legal documents and Court decisions as a result of domestic 
actors’ initiatives.  
 
According to the ESA, the authority has not received any complaint from Norwegian life 
insurance companies or financial industry on the regulatory framework for life insurance 
or occupational pensions (comments by ESA officials 2003/2007). Norwegian financial 
industry has consequently been reluctant to address EU/EEA authorities for strategic 
reasons. Any hypotheses of replacing national loyalties with European must therefore be 
rejected. My pension fund inquiry and statements from business informants underpin this 
implicit loyalty to Norwegian authorities, cf. chapter 5.4. The continuity of national loyalty 
should be regarded in the context that occupational pensions are an integral part of the 
national pension system, and that its popularity relies on fiscal provisions that remains 
within national autonomy. Moreover, the role of the Banking Law Commission as a 
consensus-biased corporate organ in this public-private nexus, might arguably lead 
attention into finding solutions nationally rather than making appeals at the European 
level, which would eventually disturb the “family peace”. 
 
Interactions with European authorities due to life insurers’ role in the provision of 
occupational pensions did however occur in 2002. Then the social objectives embedded 
in the municipal pension regime came under pressure due to increased competition in the 
municipal pension market. From the late 1990s private sector life insurance companies 
did increasingly call the municipal pension market into attention. Local governments’ 
mutually owned insurance company, KLP, did for a long time maintain monopoly in 
municipal pension markets. Recently, this monopoly has been sustained in collective 
bargaining agreements, which stress that pensions schemes are compelled to be age and 
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gender neutral.109 Private life insurers were not allowed to provide such pension products 
due to the insurance legislation.  
 
The ESA started to examine whether the EEA provisions on public procurement 
prevailed and whether these services should accordingly be marketed in the internal 
market. Norwegian authorities and Norwegian life insurers argued however that EU-
regulations did not apply on this issue, even though at the same time claiming that these 
should be exposed to competition (Hagen 1999). In Parliament the issue of non-
competition in the market for municipal occupational pensions was raised in 2000 and 
2002.  Both times a majority stressed the importance of introducing competition in this 
market (St. meld no 5 (2000-01); NOU 2003: 11). More tight budgets for many local 
governments in the late 1990s pushed at the same time local administrations to expose 
public services to competition in order to reduce expenses.110  
 
In 1999 11 local governments broke out of the agreement with KLP. Due to private 
insurer’s inability to provide age and gender-neutral tariffs as laid down in the wage 
agreement, these local governments were sued by the municipal employee organisation 
(NKF), which regarded this as an important breach of the collective bargaining agreement 
(Økonomisk rapport 2002b). For the trial in the so-called KLP-case, which emerged as 
the largest and most comprehensive case in the Labour Court’s history, the 11 local 
governments brought in the EEA dimension as an argument for breaking out of KLP’s 
monopoly.111 For settling the EEA argument, the Labour Court asked the EFTA Court 
of Justice to give a pronouncement on the interpretation of the EEA Agreement on this 
issue. The EFTA Court of Justice concluded that certain latitude for wage and labour 
terms should be accepted, even if these terms have restraining effects on competition. A 
precondition for allowing this is however that the objective of these terms is to promote 
                                              
109 Due to a collective bargaining agreement in 1998 between municipal sector’s employer federation (Kommunenes 
Sentralforbund (KS)) and labour organisation (Norsk Kommuneforbund (NKF)) it was stressed that differences in pension costs 
should not relate to age and sex profiles of municipalities.  
110 In 1997 more than 20 local governments on own initiative obtained offers from private Norwegian insurance companies 
(Hagen 1999) Their motive was to examine the potential for cheaper pension insurance in the Norwegian market than offered by 
the social contribution tariffs of KLP.  
111  The local governments were for the trial financed and supported by their respective private life insurers, and claimed that 
NKF’s interpretation of the wage agreement hampers competition in the market for municipal pension schemes and hence 
constitute a breach with the EEA-agreement’s principle of free movement of capital (DN 31/10-2001). 
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labour and employment conditions of those comprised by the agreement.112 The Labour 
Court put emphasis on the EFTA Court of Justice’s considerations and NKF gained 
support for its case. This gave birth to the introduction of age and gender neutral tariffs 
in Norwegian insurance legislation, cf. chapter 5.3.1.  
 
In sum, interest based adaptation of scope of authority has on many issues led to a re-
regulation characterised by a race to the top rather than to the bottom. Moreover, due to 
the interaction with the European market regime the principles of social distribution 
related to genders (paradoxically) have been sustained and even extended in the 
Norwegian regime. This section has also revealed a lack of financial industry orientation 
towards European authorities, and demonstrated a continuity of national loyalties.  
5.3.5 Concluding remarks on interest-based adaptation  
European market integration has led to increased competitive dynamics which have 
affected the Norwegian regime for occupational pensions. This has provided Norwegian 
insurance and pension industry with amplified arguments and rhetoric for regulatory 
change. According to this analysis, financial industry’s strategies of lobbyism are limited to 
the application of voice-mechanisms, which I have categorised as the most modest 
exercise of the European framework to own means. Nevertheless, the concerns about 
financial industry’s international competitiveness gained increased validity at the end of 
the 1990s and led to new policy-making processes, which have resulted in a new life 
insurance act. 
 
According to my analysis changes have not occurred due to considerations about financial 
industry’s competitiveness alone. Pension reforms and other social, economic and 
political objectives have also been important catalysts for change in this regime. I have 
argued that some of the changes came into force primarily due to more strategic 
considerations about the overall competitiveness of the Norwegian economy. Moreover, I 
have also found examples of government driven adaptations to European market 
                                              
112 EEA provisions are known for promoting competition and the free movement of capital. However, they also set forward 
principles of equal treatment between genders where the principle of equal wage for equal labour is central. The ECJ Barber-case 
(C-262/88) has concluded that occupational pension benefits should be considered on equal terms as wage.  
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integration in order to sustain national objectives. This has legitimised both re-regulatory 
activities and extension of social objectives on the one hand and financial liberalisation on 
the other hand. It seems that financial liberalisation and increased exposures to market 
risks has led to new ways to organise the Norwegian risk management system in order to 
control undue risk taking. One consequence of this government-driven adaptation has 
been that pension funds became subject to many EEA adapted life insurance regulations 
already in the early 1990s, more than a decade prior to the implementation of the pension 
fund directive.  
 
In sum, a continuity and even extension of national (social and economic) policy 
objectives has occurred due to forms for strategic adaptations. Hence, changes in 
Norwegian risk regime are not primarily explained in any triumph of financial market 
forces, but are rather a result of economy-/government-driven strategic adaptation to 
increased competitive dynamics.   
5.4 IDEA-BASED ADAPTATION 
One key effect of European integration arguably is increased cooperation and contact 
across national borders. This improves opportunities for policy imitation and learning due 
to the spread of ideas across borders. Prudence and paternalism are two opposing but 
widely exercised principles or doctrines for risk management organisation across Europe, 
cf. chapter 2 and 3. While the former rests on a liberal ideology, which emphasises 
individual rationality, the latter have a general distrust to individuals’ capacity to make 
rational choices and calls on state interventionism to protect the individuals from 
unintended negative effects of the market. The European Commission has for almost two 
decades advocated an occupational pension regime that rests on a prudential framework, 
cf. chapter 3. The debate in Europe has stressed the importance of prudence, risk 
diversification and less use of quantitative measures in the regulatory framework, as well 
as called for voluntary tax coordination in order to remove obstacles to corss-border 
provision of occupational pensions. Prudential principles and practices might therefore be 
transmitted into the Norwegian regime due to policy imitation of popular and modern 
ideas at the European level, or by employing European policies and arguments as solution 
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to perceived or experienced domestic problems. In chapter 2 following hypothesis was 
addressed:  
Changes in the Norwegian risk management regime for occupational pensions 
have mainly occurred due to the impact of ideas embedded in the European 
market regime 
This section therefore seeks to assess to which extent the key actors in the 
Norwegian regime has taken a European orientation. In particular I will assess 
arguments about the principles of risk diversification (assets), free provision of 
services (access) and the system of risk management organisation. Have idea-based 
adaptations to the European integration led to a diffusion of the perceived best 
practices as an inevitable outcome? 
5.4.1 Key challenges for welfare states and the role of experts 
Most welfare states today experience the challenges of financial liberalisation and 
economic globalisation on the one hand, and an ongoing demographic shift which 
challenges the traditional methods of financing pensions on the other. This has led to 
substantial reform activity across Europe in order to make pensions sustainable and to 
avert the demographic time-bomb. In chapter 3 I argued that the European initiative for 
establishing a pan-European prudential framework for occupational pensions has to a 
large extent been legitimised with the objective to deal with these challenges. Based on my 
analysis so far, it seems that the Norwegian regime has addressed many similar objectives, 
which have been primary factors of change. A key question is then if the Norwegian 
regime has employed European arguments to find solutions on these challenges or 
imitated popular and prevalent ideas at the European level in its policy making? 
 
Pensions and fund management are complex policy areas, which I argue to a large extent 
require specific technocratic expertise due to an extensive judicial framework and 
technical standards. Cooperation on these matters arguably requires a form of expertise, 
which only experts in very limited agencies possess. Furthermore, while Norwegian 
politicians are formally excluded from the decision-making processes in Europe, 
Norwegian experts have the opportunity to participate in EU committees, pan-European 
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business networks, etc, cf. chapter 2.5.3.113 The opportunity to legitimise the need for 
change with European arguments and ideas requires however a high density of interaction 
between the Norwegian level and the European level. Below I assess the European 
orientation of some experts in the Norwegian occupational pension regimes on this basis.   
 
European orientation of pension funds and NPF 
Based on my pension fund inquiry, I find the domestic orientation of these institutional 
investors quite overwhelming.114 Any employment of European sources of information 
to overcome complexity and uncertainty has been rare. Table 5.1 reveals that Norwegian 
authorities are by far the most common sources of information among Norwegian 
pension funds. Moreover, Norwegian sources of information were almost seven times 
more frequent than the application of European sources of information. Only a few 
pension funds reported that they had been in contact with European authorities and 
interest organisations.115 
 
Table 5.1 Index of national orientation of pension funds116. 
 Norwegian European 
Public authorities 139 14 
Journals/literature 90 31 
Interest organisations 103 9 
Private actors 109 15 
Total 441 69 
 
Except for contact with Norwegian authorities and other business actors, the Norwegian 
pension fund association (NPF), is reported frequently. NPF is an associated member of 
the European Federation of Retirement Provision (EFRP), which for more than two 
decades has advocated a prudential pan-European pension regime. This pan-European 
interest organisation could also be regarded as an information channel that encourages the 
                                              
113 Norway’s affiliation with the EU is accordingly represented by supranational sectoral considerations rather than 
intergovernmental, geographical considerations (Trondal 2001).  
114 Even though carried out some years ago, this was at the height of the pan-European debate on occupational pensions. 
115 About 85 percent of the pension funds that responded considered Norwegian authorities as their most important source of 
information, while 98 percent of them had Norwegian authorities on its top three list. In contrast, only 7 percent regarded 
different European sources as one of top-three important sources of information.  
116 The table summarises a score of eight variables in question 2 in my inquiry. The question relates to the application of sources 
of information to meet the lack of information. Frequent contact is given the value 3, occasional contact the value 2, seldom 
contacting equalled 1, while the sources never employed get the value 0. Maximum score that one source of information can 
obtain is 156. 
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spread of ideas concerning EU issues to the local level. However, any further 
participation beyond being an associated member has not been a prioritised issue for 
NPF. Continued membership has occasionally required hard arguing from NPF’s side at 
the organisation’s board, due to members’ resistance to pay EFRP membership fee. A 
business informant stressed that “Norwegian pension funds have been more preoccupied with 
(actuarial) pension questions than ideas about financial strategies” (comment by informant). The 
complexity of rules and regulations and increased multileveled governance are 
consequently not met by a reorientation to European organs and meeting places by the 
pension fund industry.  
 
European orientation of life insurance companies and FNH 
Compared to pension funds, life insurance companies are large financial institutions, 
which possess a wide range of knowledge and competencies. Arguably, these institutions 
have resources and competencies that should make them more adaptive to an 
international orientation. This is also confirmed to some extent through informal 
interviews with the largest Norwegian life insurance companies. But even though paying 
some attention to the pan-European pension debate, their contact with European 
authorities and interest organisation have been rare (comments by business informants). 
Moreover, according to their size, traditions and own competencies in Norwegian 
financial markets, they have arguably the power to act as providers of norms on many 
issues in the Norwegian policy-making process. As for pension funds, Norwegian 
authorities and Norwegian business actors are reported as the most frequent employed as 
sources of information. 
 
Most Norwegian life insurance companies are members of the Norwegian Financial 
Services Association (FNH), which is the trade association for bank and insurance. FNH 
enjoys a full membership in the pan-European insurance association, Committé des 
Europe Assurance (CEA), which is considered as an important source of information for 
FNH on insurance activities (comment by business informant). FNH have traditionally 
participated in 3-4 conferences annually on life and pension issues. The pension fund 
directive and establishing a level playing field on insurance has been on top of the agenda 
 102
Norwegian pensions and European markets 
several times. Nonetheless, direct contact with European or EEA authorities has been 
rare. Mostly employed on these matters are the European Commission’s Internet sources. 
 
European orientation of public authorities –MoF and Kredittilsynet 
Unlike Norwegian politicians, national officials may participate in the Commission’s 
expert committees. The EU´s Insurance Committee and the Conference of EU Insurance 
Supervisory Authorities have been the most important EU expert forums on these 
matters. In these forums national regulatory and supervisory authorities meet and discuss 
regulation on insurance related activities, their practical implementation and supervisory 
issues. In 2003 the Committee on European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Supervisors was established (CEIOPS), while a European Insurance and Occupational 
Pension Committee (EIOPC) was established in 2005. These committees replaced the 
former committees (Kredittilsynet and Norges Bank 2006). The EEA Agreement 
establishes Norwegian participation in these forums. Previously, MoF and Kredittilsynet 
represented Norway interchangeable in the Insurance Committee, which held 3-4 
meetings annually. MoF now attends the EIOPC as observer, while Kredittilsynet attends 
as an adviser for the MoF in this committee. The MoF has delegated further attendance in 
sub-committees and expert-groups to the EIOPC to Kredittilsynet. Moreover, 
Kredittilsynet attends in the CEIOPS and its working groups and sub-committees. 
 
Kredittilsynet has according to itself played an active part in the CEIOPS (Kredittilsynet 
2005). According to Kredittilsynet (comment by informant) “Norwegian authorities have been 
just as active in these meeting as EU member states”, but due to its status as a non-EU member, 
Norwegian delegates have to leave when the Committee adopts resolutions or makes 
amendments. Kredittilsynet regards attendance in these European bodies as important for 
Norway, since this is where it has the greatest opportunity to influence the EU´s 
legislative process (Kredittilsynets 2007). Participation has consequently been prioritised. 
The frequency of Kredittilsynets attendance in international meetings has doubled from 
2000 to 2005, when Kredittilsynet attended in about 300 international meetings. The 
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recent growth is mostly related to the growth in EU/EEA meetings, conferences and 
working groups (ibid).117  
 
In sum, national orientation seems to be more important than any European orientation 
for most Norwegian experts on this area. Any high density of contact between the 
national and European level has not taken place. The Kredittilsynet has increased its 
activities on the European arena substantially, but primarily this has been prioritised due 
to strategic considerations and to attain Norwegian influence on the legislative processes 
in the EU, cf. above. Moreover, the Norwegian tradition with reliance on consensus-
biased corporatist structures in the public-private nexus, such as the Banking Law 
Commission might strengthen the persistence of national orientation on these aspects. 
These institutions are not only organs for interest organisation representation, but also 
important meeting-places for experts, which are key actors in the Norwegian legislative 
processes on e.g. financial regulation and pension issues. One important role is to make 
interpretations on the implementation of EEA-relevant regulations into Norwegian 
legislation, including interpretations on the constraints and incitements embedded in the 
regime. As noted before, occupational pensions have also traditionally been regarded as 
regulatory aspects subject to national authority. 
5.4.2 Scope of assets 
Technological innovations and increased knowledge about statistical and mathematical 
methods have improved the ability to define, isolate and control sources of uncertainty. 
Risk management and modern financial theory has now emerged as a science on its own 
(Bernstein 1992; Holter 2002), which is in particular significant within activities related to 
demographics and financial markets. Modern risk management theory claims that risks on 
investments are substantially reduced if diversified across different nationalities, sectors 
and assets.118  
                                              
117 Nordic supervisory authorities have also established institutional arrangements for cooperation on supervision and exchange of 
information concerning pan-Nordic financial institutions. Other international associations (e.g. the International Associations of 
Insurance Supervisors; IAIS, and within the OECD) are also established, but of minor importance on the pension. In 2004 
OECD took the initiative to set up a new international body on occupational pensions, the International Organisation of Pension 
Supervisors (IOPS), which Kredittilsynet has joined. Apart from this bilateral meetings and cross-border visits are also included in 
statistics. 
118 Diversification of assets can eliminate any idiosyncratic risk from holding one individual asset, e.g. a company stock. Moreover, 
if national cycles and markets are imperfectly correlated, international investments will actually reduce otherwise undiversifiable or 
systematic risk (Davies 1995). An analysis examined in 1995 annual returns of broad portfolios in equities in the hundred-year 
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The European Commission has for long maintained diversification into European equity 
markets as a necessary strategy for reducing risk and increasing returns in times of 
substantial demographic challenges, cf. ch. 3. The principle of risk diversification is 
closely related to a prudential risk regime. Risk diversification is however a general trend, 
which is generally advocated on a global scale, both intellectually and commercially. The 
breakthrough of risk management as an academic discipline occurred at American 
universities in the 1950s (Bernstein 1992), and was introduced in Norwegian business 
schools during the 1980s (Holter 2002). As noted above, the principle of risk 
diversification was incorporated into the Norwegian regime in the late 1980s, i.e. years 
prior to SEM implementation. Furthermore, the EU is by far the not only international 
organisation favouring and disseminating risk diversification as necessary principle and 
strategy for asset allocation. OECD and the World Bank have also carried out substantial 
research on this area, and promoted these strategies for custodians’ asset allocation.  
 
The diffusion of risk diversification is part of a global equity culture, where custodians are 
moving from fixed income assets to equities and from domestic to foreign exposure. This 
has also occurred in Norway, as demonstrated in chapter 4. However, compared to more 
liberal market economies the exposure in equities is still rather modest. Moreover, the 
overall continued importance of national denominated assets has arguably by far exceeded 
the argument of risk diversification in its real terms. This particular concerns the 
concentration of listed firms at the Oslo Stock Exchange which in real prudential terms 
would put severe constraints on custodians’ capacity to perform risk diversification in 
Norwegian markets (Norman 2001).119 
 
                                                                                                                                             
period 1880-1995. Average annual return of equities then was 4 percent better than for governmental bonds. Moreover, it became 
evident that equities did not have negative returns if investment period was more than 20 years (St. meld 2 (1996-97):78).  
119 Norwegian capital markets are small both in absolute and relative terms. Even though more than 200 companies were listed at 
the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) by the end of 2006, the five largest listed companies accounted for 55 percent of market value, 
while the top ten listed companies accounted for more than 2/3 of total market value at OSE (www.oslobors.no/ob). Moreover, 
Norwegian industry specialisation is much more concentrated than in most other EU countries. Large parts of Norwegian 
companies are related to the oil industry, and its importance is also evident at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). Norwegian 
economy and financial markets are therefore closely related to the world prices of these commodities (oil and gas) in particular 
and to the conjunctures of these industries in general. OSE therefore demonstrates larger and more frequent volatility in stock 
prices than foreign stock markets. 
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Compared to the asset allocation of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund – Global 
(Petroleum Fund), there are striking disparities in how to deal with risks. By the end of 
2006 the fund was worth NOK 1 784 billions. Since its first asset allocations in the late 
1990s it has been bound to invest all of its assets in global securities markets, of which 40 
percent in equities and 60 percent in bonds. Due to a recent reassessment of the fund’s 
attitude towards risk, new guidelines which objective is to increase its global risks further 
(increase its equity exposure to 60 percent) are proposed (St meld. nr 24 (2006-2007)). 
Since its establishment there has been much debate on the allocation strategy of the fund. 
This has been related to domestic issues concerning finances to improve the standard of 
life in Norway, but also related to concerns that the fund is too riskily managed. Minister 
of Finance Kristin Halvorsen have however recently expressed that: 
“We believe this represents an appropriate trade-off between expected risk and return. Since the first equity 
investments were made in 1998 we have gained experience and shown that we can handle volatility without it 
undermining the fund’s investment strategy or fiscal policy” (Financial Times April 14 2007). 
Moreover, ethical guidelines related to human rights and environmental issues have been 
laid down for investments carried out by this fund since 2004. The objective is to induce 
corporate social responsibility in asset allocation.120 Such standards are not laid down for 
2nd pillar pensions, but some insurance companies have established funds on own 
initiative that offer such investment strategies on a voluntary basis. 
 
Also, my pension funds inquiry demonstrated that only a few fund managers have 
attached great significance to the internal market concerning outcomes of a prudential 
framework. Considering the role of the internal market for own activities:  
• Only 13,5 percent regards it as very important concerning increased investment 
opportunities 
• Only 11,5 percent considers it very significant for reducing long term risk in cases of 
foreign investments 
• Only 5,8 percent regards this market as very important for improved expected 
returns  
• an average of about 1/5 was uncertain about the role of the internal market on these 
aspects. 
• 51,9 percent assigned little importance to the internal market for any changed 
investment strategy, while only 5,8 percent assigned this great importance 
                                              
120 Companies that do not meet these standards may risk exclusion from the fund’s investment universe.     
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Hence, it seems that Norwegian pension funds are rather pessimistically biased to SEM 
effects for own asset allocation activities. Moreover, quantitative restrictions have 
remained in Norwegian portfolio regulation, something which is incompatible with a 
prudential framework in its real terms (Commission 1997). Lifting equity ceilings have 
also largely been primarily been legitimised in over-all economy considerations, not 
prudential standards, cf. chapter 5.3. In sum, I argue that the ideas and principles of risk 
diversification and increased exposure in international equities markets can primarily not 
be ascribed to European market integration.  
5.4.3 Scope of access 
Another principle laid down in the European Commission’s prudential approach is to 
establish the free provision of services to pension funds, in particular investment 
management and asset custody, as well as establish the freedom of cross-border 
membership in these funded plans. In this thesis I have argued that the adaptation to 
European principles on this scope has mostly taken the form of rule-based adaptation, cf. 
chapter 5.2. The value-based arguments for restricting tax-deductibility on occupational 
pension to Norwegian-based providers of these services have however changed. When 
the 1988 reforms were elaborated, a green paper on competition in Norwegian financial 
markets stressed the following when considering customers’ opportunities to obtain life 
and pension insurance in a foreign financial institution: 
“Arbeidsutvalget går ut fra at disse ordningene og deres skattemessige fordeler er sosialt begrunnet….En 
adgang til å tegne slike forsikringer i utenlandske selskaper ville svekke tilsynsmyndighetenes kontroll og 
tilsyn. Av juridiske, sosiale, sikkerhetsmessige og kontrollmessig hensyn finner en ikke å ville anbefale at 
en åpner for å tegne private TPES i utenlandske selskaper. Den økte trygghet en må anta ligger ved 
plassering i norske selskaper (sikkerhet, kontroll, språk rettsspørsmål, osv.) bør tilsi at en verner om 
enkeltpersoners sikkerhet (NOU 1986: 5, p 167-168). 
Clearly, this statement proves that discriminatory practices are legitimised in paternalistic 
arguments. Paternalistic and social arguments were carried on in the Green Paper on 
Private pension schemes (NOU 1994: 6) and in the White Paper on Welfare (St. meld. no 
35 (1994-95) respectively. In the late 1990s, however, when a new legal framework for 
supplementary pensions was assessed, the non-discriminatory principles of the EEA 
Agreement were called into attention. Norwegian lawmakers now assessed the principle 
of non-discrimination as embedded in the SEM provisions. Restrictions on cross-border 
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activities were maintained, but this time legitimised with to more functional 
considerations about tax control. 
”Å nekte fradrag til innbetalt premie til et EØS-selskap som har filial her i landet, må etter utvalgets 
syn i utgangspunktet anses å være i strid med EØS-avtalen…Ved vurderingen av disse spørsmål, har 
utvalget tatt utgangspunkt i Bachmann-dommen, som innebærer at grensekryssende virksomhet står i en 
annen stilling enn virksomhet gjennom filial. Utvalget viser til hensynet til effektiv 
skattekontroll….Ettersom det ikke finnes adekvate sanksjoner ved eventuell overtredelse av 
opplysningsplikt, vil skattekontrollen kunne bli svekket” (NOU 1998: 1, p 43-44). 
 
Some years later the question about tax-deductibility to cross-border provision was raised 
again due to the general legal development in Europe and a letter of formal notice from 
the ESA, cf. chapter 5.2. In the proposition to the legal amendments it was stressed that: 
”Rettsutviklingen i EU innebærer en tiltakende usikkerhet med hensyn til om de norske vilkårene om at 
utenlandske foretak som vil tilby skatefavoriserte kollektive pensjonsordninger må være etablert i Norge, er i tråd 
med EØS avtalen….Etter departementets syn er den usikkerhet som er knyttet til om de norske reglene på 
området er i tråd med EØS-avtalen uheldig” (Ot. prp. nr 1 (2004-2005), kap. 24.1). 
 
Nonetheless, the complexity and specifity of the regulatory framework across Europe on 
these matters, has arguably led to a domestic orientation of fund managers operations, cf. 
chapter 4. It seems, however, that this orientation goes beyond what can be legitimised in 
tax regulations alone. Provision of financial and judicial services related to asset custody 
and actuarial operations has for example not been constrained by Norwegian tax 
provisions. Still, less than 2 percent of Norwegian pension funds purchased all, or to 
some extent, of their asset custody services from a foreign financial institution, according 
to my pension fund inquiry (see appendix). The pension fund inquiry also demonstrated 
that only 7,7 percent of the pension fund assigned great importance to the internal market 
for increased competition on actuarial and investment services. About 65 percent of the 
respondents were either uncertain or assigned little significance to the internal market on 
these matters. Furthermore, most Norwegian life insurers are part of mixed financial 
institutions with own asset management arms.  
5.4.4 Scope of authority 
As this thesis has demonstrated, occupational pensions hold both important social and 
financial functions. Insurance legislation and tax regulations have shaped the Norwegian 
pension regime in accordance with some key social objectives since early 20th century. 
The development of supervisory authorities has therefore primarily been motivated by 
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social policy objectives (Knutsen & Ecklund 2000). Financial aspects have however 
become more important during the last decades as life insurance companies and pension 
funds have emerged as major financial institutions. This section calls into attention the 
scope of cross-border learning at the EU level on pension systems and capital market 
organisation.  
 
Even though the responsibility of social policy remains within welfare states’ authority, 
the EU has increasingly put emphasis on the sustainability of member states’ pensions 
systems in order to avert the old-age crisis. When the Lisbon strategy was adopted, the 
EU launched an open method coordination (OMC), which objective is to attain (non-
binding) agreements on objectives and guidelines that are not subject to EU regulatory 
authority. A systematic comparison of national policies by funding reports and finding 
key indicators that are subject to bench-marking evaluations is often a part of this 
method. Its purpose is to establish a platform for discussion and learning across borders 
and to influence policy-making in a certain direction. Norway is not attached to this 
cooperation, but issues on an annual basis a report that summarises Norway’s 
development compared to that of the EU on some key indicators (Nærings- og 
handelsdepartementet 2006).   
 
A typical modern way of thinking pensions, which also is reflected in the EU and other 
international agencies (World Bank 1994; 2001), is to consider the pension system as three 
pillars. This method, which divides pensions into social security, occupational pensions 
and individual pension agreements, has also been transposed into the Norwegian regime. 
How a pension system is understood and organised is important because it might express 
certain policy choices. On the one hand it enables public authorities to legitimise that 
pensions is a shared responsibility between the authorities, the employers and the 
individual. Increased reliance on market-based supplementary pensions would relieve 
fiscal budgets and put less stress on tax-financed social security. On the other hand, this 
three pillar system would also commit public authorities to provide tax stimuli in order to 
encourage individual saving for retirement. This became recently apparent when the 
Norwegian government withdrew tax-deductibility for individual pension agreements due 
to the introduction of mandatory occupational pensions (FNH 2007). The importance of 
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a three pillar pension system was raised from several sources and it was referred to the 
commonness of a three-pillar system across Europe. (e.g. FNH 2006).  A parliamentary 
agreement on the pension reform in 2007 re-introduced the third-pillar into the 
Norwegian regime.    
 
Concerning financial regulation, the Norwegian regulatory and supervisory framework 
became re-organised in the late 1980s. In 1986 a new comprehensive framework for 
financial supervision was established in Norway, which integrated supervision of banking 
and insurance activities under one supervisory authority. This way of organising its 
supervisory authorities was then unprecedented in Europe. The initiative was based on 
national considerations related to improvement and coordination of national supervisory 
authorities, and to meet market tendencies of desegmentation and blurring of traditional 
financial activities (Aamo 2001). This organisation was backed-up with a new 
comprehensive framework for financial institutions in 1988. This framework represented 
a breach with the previously framework, which was institution-biased like the EU 
directives. Norwegian authorities have however regarded the new comprehensive 
framework as modern and have consequently found its own solutions on problems 
related maintaining the scope of authority in times of financial liberalisation, cf. ch. 5.3.  
 
Lately, the application of stress-tests and a more risk-based supervision has been a trend 
within asset management regulation and orientation, cf. chapter 4. Risk-based supervision 
is characterised by supervisory techniques where the objective is to identify the primary 
risks that a financial institution is exposed to and how these risks can be managed. 
Kredittilsynet has recently transposed its supervisory techniques in this direction (Iversen 
2006).121 According to Kredittilsynet the development of a risk-based supervision largely 
occurred due to own efforts: 
”Utviklingen av risikobasert tilsyn kunne i utgangspunktet skjer på ulike måter. Det var mulig å benytte 
konsulentselskaper, kopiere opplegg fra andre lands tilsynsmyndigheter eller man kunne gå den lange veien og 
utvikle det risikobaserte tilsyn på egen hånd. Det ble besluttet å utvikle det risikobaserte tilsyn ved å benytte egne 
krefter….Nytt styringsverktøy skulle ikke fremstå som en revolusjon, og det som var bra med det tidligere 
tilsynsarbeidet skulle tas med i det nye opplegget” (ibid: 154-155).  
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Moreover, according to the chairman of the Banking Law Commission, it is often difficult 
to determine the exact understanding of the European financial framework at any time 
(Selvig 2002). Hence, interpretation of how SEM provisions should be understood 
becomes crucial when Norway is addressing pension and market-related reforms and 
changes. For financial industry, the frequent regulatory processes have implied great 
uncertainty about the development of the Norwegian risk regime. According to a financial 
industry informant, the Norwegian regulatory framework is very complex, stating that: 
“there is only a handful that can fully pledge that they obtain a comprehensive knowledge of the 
Norwegian regulatory framework on this issue” (comment by informant). In my pension fund 
inquiry 90 percent of the respondents agreed, wholly or in part, with the statement that 
“rules come so quickly that it is difficult to keep informed”. Moreover, 81 percent disagreed with 
the statement that “changes in rules and regulations are largely simple and clearly set out”. 
Compared to pension funds, life insurance companies might draw on larger judicial 
competencies, which enable them to better keep updated on the regulatory flow. But life 
insurers also acknowledge the complexity of the Norwegian regime, and that the 
continuously regulatory flow from Norwegian authorities curbs substantial competencies.  
 
Hence, it seems that SEM integration contributes to uncertainty rather than social 
learning and policy imitation to deal with uncertainty. The European debate on 
occupational pensions has until recently rarely been an issue in public and governmental 
papers, even though this has been on the agenda for almost two decades. Aspects of 
learning and policy imitation have arguably been more important among the Nordic 
countries than calling the European level into attention. 
5.4.5 Concluding remarks on idea-based adaptation 
Most welfare states today experience similar challenges when it comes to financial 
liberalisation and ageing of populations. This makes it difficult to distinguish between 
European impulses and demographic changes that encourage national pension reforms in 
similar patterns across Europe.  
 
                                                                                                                                             
121 Due to these developments on risk management supervision and techniques, Kredittilsynet now advocates a total abolishment 
of the investment ceilings in equities (Kredittilsynet 2006). The MoF (2006) takes however a more sceptical attitude to these 
aspects, which yet remain unclarified. 
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Increased cooperation and contact across national borders due to e.g. European 
integration have improved the opportunities for policy imitation and learning across 
borders concerning how to deal with these challenges. My analysis demonstrates however 
that the European orientation among key actors in the Norwegian regime have been 
rather modest compared with the expectations set forward. Most fund managers hold 
Norwegian authorities as their most important sources of information and few assign 
great significance to the SEM regime in asset allocation strategies, etc. Obviously 
technocratic learning across borders occurs. Much of risk management theory and 
techniques are not Norwegian innovations. However, I argue that the international 
networks in which such ideas and wisdom are spread, are by no means limited to 
European bodies. OECD, the World Bank, the Basle Committee, academic institutions, 
business networks, etc are also important agencies for the diffusion of ideas.  
 
Further, this analysis has illustrated that the Norwegian regime came into being almost a 
century ago. The consolidation of this regime, which is based on several domestic 
compromises, economic structures and considerations about fairness embedded in the 
Norwegian welfare state, has made any policy imitation difficult. Arguably, cross-border 
learning primarily proceeds as a process where welfare states evaluate other welfare states’ 
reform experiences and how these initiatives do not fit in the respective risk management 
regimes (Hagen 2003b: 19). In the processes of finding solutions to domestic challenges, 
the regime’s own experiences (both good and bad) are generally the ones considered 
mostly, which in turn form the basis of path dependence.    
5.5 SUMMARY – EUROPE MATTERS, BUT…. 
In this chapter I have examined continuity and change in the Norwegian regime for 
occupational pensions in the context of the incitements and constraints that European 
integration poses. The complex and multifaceted processes of Europeanisation have been 
revealed in this analysis. In order to make these processes more clear-cut I distinguished 
between a rule-based, an interest-based and an idea-based approach to examine 
Norwegian adaptation to European integration. 
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I have found examples on adaptational impact on all the three approaches. In contrast to 
many other European countries, which have kept fund management of occupational 
pensions under separate institutional arrangements, life insurance companies have a major 
role in the fund management of Norwegian occupational pensions. These institutions 
have been subject to EU regulations prior to Norwegian implementation of the EEA 
Agreement. Consequently, Norway has been exposed to integrative dynamics at an earlier 
stage on this issue than many other European countries, which first and foremost have 
faced these dynamics with the recent implementation of the pension fund directive.  
 
European integration has contributed to the frequent regulatory activities and 
amendments in Norwegian regulations. Lately, this has increasingly concerned changes on 
key aspects in the Norwegian regime. None of the adaptational processes have however 
produced constraints and incitements in such a manner that the hypotheses that I have 
set forward can be verified. It seems that the relative significance of the different variables 
varies both in relation to each other and over time. I find for example that the legal-
institutional pressures have grown in strength lately due to recent developments on the 
European level. Moreover, the data ascribe the least significance to idea-based adaptation. 
Interest-based adaptation gains first and foremost explanatory significance if put more 
broadly defined than to concern financial industry lobbying for improved terms of trade 
alone. I have found that government-driven adaptation to European integration might 
explain several changes related to both financial liberalisation and re-regulation. It should 
however also be noted that processes of liberalisation and re-regulation started in the late 
1980s, several years prior to the EEA implementation.  
 
To conclude, even though European integration matters, none of these adaptational 
processes can fully explain all the changes that have occurred. National authorities have in 
policy-making processes on these aspects rather attempted to manoeuvre between and 
balance several considerations and objectives related to e.g. demographic changes and 
how to make pensions sustainable, European integration, financial industry concerns, and 
other social political and economic aspects that interact with regime development. Some 
key empirical findings on these aspects are summarised in a matrix in chapter 6. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
“..regelverksutviklingen de siste tjue årene har vært særdeles krevende både for tilsynet og for 
finansbedriftene, med en nærmest total omskrivning av all lovgivning og regelverk på finansområdet. 
Dette har vært nødvendig først og fremst som følge av de stadige strømmen av de nye EU-direktiver, men 
også som følge av enkelte lovinitiativ ut fra rene nasjonale ønsker og behov, hovedsaklig innenfor området 
livsforsikring og pensjon” (Director Arne Skauge of FNH (2006: 170-171). 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The scope of this thesis has been to detect the European impact on a policy area, which 
once was a key element in the establishment of the Norwegian welfare state (pensions). 
National pension systems are usually categorised into three pillars; a public social security, 
occupational pension schemes and individual savings. In this thesis attention has been 
given to the impact of European financial integration on the Norwegian regime for 
occupational pensions. In Norway most occupational pensions are organised on funded 
basis, in contrast to public pensions that are tax-financed. When pensions are established 
on a funded basis, these are inherent to the risks of the capital markets.  How to ensure 
safe fund management and to deal with these markets risks is then crucial. 
 
The ambition for my work has been to provide new knowledge about the relation 
between Norwegian pensions and European capital markets. My research problem is 
consequently positioned in two large debates within political science; the relationship 
between states and markets on the one hand and the relationship between European and 
national policy-making on the other hand. Moreover, I have also called into attention the 
complexity of regulating financial markets in an era of globalisation. Issues related to 
which extent regulatory capacity remains on the financial area and which regulatory level 
that possesses these competencies have been illuminated. Modern welfare states have 
taken great interest in how capital markets are regulated and how pension systems are 
organised. This thesis has also addressed the different regulatory philosophies that prevail 
on this issue. Two divergent styles of regulation has been evident, one based on the 
prudent man principle, the other more paternalistic. These philosophies are related to the 
extent of ideological confidence in markets, but also how market norms are 
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institutionalised into rules and regulations. Finally, I have called into attention key aspects 
of pension reforms and how welfare states deal with the challenges (and risks) related to 
the ongoing demographic shift. The research question I set forward in chapter 1 was: 
To what extent have changes in the Norwegian risk management regime for occupational 
pensions implied a regime shift, and to what extent are these changes (if any) explained 
by constraints and incitements produced by European market integration? 
 
In Europe the debate on a pan-European regulatory regime for occupational pensions has 
been on the agenda for almost two decades. The European Commission has in particular 
advocated a pension regime based on a prudential framework. This has been regarded as 
important to complete the internal market (including to improve the free movement of 
capital, services and labour), to enhance economic growth and to make pensions 
sustainable. The Commission has faced substantial difficulties with achieving a political 
agreement at the European level on this issue. These difficulties are to a large extent 
explained with the substantial diversity that exists across Europe when it comes to 
pension system organisation, capital market regulation, taxation, supervision, etc. A 
pension fund directive was eventually adopted in 2003 and the European Commission has 
recently strengthened its judicial efforts in order to remove what it considers as 
discriminatory tax regulations on cross-border provision of supplementary pensions. 
 
The Norwegian welfare state has also taken great interest in how capital markets are 
regulated, and how pension systems are organised. Moreover, this form of welfare 
provision rests on long traditions. A Norwegian regime on occupational pensions came 
into force in the early 20th century, about 50 years prior to the establishment of the 
National Insurance Scheme. I have in this thesis argued that this regime at an early point 
of time took a national, paternalistic orientation. This regime proved to be stable for a 
long time and any substantial changes did not occur until the late 1980s. This enabled a 
regime institutionalisation where earning-related, insurance-based, defined benefit pension 
schemes became standardised. Only Norwegian life insurance companies and pension 
funds were made eligible to provide such pensions on a tax-deductible basis.  
 
Consequently, most occupational pension assets today are held in custody by life 
insurance companies and pension funds. The last decades there has been a considerable 
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growth of assets held in custody by these financial institutions. By the end of 2006 their 
assets accounted for about NOK 790 billion. These assets are mostly based on assets 
from occupational pension schemes. In comparison, equivalent numbers for 1980 was 
NOK 43 billion. How assets are invested, by whom these are managed, and in which 
framework benefits are embedded, should therefore be of increasing importance.  
6.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Since the late 1980s, there have been frequent and substantial regulatory activities in the 
Norwegian regime for occupational pensions. At the same time, European market 
integration has been extended and grown deeper. In accordance with my research 
question this analysis has been structured as followed; first I assessed if changes in the 
Norwegian risk management regime for occupational pensions have implied a regime 
shift, and thereafter I analysed what explanatory significance processes of European 
market integration have for any changes in the Norwegian regime.  
 
In order to enable a solid assessment of regime change (or denote any pattern of change) 
concerning how risk management regulation and market performance are carried out, I 
developed three dimensions which have helped me make this task achievable. These 
dimensions were related to how assets are invested (scope of assets), by whom these are 
managed (scope of access) and in which framework benefits are embedded (scope of 
authority). These were chosen with care as they indicate core policy fields of fund 
management for occupational pensions. They also relate to how different risks are dealt 
with and what risks are politically acceptable. I have argued that these three dimensions 
also allow me to analyse changes along the prudential-paternalism continuum. Moreover, 
processes of Europeanisation are complex and multi-faceted. In order to make these 
more clear-cut I have distinguished for analytical purposes between three different 
mechanisms of national adaptation to European integration; rule-based, interest-based 
and idea-based adaptations.  
 
Below this framework is structured into a matrix where some key empirical findings in my 
analysis are summarised. These findings should be related to the expectations that were 
developed in chapter 2 (expressed in italics below) in order to assess if changes have 
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moved in a prudential direction and to consider the significance of European market 
integration on the changes observed. 
Table 6.1 Matrix over theoretical framework and some key empirical findings 
 
Rule-based 
Changes have mainly occurred as a 
direct result of legal and institutional 




Changes have mainly occurred as a 
result of competitive dynamics introduced 
by the SEM, where a international 
oriented Norwegian financial industry 
has gained support for regulatory 
reforms 
Idea-based 
Changes have mainly occurred due to the 
impact of ideas embedded in the 




Scope of assets 
Norwegian portfolio 
regulation and  asset 
allocation has become more 
oriented towards risk 
diversification into European 














• Frequent re-regulatory activities in the 
1990s in order to implement 
minimum requirements on assets and 
investments set forward by the SEM-
regime. 
 
• These activities led to a more judicial 
detailed, complex and comprehensive 
framework for asset management. As 
a result, a new asset management 
regulation was implemented in 1997. 
 
• Quantitative restrictions for 
allocations in equities and abroad 
(currency-matching regulations) 
remain. A new asset management 
regulation is expected in 2008 that will 
lift the investment ceilings on equities 
substantially in accordance with the 
minimum requirements of the 
pension fund directive. 
 
In sum: 
Legal developments at the European 
level have so far not constituted a 
breach or substantial change on the 
scope of assets. A more prudential 
framework should however be expected 
when a new asset management 







• European market integration has led to 
increased competitive dynamics in the 
Norwegian regime for occupational 
pensions. Financial industry has lobbied 
for the liberalisation of equity ceilings. 
 
• Step-by-step liberalisation of equity 
ceilings in the 1990s primarily due to 
economy-based considerations to 
confront Norwegian industry’s demand 
for equity capital. 
 
• The EEA-adapted portfolio regulation 
for life insurers became applicable to 
pension funds in 1993, 10 years prior to 
the adoption of pension fund directive 
in the EU – Government-driven 
adaptation in order to establish a level 
playing field for domestic fund 
managers, which led to a liberalisation 
of investments for pension funds. 
 
• Any significant lobbying for increased 
asset allocation into international 
markets to diversify investments risks 
has not taken place. 
 
In sum: 
The general liberalisation of fund 
managers’ assets has mainly occurred due 
to a government-driven adaptation and 
due to strategic considerations about the 





• Principles of risk diversification 
implemented into Norwegian legislation 
in the late 1980s. Stress-tests 
increasingly applied recently to examine 
fund managers´ risk capacity in asset 
allocation. 
 
• Technocratic learning across borders on 
risk management occurs but this takes 
place in many international networks.  
  
• Many fund managers are rather 
pessimistically biased to the SEM 
significance for own asset management 
activities. A national orientation among 
fund managers has been revealed. 
 
• Even though investments into 
international markets have increased 
there seems to be a home-bias in asset 
allocation. Assets mostly allocated into 




The ideas and principles of risk 
management and increased exposure in 
international equities markets cannot be 
ascribed to European integration alone. 
Moreover, compared to the principles of 
risk diversification it seems yet to be a way 
to go before acting fully in accordance 




Scope of access 
Liberalisation of Norwegian 
licensing regulations and 
ownership legislation so that 
national borders are 
transparent and characterised 




• The EEA commitments about one 
single licence for life insurance 
companies were implemented in 1994. 
 
• The effects have been modest partly 
due to restrictions on nationality in 
tax provisions concerning who are 
eligible to provide tax-deductible 
pension schemes. 
 
• Lately, there has been a step-by-step 
liberalisation of tax provisions 
concerning eligibility of foreign fund 
managers due to legal processes at the 
European level (ECJ-rulings).  
 
• Compelled to replace ownership 
regulations that limited maximum 
• Any competitive disadvantages have not 
triggered strategies of exit and evasion 
among Norwegian fund managers. Due 
to the cross-national variance in 
pensions systems, fiscal regulations and 
life insurance legislation, occupational 
pensions have to a large extent been 
non-tradable services in real terms. 
 
• Concerns about foreign acquisitions 
have grown more prevalent, but mergers 
and acquisitions within life and pension 
insurance have mostly been carried out 
within Norwegian borders. 
 
In sum: 
Financial industry lobbying has been 
biased towards sustaining market shares 
• Changes the in principles for restricting 
tax-deductibility on occupational 
pensions to Norwegian-based providers 
– from putting emphasis on national 
paternalistic arguments to functional 
considerations about tax control. 
 
• A home-bias among fund managers 
remains concerning the purchase of 
asset management related services.   
 
In sum: 
Changes in the Norwegian regime must be 













ownership in a Norwegian financial 
institution to a 10 percent share, with 
a system of more approximate 
judgements. This occurred due to 
infringement procedures carried out 
by the ESA. 
 
In sum: 
Institutional pressures at the European 
level have increased the formal scope of 
access substantially, in particular during 
the last 5-6 years. The extent of 
transnational activities are however very 
modest.  
domestically rather than increase market 
opportunities internationally. National 
variations in fiscal provisions, insurance 
and pension legislation have put 















Scope of authority 
A few market-conform 
regulations has become more 
important than a regulatory 
framework that put emphasis 















• The organisation of occupational 
pensions remains within welfare 
states’ authority. This also concerns 
the social objectives that have to be 
attained in order to achieve tax-
deductibility, including respecting 
social and labour legislation and the 
outcomes of collective bargaining 
agreements. 
 
• The EU regulatory framework rests 
on the principle of home country 
control and implementation of some 
minimum requirements, e.g. 
concerning solvency requirements.   
 
• Norwegian authorities have on several 
issues implemented more strict (and 
extensive) regulations than laid down 
in EU-regulations. Hence, several 
special regulations persist due the role 
of fiscal provision and considerations 
about the general good (consumer 
protection, solidity of fund managers, 




The national scope of authority both on 
pensions and financial activities are 
more broadly defined than set forward 






• Considerable financial industry 
disapproval with the so-called 
Norwegian special regulations, which 
several have been established as a result 
government-driven adaptation, where 
minimum requirements have been 
implemented more strictly or broadly 
than set forward in the EU directives 
 
• Life insurance companies and pension 
funds have for example been subject to 
capital adequacy requirements set 
forward for banks and credit institutions
since the early 1990s. 
 
• Financial industry lobbying in the late 
1990s led to increased focus on fund 
managers’ terms of trade vis-à-vis 
international competitor and a new life 
insurance act is implemented. Several 
special regulations persist. Industry 
loyalty on these matters seems however 
to remain with national not European 
authorities. 
 
• Extension of social policy objectives has 
primarily occurred due to national 
strategic considerations, but elements of 
interest-based adaptation has also been 
prevalent, e.g. the case of gender and 
age neutral pensions. 
 
In sum: 
Several examples of re-regulation due to 
both European adaptation and other 
domestic concerns and objectives. 
 
 
• Few examples on policy imitation and 
cross-border learning concerning 
pension system organisation. It has 
however become more usual to consider 
the pensions system as three pillars. 
 
• Financial regulation and supervision 
became integrated in the late 1980s, 
This comprehensive framework was 
unprecedented in Europe. 
 
• Kredittilsynet has increasingly engaged 
in international activities at the EU level 
and elsewhere. This should encourage 
cross-border learning. When developing 
a risk-based supervision, however, own 
experiences and efforts were 
emphasised. 
 
• SEM integration has largely contributed 
to uncertainty and complexity about the 
policy development among key actors in 
the Norwegian regime.  
 
In sum: 
In the process of finding solutions to 
domestic challenges, the regime’s own 
experiences (good and bad) are generally 






A step-by-step liberalisation of portfolio regulation (scope of assets) and deregulation of 
licensing and ownership legislation (scope of access) have indicated a gradual move in 
prudential direction on these matters. The introduction of defined contribution pension 
schemes also represents a major liberalisation on risk management policies on pensions, 
as market risks are individualised in these schemes. A fully prudential framework is 
however yet to be implemented. Quantitative investment ceilings have remained on the 
traditional defined benefit pension schemes, while the actual scope of asset allocation and 
transnational activities performed by fund managers have been much more modest than 
expected. Moreover, there have been several examples of re-regulation to ensure and 
strengthen consumer protection, solidity and fund security on the on hand and to 
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maintain and extend the social principles embedded in the Norwegian regime on the 
other hand.  
 
In sum, the data I have observed for assessing regime change do not provide a clear-cut 
conclusion on this question. It seems that the Norwegian risk management regime for 
occupational pensions has increasingly emerged as a hybrid model, between paternalism 
and prudence, between continuity and change.    
 
European market integration has produced constraints and incitements for Norwegian 
authorities on several fund management issues. In contrast to many other European 
countries, which have kept fund management of occupational pensions under separate 
institutional arrangements, life insurance companies have a major role in the fund 
management of Norwegian occupational pensions. These institutions have been subject 
to EU regulations prior to Norwegian implementation of the EEA Agreement. 
Consequently, Norway has been exposed to integrative dynamics at an earlier stage on 
this issue than many other European countries, which first and foremost have faced these 
dynamics with the recent implementation of the pension fund directive. I have found 
examples on European impact on the Norwegian regime in all three mechanisms for 
national adaptation which have been analysed. None have however produced constraints 
and incitements in such a manner that the hypotheses that I have set forward can be 
verified.  
 
It seems that the relative significance of the different variables varies both on relations to 
each other and over time. I find for example that the legal-institutional pressures have 
grown in strength lately due to recent developments on the European level. Moreover, 
the data ascribe the least significance to idea-based adaptation. Interest-based adaptation 
gains first and foremost explanatory significance if put more broadly defined than to 
concern financial industry lobbying for improved terms of trade alone.  I have found that 
government-driven adaptation to European integration might explain several changes in 
the Norwegian regime. It should however also be noted that processes of liberalisation 
and re-regulation started in the late 1980s, several years prior to the EEA implementation. 
This is exemplified on all the tree scopes (assets, access and authority).  
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To conclude, even though European integration has produced constraints and 
incitements on the Norwegian regime, one cannot fully grasp the big picture of continuity 
and change unless a more broadly explanatory approach is chosen. National pension 
reforms and other policy objectives have been at least as important as European 
integration. In sum, national authorities have in policy-making processes on these aspects 
continuously attempted to manoeuvre between and balance several considerations and 
objectives related to e.g. demographic changes and how to make pensions sustainable, 
European integration, financial industry concerns and other social, political and economic 
aspects that interact with regime development. 
6.3 LESSONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The theme of this paper has been positioned between social policy (pensions) and 
Europeanisation of the welfare state, but where emphasis is put on financial markets and 
how to regulate these. With a few exceptions there has been a general lack of studies that 
focus on regimes for markets and finance and how states and markets interact on these 
matters. My study has been an empirical contribution to this research area and the key 
discourses that prevail in this context, cf. chapter 1.2. 
 
Firstly, contrary to the vast amount of statements on the state-markets issues, where a 
general claim is that more markets imply less politics, this thesis demonstrates a more 
profound relationship between states and markets. I find that public authorities in many 
cases have induced financial liberalisation in order to achieve key economic, social and 
political objectives. Hence, freer markets have occurred a result of state-driven policy-
making. At the same time, processes of financial liberalisation and re-regulation have 
proceeded combined during the last decades. Re-regulation has consequently been a state 
response to financial liberalisation and to cope with the challenges related to increased 
market exposure. Scholars of political science should in the future therefore to a larger 
extent look into the complementarities of state and markets and how market behaviour is 
shaped by public regulation and policy-making. 
Secondly, this thesis has provided new knowledge about the relationship between 
Norwegian pensions and European capital markets. In general, the authority of social policies 
 120
Norwegian pensions and European markets 
rests within the national domain, while market-making rests within the domain of the EU. 
Occupational pensions, which are important for both welfare states´ pension systems and 
European markets, have however been a contested issue between these levels. Recently, 
several ECJ decisions have challenged welfare states´ autonomy on taxation and social 
policy  issues. Future research on social policy should therefore focus on the legal and 
judical development in the EU and how this affects welfare states´ welfare provision.  
 
At the same time, this thesis has illustrated that even though the EU has established 
considerable regulatory competencies on the financial area, it seems that there still 
remains a considerable scope of national manoeuvrability. This has to some extent caused 
domestic adaptation with national colours and elements of path dependence in the 
Norwegian financial regulation (so-called Norwegian special regulations). Studies that 
examine the impact of Europeanisation on the nation state should consequently put 
emphasis on a more broadly defined approach than changes in national jurisdiction due to 
implementation of EU directives. Examining continuity and change in the public-private 
mix should also call into attention the constraints and incitements embedded in the 
national regime and how these interact with the constraints and incitements at the EU 
level. This concerns in particular to what extent national institutions such as the Banking 
Law Commission transpose special interests and ideas into policy preferences.  
 
Thirdly, since the late 1980s the national abdication on the financial area has to a large extent 
been taken for granted by many scholars due to processes of globalisation and financial 
liberalisation. An almost unison conviction has been evident, stating that capital is global, 
that financial institutions operate on a transnational basis, and that nation states 
experience reduced capacity to enforce social regulations on the financial area. Based on 
the findings in this case study on the Norwegian pension industry this general conviction 
should be modified substantially. The EU initiatives on this area indicate that Norway is 
not a deviant case on these matters. As this industry has a growing importance in global 
finance, scholars should consequently take the growing pension fund industry into 
account before making their conclusions on the globalisation thesis. 
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Fourthly, this thesis indicates that different regimes are characterised by different regulatory 
philosophies. These philosophies are obviously related to the extent of a fundamental 
ideological confidence in the markets. As illustrated in this context, the regulatory 
philosophy is also closely related to how welfare states organise its risk management 
systems. Hence, different regulatory philosophies largely define the conditions under 
which the transaction occur and shape market behaviour. In order to address what market 
risks that are political acceptable, future research should address how and what kind of 
market norms that are institutionalised into rules and regulations. This would be of 
particular importance in reform periods, when financial liberalisation and re-regulation 
could be understood as a re-organisation of welfare states´ risk management systems.  
 
Finally, this thesis has addressed key aspects of pension reforms and how welfare states deal 
with the challenges (and risks) related to the ongoing demographic shift. A key objective 
is how to make pensions sustainable. In countries such as Norway and Sweden the 
national reforms in first pillar social security pensions are now to a large extent adopted. 
It remains however unclarified how the regime for second pillar occupational pensions 
should be accommodated to social security. A key objective on the political agenda is to 
make second pillar pensions complementary with a modernised social security. Increased 
reliance on markets puts less stress on public expenditure for future welfare provision and 
reduces the political risks related to the maintenance of fiscal budgets. The risks would 
then become increasingly related to the returns of the markets. Future research should 
consequently take into consideration how increased market-reliance and the 
individualisation of market risks affect future welfare provisions (distribution of costs and 
income) between different social and economic actors. Who wins and who loses would 
apparently have political implications, perhaps also for the Norwegian social model. 
 
When accounting for these lessons it seems however that the challenges of the twin 
pressure (characterised by financial liberalisation and demographic shift) that most welfare 
states experience today  are closely inter-related and also appear as a part of the solution 
to the problems caused by the ageing populations. 
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APPENDIX 1 – PENSION FUND INQUIRY 
 
Vi ber Dem markere svarene Deres med ett kryss i de aktuelle svarkategoriene, om annet ikke er 
nevnt.122 
 
1) I hvilken grad opplever De at norske myndigheter dekker Deres informasjonsbehov om nytt 
regelverk vedrørende pensjonskassens virksomhet? 
 
 Svært godt Bra Passe Dårlig Svært dårlig Usikker Missing 
Norske regler 7,7 44,2 28,8 19,2 0 0 0 
EU-/EØS-regler 1,9 5,8 19,2 26,9 28,8 11,5 5,8 
 
2) Vi vil også gjerne vite om hvilke andre informasjonskilder De benytter. 
 
 Ofte Av og til Sjelden Aldri Missing
Offentlige myndigheter (Kredittilsynet, Finansdepartementet, osv) 69,2 28,8 1,9 0 0 
Norske bransjetidsskrifter/- litteratur 21,2 38,5 32,7 5,8 1,9 
Norske interesseorganisasjoner 34,6 40,4 13,5 9,6 1,9 
Kontakt med norske private aktører (f.eks kolleger og venner) 38,5 36,5 21,2 3,8 0 
EU-/EØS-organer og institusjoner 0 3,8 19,2 73,1 3,8 
Utenlandske bransjetidsskrifter/ -litteratur 1,9 5,8 42,3 46,2 3,8 
Utenlandske interesseorganisasjoner 0 3,8 9,6 82,7 3,8 
Kontakt med utenlandske private aktører 0 9,6 9,6 78,8 1,9 
 
3) Hvilke av disse informasjonskildene oppfatter De som viktigst? Marker den viktigste med 1. 
Marker den nest viktigste med 2, og eventuelt den tredje viktigste med 3. 
 
 Rangering Missing 
Offentlige myndigheter (Kredittilsynet, Finansdepartementet, osv) 1=84,6/ 2=9,6 1,9 
Norske bransjetidsskrifter/- litteratur 3=25,0/ 4=15,4 44,2 
Norske interesseorganisasjoner 2=53,8/ 3=17,3 17,3 
Kontakt med norske private aktører (f.eks kolleger og venner) 2=26,9/ 3=28,8 28,8 
EU-/EØS-organer og institusjoner 5=3,8/ 6=5,8 86,5 
Utenlandske bransjetidsskrifter/ -litteratur 6=5,8/ 7=3,8 84,6 
Utenlandske interesseorganisasjoner 5=5,8/ 7=3,8 86,5 
Kontakt med utenlandske private aktører 3=5,8/ 8=5,8 82,7 
 
4) I løpet av de siste årene har det kommet flere endringer i regelverket for bedriftspensjoner og 
pensjonskasser. I hvilken grad er De enig i følgende påstander? 
 
 Helt enig Delvis enig Uenig Usikker Missing 
Reglene kommer så fort at det er vanskelig å 
være oppdatert 
44,2 46,2 9,6 0 0 
Regelendringene er stort sett enkle og 
oversiktlige 
0 15,4 82,7 1,9 0 
                                              
122 Fordelingene er gjengitt i prosent. 
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5) EU-kommisjonen la i oktober 2000 frem et forslag om nytt regelverk for pensjonskassers 
virksomhet. Dette vil bli en del av EØS-avtalen dersom det blir vedtatt. I hvilken grad opplever 
De at norske myndigheter har informert om dette direktivet? 
 
I stor grad Nokså stor grad Mindre grad Liten grad Usikker Missing 
0 1,9 21,2 73,1 3,8 0 
 
6) Opplever De at dette direktivet vil ha betydning for Deres virksomhet? 
 
I stor grad Nokså stor grad Mindre grad Liten grad Usikker Missing 
7,7 15,4 21,2 5,8 50,0 0 
 
7) Blant noen medlemsland er det motstand mot felles EU-regler for pensjonskasser. I hvilken 
grad vil De si at De kjenner til denne debatten? 
 
I stor grad Nokså stor grad Mindre grad Liten grad Ukjent Missing 
0 3,8 11,5 42,3 40,4 1,9 
 
8) Gjennom EØS-avtalen gjelder reglene for det indre kapitalmarkedet også for Norge. Hvilken 
betydning har dette for Deres virksomhet? 
 
 Stor grad Viss grad Liten grad Usikker Missing 
Et større tilfavn av plasseringsmuligheter 13,5 42,3 25,0 15,4 3,8 
Lavere langsiktig risiko ved utlandsplasseringer 11,5 46,2 19,2 19,2 3,8 
Bedre forventet avkastning 5,8 40,4 26,9 23,1 3,8 
Mindre usikkerhet rundt norske særregler 13,5 25,0 25,0 32,7 3,8 
Økt konkurranse om aktuar- og plasseringstjenester 7,7 23,1 46,2 19,2 3,8 
Økende problemer med manglende informasjon 19,2 34,6 21,2 21,2 3,8 
Endret investeringsstrategi for vår pensjonskasse 5,8 21,2 51,9 17,3 3,8 
 
9) Har det vært diskutert å flytte pensjonskassen til et annet EØS-land?  
 
Nei 100 
Ja, for å komme inn under et mer fordelaktig regelverk 0 
Ja, andre grunner 0 
 
10) Til slutt følger noen spørsmål om pensjonskassen. Først, hvor gammel er pensjonskassen? 
 
Antall år Gjennomsnitt på 44 år Missing=1 
 
11) Kan De angi pensjonskassens samlede forvaltningskapital (gi et anslag avrundet til nærmeste 
10 millioner kroner)?  
 
Beløp  SUM=50.5 mrd = 990 mill i gjennomsnitt Missing=1 
 
12) Hvordan foregår forvaltningen av pensjonskassens midler? 
 
Kjøper alle tjenestene av 
eksterne forvaltere 
Kjøper noen tjenester 
eksternt 
Forvalter alt selv Missing 
38,5 32,7 26,9 1,9 
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13) Har det etter Deres oppfatning skjedd større endringer i investeringsstrategien til 
pensjonskassen de siste fem årene? 
 
Nei 13,5 
Ja, noen få endringer av mindre betydning 46,2 
Ja, hyppige og relativt omfattende endringer 40,4 
 
14) I hvor stor grad kjøper pensjonskassen eksterne finansielle og juridiske tjenester som ledd 
iden løpende virksomheten? 
 
 I stor grad Nokså stor 
grad 
Liten grad Usikker Missing 
Fra hovedsakelig norske forbindelser 38,5 28,8 30,8 0 1,9 
Fra hovedsakelig utenlandske firmaer 0 1,9 55,8 5,8 36,5 
 
15) I hvilken grad deltar medlemmene (fagorganisasjonene, etc.) i beslutninger om forvaltning av 
pensjonskapital? 
 
Høy grad Noen grad Liten grad Aldri Missing 
17,3 34,6 32,7 15,4 0 
 
15) Kan De angi den omtrentlige andelen (i %) av ulike plasseringer nå?  
 
Bankinnskudd Obligasjoner Aksjer/aksjefond Utlån Fast eiendom Missing 
14,5 54,9 20,9 8,2 1,5 2 stk 
 
16) Hvordan vil De karakterisere pensjonskassens investeringer i aksjer de siste fem årene?  
 
 Økt betydelig Økt 
Moderat 
Uendret Sunket Missing 
Andelen plassert i norske selskaper har 7,7 48,1 19,2 21,2 3,8 
Andelen plassert i utenlandske selskaper har 34,6 36,5 19,2 3,8 5,8 
 
17) Helt til slutt vil vi be Dem angi hvordan de ulike plasseringsformene er geografisk fordelt. Vi 
spør kun om omtrentlige andeler (i %).123 
 
 Norge Norden Andre EU-land Andre land 
Bankinnskudd     
Obligasjoner     
Aksjer/aksjefond     
Utlån     






                                              
123 Mangelfulle og ufullstendige svar medførte vanskeligheter med å gjengi valide svar på dette spørsmålet. 
